New Leader, New Approach to China?

Over the past three years, Southeast Asia has witnessed a series of important leadership transitions. How will these new leaders approach China and how will they differ from their predecessors? Will the leadership change lead to closer or more distant relations with China? In this “China Through a SEA Lens” survey, Carnegie China asked scholars from seven different Southeast Asian countries for their views.

Philippines

Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby
Nonresident scholar, Carnegie China

On the campaign trail leading to the 2022 national elections, there were indications that Ferdinand Marcos Jr. would maintain continuity with then president Rodrigo Duterte’s policies. Not only was Duterte’s daughter, Sara, on the ticket as Marcos’s vice president, but Marcos was willing to meet with China’s ambassador to the Philippines, Huang Xilian, in October 2021, during his presidential bid. Once inaugurated, President Marcos visited Beijing in January 2023, suggesting that he intended to maintain Duterte’s pivot to China. 

However, China’s continued occupation of the West Philippine Sea and an intensification of Chinese gray-zone operations throughout 2023 prompted Marcos to diversify the country’s international relations. Incidents in the West Philippine Sea—including the Chinese Coast Guard pointing a military-grade laser at the Philippine Coast Guard, using water cannons to deter the Philippines’ routine and resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal, and relying on the Chinese maritime militia to chase Filipino fishers away from their traditional fishing grounds—heightened tensions between the two countries.

To safeguard the Philippines’ national interests in the face of threats to its sovereign and territorial integrity in the West Philippine Sea, Marcos reinvigorated the country’s long-standing alliance with the United States. For instance, the allies identified new sites in April 2023 to expand the scope and coverage of the 2014 Enhanced Cooperation Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA). Joint military exercises, like the annual Balikatan drills, and security cooperation with like-minded states have contributed to the Philippines’ goal of harnessing an independent foreign policy and completing the modernization of its armed forces.  

Marcos has successfully reintroduced the Philippines to the international community—a move in stark contrast to his predecessor’s path of isolation. In conducting state and official visits to other countries, Marcos has reached out to partners and demonstrated the Philippines’ resolve to be seen as a credible and responsible member of the international community. From 2016 to 2022, by contrast, former president Duterte focused primarily on domestic initiatives: the so-called war on drugs, a campaign pledge to rid the country of crime and corruption, and his flagship infrastructure program. In the face of widespread criticism related to human rights violations arising from the war on drugs, Duterte found an ally in Chinese President Xi Jinping, who supported Duterte’s “Build, Build, Build” program. In exchange, the Philippines downplayed China’s incursions into the West Philippine Sea. Duterte was also responsible for jump-starting the abrogation of the EDCA, which challenged the very foundation of the Philippine-U.S. alliance. In response to international criticism of Duterte’s drug war policies, he withdrew the Philippines from the International Criminal Court. 

Under Duterte, the Philippines turned inward; China was its only window—or bridge—to the outside world. Conversely, Marcos has pursued a more outward orientation and leveraged international partnerships beyond China. 

Malaysia

Cheng-Chwee Kuik
Nonresident scholar, Carnegie China

Anwar Ibrahim was sworn in as Malaysia’s tenth prime minister in November 2022. Under his leadership, Malaysia has viewed China positively and taken steps on several fronts to develop closer relations with Beijing. In late March 2023, four months into his premiership, Anwar flew to Hainan to address the Boao Forum for Asia before arriving in Beijing for bilateral exchanges. In September, he made another visit to China, this time to Nanning, to attend an annual event for cooperation between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the China-ASEAN Expo. The two visits were driven primarily by diplomatic and economic imperatives: maximizing high-level leader interactions and securing billion-dollar business deals.

During both visits, Anwar spoke favorably of China’s global initiatives and expressed support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). His administration announced a second 5G network in Malaysia, which could be open for participation by China’s Huawei. The Anwar administration’s first year also witnessed the implementation of mutual visa-free policies between the two countries, increased inflows of Chinese investment into Malaysia’s manufacturing sector (including semiconductors), and steady progress on BRI–related development and infrastructure projects in Malaysia. In 2024, the two countries are celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of their establishment of diplomatic ties in May 1974. (Malaysia was the first ASEAN state to establish diplomatic ties with China.) 

Many of these steps and developments are a continuation or enhancement of Malaysia’s decades-long policy of pragmatic engagement with its powerful neighbor, rather than a new direction set by Anwar. Policy continuity stems from internal and external factors. Domestically, Malaysia’s successive governing elites rely on growth and development-based performance as their primary pathway to enhance and consolidate their authority to rule the multiethnic, multireligious country. This domestic logic necessitates not just economic pragmatism but also diplomatic pragmatism. This dual approach prompts Malaysian elites to see a rising China as a source of strength to leverage upon, rather than a threat to balance against. China provides opportunities to maximize economic benefits, ensure a stable external environment, and promote a more integrated and productive region. Hence, notwithstanding overlapping claims over the southern part of the South China Sea, Malaysia and China have partnered throughout the post–Cold War era on a range of regional and international issues, most notably East Asian integration. Externally, there are structural logics that compel Malaysia, like many other regional states, to pursue a neutral, “equidistance” policy vis-à-vis China and the United States, not least to avoid the dangers of entrapment within a possible great power conflict. 

This is not to say that leadership does not matter for Malaysian policy. Leadership remains a significant factor, primarily in terms of diplomatic style and skill. Anwar, for instance, has been deferential toward China. He has avoided openly criticizing Beijing on the issue of Xinjiang, avoided a confrontational approach on the South China Sea, repeatedly expressed that Malaysia “has no problem with China,” and publicly commented on the West’s “Chinaphobia” problem. Some of these deferential acts may have gone too far (such as his public statements about China’s three global initiatives).

However, as a seasoned statesman, Anwar has been prudent in striking a balance between crucial domestic interests and external considerations. Selective deference has been displayed together with selective defiance (for example, Malaysia officially rebuking China when the August 2023 edition of the map of China indicated a ten-dash line in the South China Sea). Equally important, the Anwar administration’s efforts in enhancing the Sino-Malaysian partnership have also been pursued concurrently with efforts to expand cooperation with other key partners (including upgrading defence cooperation with the United States, elevating relations with Japan to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, strengthening multidomain cooperation with South Korea, partnering with the European Union on Global Gateway projects, and working with Canada on cybersecurity, trade, clean technologies and other sectors).  

Cambodia

Lak Chansok
Senior lecturer, Royal University of Phnom Penh

Hun Manet, the eldest son of longtime Cambodian leader Hun Sen, became the country’s second postwar prime minister on August 22, 2023. For the past eight months, Manet has demonstrated competent and versatile statecraft, welcomed face-to-face diplomacy, embraced continuity with his father’s domestic and foreign policies, and aimed for peace, diplomacy, and socioeconomic development.  

Since assuming office in August, Manet has embarked on a series of strategic engagements with numerous foreign dignitaries and business leaders. These efforts have accentuated his strategic hedging policy: a multidimensional approach that strategically seeks to diversify diplomatic relations, leverage economic diplomacy, safeguard national interests, minimize and mitigate potential risks, and ensure flexibility on the global stage.

China was, indeed, the first foreign country to which Manet paid an official visit. This visit had significant implications for the two nations’ bilateral ties. First, the visit demonstrated China’s level of significance for Cambodia’s interests, underscoring the two nations’ ambitions to invigorate a “high-level, high-quality, and high-standard community with a shared future.” Second, the visit’s success can be attributed to the deep political and strategic trust between the two leaders, underscoring the robust ties between the two countries to ensure “national sovereignty, security, and development.” Third, both leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment to elevating their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, extending cooperation beyond the bilateral sphere. 

The success of the recent visit to Cambodia by Wang Yi, senior cadre of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, reaffirms Manet’s intent to continue embracing China as one of Cambodia’s partners. The visit came amid growing concerns over two China-funded projects—Ream Naval Base and Funan Techno Canal—in the country. During the visit, Wang and Cambodian leaders reiterated their commitment to maintaining the “ironclad” friendship between the two leaders and fostering the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two nations. Both leaders expressed their firm intent to develop the Diamond Hexagon cooperation framework, enhance strategic synergy between Cambodia’s Pentagonal Strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), deepen sectoral cooperation, and promote a rules-based international order that could contribute to regional peace, stability, and development. 

Cambodia’s continued strategic alignment with China has been seen as a “pragmatic” foreign policy choice for the country’s quest for long-term peace, political stability, security, and economic prosperity. Key factors—including geographical proximity, civilizational connectivity, economic interdependence, and convergent strategic interests—substantiate the logic of Cambodia’s ties with China. Based on alignment in these areas, both sides continue to support each other’s mutual benefit by prioritizing the other’s core interests. 

The backbone of Sino-Cambodian relations primarily lies in political trust and convergent strategic and economic interests. Cambodia has been a staunch supporter of China’s initiatives in international forums. Since 2013, Cambodia has reaffirmed its support of China’s mutually beneficial BRI projects and other proposals, including the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative. On economic cooperation, China remains Cambodia’s most important trading partner and source of foreign investment. In the first half of 2023, the two nations’ trade volume reached approximately $7 billion, and China’s new investment alone accounted for around 65 percent of the total investment in Cambodia, representing around $1.1 billion in combined registered capital. In tandem, Chinese tourism has contributed to Cambodia’s economic growth, with nearly 550,000 tourists in 2023 ranking third in foreign tourism to Cambodia. 

Thailand

Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Professor of political science and international relations, Chulalongkorn University

Thailand has an enviable regional position in Asia as a longstanding U.S. treaty ally with historically close and intimate relations with China. Except for a blip in the 1970s when China supported the Communist Party of Thailand, ties between Bangkok and Beijing have gone from strength to strength, aided by the remarkable enmeshment of overseas Chinese in Thailand’s hierarchical society and their phenomenal business success in the Thai economy.

The Srettha government—widely seen as democratically legitimate despite its controversial dealmaking to take office—has tried to generate policy momentum and improve investor confidence. In contrast to the former government under Prayut Chan-o-cha, the Srettha government’s democratic credentials allow it be less beholden to China. This is not to say that Bangkok has turned away from Beijing to embrace Washington. Democratic credibility merely gives Srettha more options and space to engage. It can be expected that Thailand will toe the West’s preferred positions on major conflicts, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the Hamas-Israel conflict. Thai foreign policy posture may be omnidirectional, but it is also seen as relatively more open and liberal because it no longer suffers from the autocracy complex of Prayut.

So far, Srettha’s approach to China has been evenhanded. Srettha attended the Belt and Road Forum last October, where he met Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time. Three months later, the Srettha government implemented a mutual visa-free agreement with China. Srettha has also welcomed Chinese investment in Thailand, with a focus on electrical vehicles. His government is banking on Chinese tourists to return to pre-pandemic levels—in 2019, the country recorded 39 million visitors, among which 11 million visitors were from China. Other Sino-Thai engagements have included joint military exercises and even outer space cooperation.

This trend of solid bilateral engagement can be expected to continue. In other words, none of what Thailand was doing with China under the Prayut government will cease under the Srettha administration. On the contrary, the Bangkok-Beijing relationship appears to be moving from strength to strength. The difference now is that Thailand can move in other directions at the same time. 

Indonesia

Lina A. Alexandra
Head of Department of International Relations, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

The legislative and presidential elections held this year on Valentine’s Day—February 14, 2024—turned the page for Indonesia. After a decade with Joko Widodo in power, Prabowo Subianto will officially assume the presidency in October 2024. The incoming president, known as a blunt and often emotional individual, especially during his time as defense minister, has raised questions regarding the direction of Indonesian foreign policy ahead.

At this stage, we do not know much about Prabowo’s intended foreign policy direction. Nonetheless, there are some hints about how he might run the course. First, in terms of leadership style, Prabowo will likely be more interested in attending regional and international forums and engagements, rather than shy away from them as his predecessor has. Based on his personality, he will likely be more outspoken and could even criticize relevant countries if Indonesia’s national interests or security are perceived to be threatened.

Second, during Prabowo’s November 2023 speech at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, prior to the campaign period, then candidate Prabowo portrayed his foreign policy vision as based on a “good neighbor policy, ” in which Indonesia pursues friendly relations with all nations. He repeated several times the tenet that “one enemy is too many and a thousand friends is too few.”

What will this mean for Indonesia’s foreign policy approach to China? Will there be continuation or change?

On the one hand, during the campaign, Prabowo, whose running mate is Widodo’s son, indicated that his policies would continue those of his predecessor, including engaging China on economic sector. This makes sense from an economic perspective. Indonesia has been able to maintain relatively high growth (averaging growth rates of around 5 percent in 2023) while most countries worldwide have struggled. China is Indonesia’s biggest trading partner and second-largest source of investment. For this reason, Prabowo is likely to maintain the status quo and sustain Indonesia’s strong relations with China.

On the other hand, Prabowo is obviously interested in further developing Indonesia’s military capabilities. This is not new, either. With its expanding economic capabilities, Indonesia has aspired to complete its Minimum Essential Force plan by 2024 and then move its defense posture to the next stage¹. Because the United States and European countries have traditionally been major arms suppliers, maintaining good relations with the West is equally important for Indonesia’s defense goals.

Prabowo is likely fully aware of the challenges and risks posed to Indonesia’s national security and welfare by the heightening strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Indonesia benefits from stable, if not friendly relations, among major powers. As the saying goes, “when the elephants fight, the grass suffers.” Hence, under the new presidency, there is much hope that Indonesia will, at a minimum, maintain its good relations with all great powers. More significantly, Indonesia may become more proactive in introducing initiatives that bring these powers together for the benefit of all countries.

Vietnam

Dien Nguyen An Luong
Associate fellow, ISEAS Yusof-Ishak Institute

In the wake of the sudden resignation of President Vo Van Thuong in March 2024, a flurry of diplomatic activity has unfolded between Hanoi and Beijing. Three senior Vietnamese officials visited China within the span of three weeks. Vuong Dinh Hue, the now ousted chairman of the National Assembly who was among the four “pillars” of Vietnam’s leadership, embarked on a weeklong visit to China on April 7, 2024. During his visit, Hue met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, where they discussed enhancing cooperation on trade and development projects. This visit came closely on the heels of a meeting between Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Guangxi a week earlier, and a March visit to China by Le Hoai Trung, who oversees the Vietnamese Communist Party’s external relations. 

While Trung’s visit may have been planned prior to the recent shakeup of Vietnam’s leadership, subsequent trips by Hue and Son seemed designed as part of Hanoi’s efforts to assure Chinese leaders that the abrupt defenestration of a second president in just over a year would not cause instability. These diplomatic overtures occurred against the backdrop of brewing tensions in the flashpoint South China Sea, in which Hanoi has been one of the most vociferous critics of Beijing’s growing assertiveness. These developments underscore a fundamental principle of Vietnam’s foreign policy: any government must try to get along with and stand up to China at the same time. This delicate balance is expected to persist despite the relentless political upheaval in Vietnam. In late April 2024, Hue was ousted from parliamentary leadership. Three weeks later, Truong Thi Mai, who was a permanent member of the Communist Party Central Committee’s Secretariat and fifth in Vietnam’s leadership hierarchy, also got the axe. Both Hue and Mai were apparently defenestrated after the party cryptically accused them of “violations and shortcomings.” Before long, in May 2024, Vietnam named Tran Thanh Man, Hue’s deputy, as his successor and installed To Lam, the minister of public security, as the new president.

In Vietnam’s political system, characterized by collective leadership, the removal of high-profile individuals does not typically signal a seismic shift in its bilateral ties with China, which are underpinned by a complex web of economic interdependence, security concerns, and deep-rooted ideological similarities. China has remained Vietnam’s largest trading partner, playing a critical role in its manufacturing sector and agricultural exports. Ideologically, Vietnam’s socialist-oriented model closely aligns with China’s, with both governments sharing a fear of being overthrown in a so-called color revolution instigated by foreign powers. This ideological affinity has led Vietnam to adopt Chinese-style governance practices, including tightening controls on the internet and civil society, and a focus on building a strong state-led economy. Seen in this light, it is essential for observers to grasp the complex dynamics of Vietnam’s ties with China: the Vietnamese Communist Party regards Beijing as an ideological ally, the government sees it as a capricious partner, and the general population views it as a constant threat. 

To be sure, Vietnam and the Philippines have remained outliers in Southeast Asia that favor alignment with the United States over China if forced to choose between the superpowers. The ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute survey, polling individuals from the private and public sectors, as well as academics and researchers, offers insight into the prevailing attitudes that shape policy on regional issues in Southeast Asia. In the most recent survey, 50.5 percent of Southeast Asians now prefer China, with the United States close behind at 49.5 percent. This is the first time China has edged past the United States in preference since the survey’s inception in 2020. However, the United States remains the preferred ally for the Philippines and Vietnam, with 83.3 percent and 79 percent support, respectively.

While these findings shed light on regional sentiment, it is crucial to distinguish between perception and policy. The question of preferred alignment is largely hypothetical, designed to measure the level of trust or distrust toward Beijing and Washington. The reality of Vietnam’s foreign policy suggests that, despite distrust toward China, it is unlikely that Vietnamese policymakers would choose Washington over Beijing when faced with a critical decision. Ultimately, the enduring economic, ideological, and strategic ties between Hanoi and Beijing suggest that Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China is likely to remain consistent, balancing cooperation with caution.    

Singapore

Lam Peng Er
Principal research fellow, East Asian Institute

On May 15, 2024, Lawrence Wong Shyun Tsai officially succeeded Lee Hsien Loong as prime minister of Singapore. Singapore’s careful succession planning will ensure continuity in domestic public policy and foreign relations, including its close partnership and strong friendship with China. In Singapore’s unique political system, Lee Hsien Loong has become a senior minister and a de facto mentor who remains in the cabinet. Lee will also remain secretary general of the perennial party in power, the People’s Action Party.

Though the political baton has been handed over to Wong, the key appointment holders—including the foreign minister, defense minister, and minister of trade and industry—will remain at their posts until at least the next general election. Simply put, the city-state’s foreign policy orientation will be marked by continuity notwithstanding the advent of a new prime minister.

That said, the city-state’s political continuity does not mean that the administration will merely and complacently maintain cordial relations with China. Rather, Singapore seeks to enhance its partnership with China in the years ahead.

Singaporean elite perceptions of China

According to the Singapore-based Institute of Southeast Asian Studies’ State of Southeast Asia 2023 Survey Report, 70.7 percent of Singaporean elites (comprising bureaucrats, corporate leaders, journalists, and academics) perceive that China is the most influential economic power in this region. However, 33.2 percent of Singaporean elites perceive China has the most political and strategic influence in Southeast Asia. Arguably, Singaporean elites have a pragmatic view that Singapore and the other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) must maintain good relations with both United States and Chinese superpowers, which are both vitally important to Southeast Asia. To be sure, the great power transition in the Asia-Pacific is uncertain and potentially perilous to the small and medium powers in Southeast Asia who wish to avoid the potential crossfire of competing major powers. Singapore, with a new captain and pilot abroad, must navigate turbulent regional and global politics and economics while seeking to maintain good relations with all great powers and its ASEAN neighbors.

Singapore’s relations with China are based on three important state-to-state projects: the Suzhou Industrial Park, the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Ecocity, and the China-Singapore Chongqing Connectivity Initiative. Other recent bilateral projects include the Singapore-China (Shenzhen) Smart City Initiative, which promotes cross-border digital trade and data flows. According to Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, the city-state has been China’s largest foreign investor since 2013 and representing 15.3 percent of Singapore’s cumulative direct investment abroad as of 2021. Besides economic cooperation, the Singapore Armed Forces and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army have conducted periodic joint military exercises.

Since 1996, Singapore has trained more than 55,000 Chinese officials and cadres on good governance and sharing aspects of its governance model, including the rule of law and anticorruption. Besides elite training, people-to-people relations between the city-state and China are strong. Both countries are among one another’s favorite tourist destinations.

The Sino-Singapore relationship is not one based primarily on nostalgia and a mawkish view of shared culture and ethnicity simply because 75 percent of Singaporeans are of Chinese ethnic origins. After all, Singapore is a multiethnic, plural society and cannot conduct its foreign policy according to the ancestral preferences of its citizens from India, China, the Malay Archipelago, and Europe. In a nutshell, the Sino-Singapore relationship is a time-tested and mutually beneficial relationship.

Both countries should continue to engage bilaterally, and multilaterally within the ASEAN framework and ASEAN-led multilateral processes such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus. China and Singapore should promote the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and boost the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).

One caveat to the otherwise positive assessment of Sino-Singapore relations is that it is not possible for the two nations, as sovereign states with their own core national interests, to have foreign policy alignment at all times. Both countries should appreciate past cooperation and build a future-oriented, multifaceted partnership that can withstand any occasional difference in outlook. Regardless of who is at the helm in either country over the next decade, Sino-Singapore relations will grow from strength to strength because of deep, mutual interests.