In any defense establishment, change is an ongoing process. However, despite the best of intentions, existing bureaucracies, bound by habit and years of socialization, have their limits in implementing transformative change.
Anit Mukherjee
{
"authors": [],
"type": "pressRelease",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "MEP",
"programs": [
"Middle East"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North Africa",
"Algeria"
],
"topics": [
"Security"
]
}REQUIRED IMAGE
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—an Algerian jihadi group that pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2006—garnered worldwide media exposure after simultaneous attacks in December 2007 on the UN building and the Constitutional Court in Algiers. AQIM, however, has not been able to sustain this level of violence and failed to transform itself into a North Africa-wide organization.
WASHINGTON, Dec 1—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—an Algerian jihadi group that pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2006—garnered worldwide media exposure after simultaneous attacks in December 2007 on the United Nations building and the Constitutional Court in Algiers. AQIM, however, has not been able to sustain this level of violence and failed to transform itself into a North Africa-wide organization, contends a new paper by Jean-Pierre Filiu.
AQIM’s global aims have been thwarted by the Algerian government’s more effective military strategy and the collapse of al-Qaeda in Iraq—the conflict in Iraq helped attract followers. Violent incidents fell from 200 in 2007 to below 150 in 2008. Still, the danger of terrorism in the region is real and considerable attention should be devoted to North Africa and the Sahel.
Methods to contain and ultimately eradicate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb:
“AQIM is deeply rooted in Algeria’s recent history of violence and strife, but the organization’s heavy legacy limits its global potential,” says Filiu. “The security paradox posed by AQIM is that its inability to project its ‘global’ terror beyond Africa intensifies the pressures from al-Qaeda central to achieve such a breakthrough and to force the Algerian jihadi leadership to live up to this commitment.”
###
NOTES
Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
In any defense establishment, change is an ongoing process. However, despite the best of intentions, existing bureaucracies, bound by habit and years of socialization, have their limits in implementing transformative change.
Anit Mukherjee
After the chill in ties between 2020 and 2024 that brought India–China relations to their lowest point in several decades, the two countries have engaged each other afresh. This paper argues that there are predominantly four imperatives guiding India’s approach to China, and they exist in an order of priority.
Saheb Singh Chadha
A partnership between India, a country of subcontinental size, and Africa, a continent of fifty-four countries, may seem asymmetric until one notes that both are home to nearly the same number of people—1.4 billion. This essay spells out the existing challenges to the partnership, its optimal potential, and the possible pathways to realize it over the next quarter-century.
Rajiv Bhatia
This piece argues that the present Indian strategy, based on opportunistic diversification and utilization of limited strategic reserves, remains inadequate when confronting supply disruptions. It evaluates India’s options in the short, medium, and long terms.
Vrinda Sahai
This piece examines India’s response to U.S. sanctions and tariffs, specifically assessing the immediate market consequences, such as alterations in import costs, and the broader strategic implications for India’s energy security and foreign policy orientation.
Vrinda Sahai