The India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, under which the U.S. would provide civilian nuclear technology to India, overturning decades of U.S. policy and marking a turning point in the evolution of the U.S.-India relationship, has faltered close to fruition. Even as a new counter-offensive has been launched to push through the deal during the lame duck session of the Senate in November, proponents of the deal are disappointed, and even slightly frustrated, that the Senate did not take up the bill in its recently concluded session.

 

Adding to their discomfort is North Korea’s recent nuclear test. North Korea’s test is likely to place the India-U.S. nuclear deal debate more firmly within the context of increasing proliferation in the world, instead of in the narrative about strengthening the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India. The test has strengthened the voice of the critics of the India-U.S. nuclear deal.

 

The Indian government has not given up hope. It seems to be developing a multi-pronged strategy to counter the growing opposition and unexpected obstacles for a deal that many consider is largely favorable to the Indians.

 

Firstly, even as they have criticized the DPRK for the nuclear test, Indian officials have sought to prevent India from being clubbed with North Korea on non-proliferation matters. They see two key distinctions between the North Korean and Indian nuclear programs. One, they have highlighted the role of clandestine proliferation and Pakistan’s assistance in the North Korean test while emphasizing India’s own clean, transparent record on proliferation matters.

 

Two, they have emphasized that the North Korean nuclear test cannot and should not be compared to the Indian tests in 1998. They point out that India never signed the NPT nor violated any safeguards, whereas North Korea, having accepted “safeguards in perpetuity” as a signatory of the NPT, has violated its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

 

India can also argue that the DPRK test has in fact increased the strategic need for a nuclear India to be brought within the international non-proliferation framework. Proponents of the deal have long argued that ensuring India is included as a partner in non-proliferation efforts rather than being treated as a nuclear pariah would help build an effective non-proliferation regime based on ground realities.

 

Critics contend that India should not be rewarded so highly for doing what responsible nuclear powers should do anyway. They also maintain that if the deal went through, North Korea (and possibly Iran, among others) would expect that it might also be able to get rid of its pariah status if it could bear the initial brunt of sanctions in the aftermath of its nuclear tests. It is these critics who need to be convinced- not ignored- and therefore it would be unwise for India to be relieved simply because of statements emanating from the Bush administration that India and North Korea cannot be equated.   

 

There might be a silver lining for the Indian government in the timing of North Korea’s test. Coming over a month before the lame duck session of the Congress, the test has given India a month to make sure that it is not clubbed with North Korea on non-proliferation issues. If the test had occurred while the India-US nuclear deal was being debated in the Senate or in the week before the voting, India might have been hard-pressed to do damage control.

 

The Indian lobby and the PR firms hired by the India and other US business groups are leaving no stone unturned. This is not surprising because by some accounts, the stakes are as high as $80-100 billion for U.S. businesses. This is also being seen as a litmus test for the Indian American lobby, especially since their influence over legislators is likely to be diminished in the post-elections period.

 

Amidst the vagaries of the U.S. legislative process, if the bill doesn’t get taken up in November, then it will be back to square one. The bill would have to then go through the entire process again, starting with the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. This is something India definitely wants to avoid. Given the fact that the Democrats might gain control of the House and maybe even the Senate after the November elections, the pro-Indian lobby is likely to target its efforts towards key Democrats including Senate Minority Leader, Harry Reid, in addition to convincing the Republican Majority Leader, Bill Frist, to ensure that the Bill gets taken up in November.

 

The Democrats, who wanted to introduce 19 amendments to the Bill in the last session, are attempting to push for a deal that ensures U.S. interests and extracts certain assurances from India. Assuming the Bill does get taken up in November, the Bill might still only be approved with some potential “deal-breakers” such as Sections 106-108 of S. 3709 that deal with prohibition of certain exports and re-exports and end-use monitoring. Along with these conditions, the Indian government is also hoping that the Bush administration will be able to get certain provisions, especially those related to the termination and prohibition of nuclear transfers to India as outlined in HR 5682, amended in the House-Senate Conference.

 

If that does not happen, then the ball would be placed in India’s court. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh might be forced to pull out from the deal, given the promises extracted from him by domestic opposition parties and the scientific community that the final deal would adhere strictly to the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements.

 

Though backing out of the deal is an option, it is probably not India’s best option. A nuclear cooperation deal will be better than no deal, because it could open up the arena for similar, probably less restrictive deals between India and other NSG member countries. If the NSG alters its rules, following the India-U.S. deal, it will allow countries like France and Russia to offer India the latest civilian nuclear energy technology along with countries like South Africa that could then provide it with nuclear fuel supplies.

 

Much will now depend on how well India is able to lobby in Washington on two counts: getting the bill on the agenda in November and negotiating successfully on potential “deal-breakers,” while diplomatically staving off any attempts at linkages with the North Korean issue. They will be assisted by the US business lobby which, afraid of losing the “India opportunity” to their European counterparts, will be pushing aggressively for the deal to go through next month in a mutually acceptable form.

Anirudh Suri is a Junior Fellow with the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment.