Commentary
Amr Hamzawy
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Source: Getty
In The Media
How Arab Governments Resist the Trend to Democracy
The current regimes in the Arab world are resisting democratic change because of firm security measures maintaining the status quo and ineffective, incapable, and insular opposition movements.
By Amr Hamzawy
Published on Aug 20, 2010
Source: U.S.News and World Report
While authoritarian governments facing similar circumstances have toppled elsewhere—as we saw in Ghana and Indonesia—the Arab world is different. Some observers suggest its cultural and religious values are responsible. But this is simply not the case. In fact, several unique features hinder reform and block the democratic progress that the United States and Europe desires.
First, Arab governments have poured even more money into security in recent years. This spending not only includes monitoring and punishing the opposition using traditional methods, but also exerting pressure on civil organizations and the media and even changing the composition of electoral districts. All of these efforts make it harder for citizens to organize and confront the hugely powerful regimes.
But should signs of protest arise, the regimes have no qualms using violence to squelch them. While a number of nonstate actors carry out threats of violence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, the power of repression resides exclusively with the authoritarian governments in most other Arab countries. The use of violence ranges from intimidation to torture to, ultimately, murder.
Second, ruling regimes also squash reform by warning citizens that any demand for change will threaten order and stability and unleash chaos. Despite spontaneous protests increasingly seen throughout the Arab world in recent years, the government's message—delivered largely by religious institutions and the media—has sufficiently scared people from pursuing the kind of organized, sustained activity that could bring about real change.
Third, while the elites rule with an iron fist, the resistance responds with kid gloves. Opposition leaders have failed to develop a serious message and platform about what kind of change is possible. This lack of leadership does little to reassure an anxious public that the opposition will not make an already bad situation worse.
Fourth, change is unlikely to come from Islamist movements either. Although these forces have sparked excitement in Arab politics, their leaders are more interested in pursuing an ideological and religious agenda than in forging compromises with the regimes to improve people's lives.
And fifth, a small group of individuals who form close alliances based on their common interests are leading these regimes. By banding together, these Arab elites limit the possibility of internal conflicts that led to the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe.
The limited number of powerful families in Arab countries also makes disagreements unlikely. Each family can be represented in the cabinet or in important security positions, as we see in Jordan. Prominent figures, such as those in Egypt and Morocco, can exercise uninterrupted control for decades at a time. Although some Arab elites have cracked open the doors of their regimes to small groups of businessmen, they have not—and do not plan to—fully integrate these outsiders anytime soon.
While some ruling elites want to promote ideas like rationality, negotiation, and peaceful settlements—ideas the United States and Europe welcome—others align themselves with non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. It is this latter group—which calls for waging jihad on the United States and Israel—that creates immediate policy implications for Washington.
The West needs to act in defense of democracy in the Arab world. It's critical for its interests in the Middle East peace process, Iraq, Egypt, and Yemen as democracy is the only sustained path for development, moderation, and peace. The United States and its European allies should make democracy and human rights integral parts of bilateral diplomacy, condition aid packages and trade relations on improvements in these policies, publicly condemn abuses, and closely monitor elections.
Even as they lose their legitimacy amid deteriorating social conditions Arab governments will remain secure. And the West will face few options for achieving its security objectives in the region without change. Until then, the stalemate continues.
About the Author
Amr Hamzawy
Director, Middle East Program
Amr Hamzawy is a senior fellow and the director of the Carnegie Middle East Program. His research and writings focus on Egypt’s and other middle powers’ involvement in regional security in the Middle East, particularly through collective diplomacy and multilateral conflict resolution
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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