Commentary
Katherine Charlet, Danielle Citron
{
"authors": [
"Katherine Charlet"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "TIA",
"programs": [
"Technology and International Affairs"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"Russia",
"Iran"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Foreign Policy",
"Technology"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
Sanctions Announcement Reveals Hacks of U.S. Critical Infrastructure
One genuine piece of news behind the U.S. sanctions against Russian individuals and organizations is the attribution to Russia of a hacking campaign that has targeted critical U.S. infrastructure.
Published on Mar 16, 2018
Source: Axios
One genuine piece of news behind the U.S. sanctions against Russian individuals and organizations is the attribution to Russia of a cyberhacking campaign that has targeted critical U.S. infrastructure.
The details: Per the Treasury Department’s statement, “Since at least March 2016, Russian government cyber actors have also targeted … the energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and critical manufacturing sectors.”
The Department of Homeland Security has previously reported on cyber intrusions into critical infrastructure but has only identified an “Advanced Persistent Threat” without pointing the finger at a suspected culprit. In a move surely coordinated with Treasury’s announcement, the DHS updated its alert to note the Russian attribution and describe a “multi-stage campaign” into energy sector networks that included collection of “information pertaining to Industrial Control Systems.”
Why it matters: This attribution reinforces the need to secure critical infrastructure and continues a series of actions that have picked up steam since Homeland Security Advisor Tom Bossert told an audience last June that the U.S. government would “call out bad behavior and impose costs on our adversaries.” These include removal of Kaspersky from U.S. government systems, special counsel indictments,naming-and-shaming of Russia for the NotPetya attacks and this week’s sanctions and attribution.
What's next: These moves aren’t yet enough to stop Russia’s bad behavior. But it’s hard to imagine matters ending here.
About the Author
Katherine Charlet
Former Director, Technology and International Affairs Program
Katherine Charlet was the inaugural director of Carnegie’s Technology and International Affairs Program.
- Campaigns Must Prepare for Deepfakes: This Is What Their Plan Should Look Like
- What the Machine Learning Value Chain Means for GeopoliticsArticle
- +3
Charlotte Stanton, Vivien Lung, Nancy (Hanzhuo) Zhang, …
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
- Hezbollah’s Wartime StrategyCommentary
The party’s objectives involve tying together the Lebanese and Iranian fronts, while surviving militarily and politically at home.
Mohamad Fawaz
- Iran Rewrites Its War StrategyCommentary
In an interview, Hamidreza Azizi discusses how Tehran has adapted in real time to the conflict with the United States and Israel.
Michael Young
- Trump’s Plan for Gaza Is Not Irrelevant. It’s Worse.Commentary
The simple conclusion is that the scheme will bring neither peace nor prosperity, but will institutionalize devastation.
Nathan J. Brown
- What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?Commentary
In an interview, Roger Diwan discusses where the global economy may be going in the third week of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.
Nur Arafeh
- Tehran’s Easy TargetsCommentary
In an interview, Andrew Leber discusses the impact the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran is having on Arab Gulf states.
Michael Young
