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WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications
Report

WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications

A groundbreaking report details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

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By Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton
Published on Jan 8, 2004

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Table 6. Summary: Missile and Delivery SystemAppendicesNotesFull Text (PDF)Guide to Key Findings and Summary of RecomendationChapter I: IntroductionChapter II: Iraq's WMD CapabilitiesChapter III: Findings and RecomendationsTable of ContentsTable 1. Summary of WMD Search TeamsTable 2. Key NIE DissentsTable 3. Summary of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon ProgramTable 4. Summary of Iraq's Chemical Weapon ProgramTable 5. Summary of Iraq's Biological Weapon ProgrTranscript: Authors present findings

Summary
This new study details what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process.

The report distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and what is now known about Iraq's programs.

Click on the link above for full text or the links to the right for specific sections of this Carnegie report.

About the Authors
Joseph Cirincione is a senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation Project. Jessica T. Mathews is president and George Perkovich is vice president for studies of the Carnegie Endowment. Alexis Orton is a Junior Fellow with the Non-Proliferation Project.

This is a web-only publication.

Authors

Joseph Cirincione
Former Senior Associate, Director for NonProliferation
Joseph Cirincione
Jessica Tuchman Mathews
Distinguished Fellow
Jessica Tuchman Mathews
George Perkovich
Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow
George Perkovich
with Alexis Orton
Middle EastIranIraqSecurityNuclear PolicyNuclear Energy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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