Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Malaysia from June 18 to 20, 2024, in conjunction with the fiftieth anniversary of China-Malaysia diplomatic ties. During the visit, Li had an audience with the king of Malaysia, Sultan Ibrahim ibni Sultan Iskandar, and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Both premiers attended the groundbreaking ceremony of the Gombak Integrated Terminal Station on the East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), a signature of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) venture in Malaysia. The two sides signed multiple cooperative documents—including a new five-year deal for economic and trade cooperation—that highlighted the salience of economic pragmatism as the central pillar of bilateral relations. The signed documents also included a protocol that would allow Malaysia to export to China its fresh durians (the spiky tropical fruit known for its creamy pulp’s rich taste and intense smell).[1] The two governments also agreed to jointly nominate the lion dance for the UNESCO Cultural Heritage List.[2] On June 20, the two sides issued a joint statement. At the commemorative dinner, Li described China-Malaysia relations as “a fine example of relations between the countries in the region.”
Li’s remark was not entirely rhetorical. Malaysia has been China’s valuable partner, whose importance has gone beyond bilateral ties at multiple critical junctures. Malaysia was not only the first country from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish official ties with China at the height of the Cold War but also one of the first to dispatch an official delegation to Beijing when China was isolated internationally after the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989. Malaysia brought China into ASEAN-based multilateral processes in the early 1990s (thereby kickstarting the China-ASEAN Dialogue); it also played an instrumental role in initiating and partnering on creating the ASEAN Plus Three in 1997 and the East Asia Summit in 2005. After 2012, Malaysia has also been an enthusiastic partner of the BRI and an early supporter of China’s Global Development Initiative. Such past and present partnerships, as well as the potentials of the “exemplary” relations between Malaysia and China, underpin the dazzling diplomatic limelight of Li’s visit.
Limits of Limelight
Despite the diplomatic limelight, some officials and experts in Malaysian foreign policy circles were discontented. While acknowledging that Li’s visit was a positive moment in a generally strong bilateral relationship, some privately opined that the fiftieth anniversary celebrations were not particularly momentous. In fact, there were disappointments over several aspects of the bilateral interactions before and during the visit.
To begin, Malaysia had hoped that Chinese President Xi Jinping would visit for the anniversary celebrations. Anwar openly expressed such hopes during and after his two visits to China in 2023. Since then, some members of Anwar’s administration repeated such a wish publicly, a wish that appeared realistic especially after Xi paid a state visit to Vietnam in December 2023 (three months after President Joe Biden visited the country). By early 2024, however, it became evident it would be Li and not Xi who would visit Malaysia. (There was talk about Xi visiting in 2025, when Malaysia takes over the chairmanship of ASEAN, but this remains unconfirmed.)
Initially, Li’s proposed arrival date was June 17, the first day of Eid al-Adha, one of the two main Islamic holidays (the other being Eid al-Fitr). While this might have been an oversight and eventually the date was pushed to June 18, some in Malaysia saw this as a lack of cultural sensitivity.
There were expectations that during Li’s visit China would announce extending visa exemptions for Malaysian tourists from fifteen to thirty days (as advocated by Malaysian Deputy Premier Zahid Hamidi during his China trip in late May) and bring in new major investments. But neither of these came through. Just before arriving in Malaysia, Li announced in Canberra that Australia would receive a pair of giant pandas. Some Malaysians were disappointed that a similar arrangement was not announced in Malaysia. While several members of the Malaysian elite dismissed such expectations as unrealistic or impatient, others felt that as China has grown stronger, it has increasingly treated periodically defiant nations (such as Australia and Vietnam) better than its long-standing and stable partners. In their eyes, China has taken for granted the goodwill and deference of friendly neighbors such as Malaysia.
Malaysia observers are critical not only of China but also of the Anwar administration. They view some of Anwar’s statements and actions as “too deferential” to China. Examples include Anwar praising Xi as “an outstanding leader” and pledging support for China’s three global initiatives. In addition, many Malaysians, even those within the policy establishments, were surprised by Anwar’s announcement during an interview with Chinese media outlet Guancha on June 18 that Malaysia would begin formal procedures to join the BRICS (the intergovernmental body consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, along with new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Although there was support for joining the BRICS, some questioned the timing of the announcement and criticized Anwar’s stated rationale of joining a group that is widely viewed as led by China and Russia. Anwar was quoted as saying he was “relieved that the world was no longer unipolar, with BRICS providing a ray of hope that there are checks and balances in the world,” adding that “[we] can no longer accept the scenario where the West wants to control the discourse because the fact is they are not colonial powers anymore and independent countries should be free to express themselves.” Anwar was presumably playing to the gallery (both the Malaysian public and probably also China), but his statements were deemed as unnecessarily portraying Malaysia’s BRICS decision in a zero-sum, we-them light and overly defiant to the West. After all, joining BRICS is not a zero-sum matter—Malaysia continues to be an enthusiastic participant in many Western-dominated bodies—and further defiance beyond the Gaza issue only reinforces the emerging perception that Malaysia is tilting to China.
One issue that raised Malaysian experts’ and analysts’ eyebrows was the paragraph on Taiwan in the joint statement released by the Chinese and Malaysian governments on June 20. While the joint statements issued in 2016 and 2018 mentioned “cross-Straits relations” and “One China Policy,” the 2024 statement was missing a word: “Consistent with One China Policy, Malaysia recognizes that Taiwan is an inalienable territory of the People’s Republic of China, in order for China to achieve national reunification and thus will not support any call for the independence of Taiwan.” In all past bilateral documents, the word “peaceful” had appeared before “national reunification” or “reunification,” but not this time. It is unclear if the missing word was the result of negligence, a lack of prudent vigilance, or a consent. Malaysian observers who noticed the missing word expressed unease and emphasized the need for the word “peaceful” to be included in future documents.
Dancing with (but Not Tilting to) China
After Li’s visit, some commentators described Malaysia as tilting to China. Anwar’s highly deferential tone toward China was contrasted with his highly defiant posture toward the United States, especially on the Israel’s ongoing bombing of Gaza, but also on the international monetary order, Chinaphobia, and the BRICS. These facts must be put in context, and each dynamic must be seen more as domestically driven rhetoric than actual policy direction. Put simply, depicting Anwar’s Malaysia as tilting to one side is a simplistic, black-and-white interpretation, obscuring more nuanced complexities. Indeed, despite the rhetoric, Malaysia’s actions indicate it continues to pursue an inclusive and prudent “equidistance” policy. Key examples include the following:
First, despite the Anwar administration’s openly critical remarks about the U.S. “condoning” the atrocities by Israel in Gaza, it has also sent positive signals (perhaps not strong enough) to the United States. For instance, at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) on June 6 attended by both Malaysian and foreign participants including Western diplomats, Anwar talked about the milestones in Malaysia’s relationship with the United States, highlighting the 2014 upgrading of Malaysia-US relations to a strategic partnership, as well as emphasizing the “importance and value of US-based foreign direct investments in Malaysia, especially in high-tech sectors.”
It was not a coincidence that in the week before Li’s arrival, Anwar’s office confirmed the request for a courtesy visit by the U.S. ambassador to Malaysia. At the meeting on June 11, Anwar and the U.S. envoy discussed trade and investment, as well as people-to-people relations, while affirming “commitment to enhancing comprehensive cooperation to a higher level.” While the timing of the meeting was necessitated by the United States returning to Malaysia US$156 million of funds from the 1MDB scandal, it was also made possible by the United States’ Gaza peace proposal and made necessary by Li’s impending visit to Malaysia.
The extensively reported meeting with the U.S. envoy served to underscore Malaysia’s long held neutral stance, balanced approach, and, as Anwar emphasized at the 2024 APR, “fiercely independent” policy. Beyond economic and people-to-people realms, Malaysia has also long maintained robust defense and security ties with the United States. Malaysia conducts more bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the United States than with any other partner. Malaysia-China military cooperation pales in comparison with the far more robust Malaysia-U.S. defense ties. Discussion on signing a Malaysia-U.S. defense memorandum of understanding (MoU) is underway.
Second, Malaysia’s equidistance policy is manifested in its recent efforts to forge strategic and comprehensive partnerships with several key countries. In 2023, Malaysia and Japan elevated their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed the Official Security Assistance Grant Aid (thereby enabling Japan to provide monitoring and surveillance equipment for Malaysia). In February 2024, the two countries conducted bilateral joint exercises, their first since they signed the 2018 bilateral defence MoU. Less than two months later, in April 2024, the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force conducted a two-phase joint exercise around Kota Kinabalu port, marking their first joint exercise in the South China Sea. Malaysia’s partnership with South Korea is moving in a similar direction. It is also partnering with European Union’s Global Gateway, an infrastructure cooperation initiative, presumably the EU alternative to China’s BRI. In sum, it is clear that Malaysia is not only dancing with China.
Finally, an inclusive and prudent equidistance outlook dictates that as Malaysia continues to strengthen its long-standing defense partnerships with Western powers and explore new multi-sector cooperation with new partners, it must also maintain a constructive and stable relationship with China. Hence, on the South China Sea, Malaysia, a claimant state, has opted to pursue a nonconfrontational, nonmilitary approach. At the APR conference noted above, Anwar contrasted Malaysia’s policy with the Philippine confrontational, alliance-first approach: “We [Malaysia] take a more aggressive way of diplomatic engagement, and we have been rather successful in that regard,” adding that “we have been relatively more successful” because “we are deemed and seemed to be really neutral in the engagement.”
Considering Malaysia’s emphasis on active diplomatic engagement, it is perhaps not surprising that the 2024 Malaysia-China joint statement indicated that the two sides “will launch the bilateral dialogue on the management of maritime issues as early as possible to foster maritime dialogue and cooperation.” Mainstream media might interpret such a bilateral maritime dialogue as playing into Beijing’s hand and not showing solidarity to a fellow ASEAN member, namely the Philippines, on regional maritime disputes.
However, from Malaysia’s point of view, the realities and approaches are never as straight or simple as portrayed by mainstream commentaries. To begin, Malaysia’s emphasis on active neutrality and its alliance-allergic stance mean that it disagrees with the Philippines’ alliance-centric approach to the multi-nation territorial problem. In addition, so long as Manila refuses to give up its claims over Sabah, a Malaysian state on the island of Borneo, it is unrealistic to expect Malaysia to support the Philippines and choose confrontation over cooperation vis-à-vis China regarding the current Philippines-China tensions in the South China Sea.
Most important, all politics is local. Given Malaysia’s domestic problems and the many enormous challenges the Anwar government is facing before the next general elections (by February 2028), the ruling elites probably judge that while a maritime dialogue will not be a principal nor sufficient platform to resolve the South China Sea problem, it is nonetheless a useful layer of risk management and a useful channel to give peace a chance. As a militarily weaker state in an increasingly uncertain external environment, Malaysia prioritizes the goals of preserving its sovereignty, exercising its agency to continue its energy exploration activities in the South China Sea, and concentrating on pressing domestic tasks while simultaneously avoiding armed conflict and big power entrapment.
[1] In 2023, the value of durian exports from Southeast Asia (mainly Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam) to China was US$6.7 billion, a twelvefold increase from $550 million in 2017. See https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/16/business/durian-china-malaysia-thailand.html.
[2] While the lion dance originated in China, over the past thirty years, Malaysians have turned the ancient tradition into an acrobatic and emotive sport, with the country’s Kun Seng Keng, the most awarded troupe in the world, enjoying the reputation of the “king of lions.” See https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/lion-dance-competition-malaysia; and https://www.optionstheedge.com/topic/culture/revolutionising-lion-dance-kun-seng-keng-lion-dragon-dance-association-keeping-our.
