For those who have been watching attentively the developments in North Caucasus over the last several months it looks like something serious is about to happen there soon. Intensified clashes in Chechnya and the conflict between Chechnya and Ingushetia over territory, continuing killings of policemen in Dagestan, Doku Umarov’s appeal to foil Sochi Olympics by all means, and finally the anti-Chechen rallies in Pugachev in the Saratov Oblast in southern Russia after a murder of a former paratrooper committed there by an ethnically Chechen teenager.
The problem is not so much connected with any specific fatal mistakes that the Kremlin might have committed recently. It is rather a cumulative effect of numerous small mistakes made in past or inaction when action was needed, as well as the lack of a distinct strategy. The time has now come to pay the bills.
There is a whole range of serious risks in connection with Sochi-2014 Olympics, both in the run-up to and in the wake of the Olympics. First and foremost there is the risk of terrorist attacks, with the stakes running higher—both for the terrorists and for the Kremlin, the closer the Sochi-2014 Olympics approach. Second, there is the risk of escalation of conflicts connected with Chechen leader Kadyrov who understands perfectly well that after the Olympics he will have much less leverage and is ready to try to get as much as possible now, when the Kremlin depends on him as a guarantor of security. Third, there are risks of a political destabilization in Caucasian republics after the Olympics, when financing of ethnic-clan elites for the purpose of buying their loyalty (in particular through the economically dubious project The Resorts of the North Caucasus) will inevitably decrease. Finally, there understandably exist post-Olympic risks in the Krasnodar Krai, connected with blamestorming and repairing the damage.
The general trend toward decentralization which will shape Russia’s development in coming years will also play a role. The Kremlin, which was not constructing federalism when being in a strong position during the fat years, will be forced to deal with regionalization while finding itself in a weak position now. The problem is aggravated by the fact that regional elites have degraded compared to 1990s.
How can the Kremlin counter these risks? There is either expensive or cheap populism in its arsenal, meaning in the first case increasing pensions, salaries, etc., or, in the second case, indulging the undeveloped tastes, whether it be promoting the “right” faith or speculating on orphans. The proportion will change in favor of cheap populism as the Kremlin runs out of money.
This is turning “managed democracy” promoted by the Kremlin into ochlocracy managing the Kremlin.
Putin finds himself in need of sacrificing his strategic goals in favor of tactical considerations. A telling example of this is the issue of Eurasian integration which is being sacrificed to meet anti-immigrant feelings. The Caucasus which, as the nationalist slogan goes, Russia “should stop feeding” is next in line. Rather than becoming an empire builder Putin increasingly moves in the direction of a national state, a trend which in the case of multinational Russia can cause huge damage, especially in the Caucasus.
The very idea to separate the Caucasus from Russia which seemed exotic a while ago, gets increasingly more supporters, not as much in the Caucasus as in the rest of the country.
The failure of Putin’s Eurasian strategy will mean the failure of Caucasus strategy as well, if one can speak about such a strategy. Foreign policy factors will contribute to this, and primarily not even the drastic worsening of relations with Georgia in the aftermath of the five-day Russian-Georgian war of 2008, but the consequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia which created an insurmountable barrier for improving these relations.
Nikolay Petrov is a professor at the Higher School of Economics.