A few days after new China Coast Guard (CCG) regulations were put into effect, giving its vessels a mandate to detain foreign “trespassers” for up to 60 days without trial, the Philippines reported on June 17 that China had used “dangerous maneuvers” to disrupt a routine resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal (locally known as Ayungin Shoal). The CCG deployed at least eight vessels and repeatedly rammed and tried to block two Philippine Navy rigid hull inflatable boats. Chinese forces towed, boarded, and punctured some Philippine boats. The incident resulted in a severe injury to a Filipino soldier when a CCG vessel used high-speed ramming to collide with the Philippine Navy’s inflatable boats, a stark reminder of the human cost of the territorial disputes between China and the Philippines in waters that Beijing calls the South China Sea and Manila calls the West Philippine Sea.
The June 17 resupply mission followed the Philippine government’s transparency initiative to assert the country’s sovereign rights and territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea. However, the country’s response indicates a fracturing of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s approach to maritime security. The usual practice is that the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea coordinates resupply missions in the West Philippine Sea with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Department of National Defense (DND), and the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The June 17 mission, however, turned out to be a move by the AFP and the DND without escorts from the PCG.
Another indication of the fracturing of the Philippine government’s maritime security approach is that the National Security Council took over 12 hours to issue a statement, and the AFP waited a day to do the same. Moreover, Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin, who heads the National Maritime Council, referred to the attack as a “misunderstanding” or an “accident.” At the same time, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. called it an “aggressive and illegal use of force,” suggesting that the president’s security team was divided on the issue.
As a result of this incident, the Philippines and China concluded a provisional arrangement for resupply missions on July 21. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said the agreement was to resupply the daily necessities of personnel stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre. Although China made no immediate comment, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs later emphasized that the arrangement was only temporary. Beijing likewise maintained its demand for the Philippines to tow away the grounded ship, implying that it would be unacceptable for Manila to continue shipping building materials to Second Thomas Shoal. Details about the agreement so far have been scarce, but reports highlight that it allows the Philippines to continue delivering supplies to the BRP Sierra Madre only on “humanitarian” grounds. While the actual text of the agreement has not yet been released, it does demonstrate that both sides are committed to deescalating the situation in the South China Sea and that differences can be managed through dialogue and consultation.
The Marcos administration’s transparency approach contrasts with former president Rodrigo Duterte’s pivot to China policy. Duterte’s policy, to a certain extent, lowered tensions with China, and Duterte himself received support for his flagship infrastructure program. However, the Duterte administration failed to leverage the 2016 arbitration award by an international tribunal, and the Philippines lost much-needed momentum when it minimized the gravity of the maritime incidents in the West Philippine Sea. It should be emphasized that the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in the latter’s exclusive economic zone by interfering in Philippine activities like fishing and petroleum exploration, constructing artificial islands, and failing to prevent Chinese fisherfolks from exploiting the Philippines’ traditional fishing grounds. In contrast, Marcos’s transparency initiative is driven by the assumption that China can be influenced by the reputational costs of its assertive moves in the South China Sea. As such, the transparency approach involves calling out China’s actions and shedding light on incidents at sea when they happen. The problem is that this approach does not seem to be part of a broader strategy. Besides calling China out, how does the Philippines plan to uphold its sovereignty and territorial claims? Ultimately, it should be noted that neither Duterte’s pivot to China policy nor Marcos’s transparency initiative is changing China’s behavior.
Given this, the Philippines must craft a specific and explicit maritime strategy. The first step here is for Marcos to turn the proposed Philippine Maritime Zones Act into law. The bill, which declares the country’s maritime zones based on the standards set by international law, has already been approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate and is now awaiting the president’s signature. The strategy must tap into various mechanisms to advance the country’s national interests, including diplomacy and efforts to combat economic coercion. Concurrently, the Philippines must continue the widening and deepening of its international relationships. Marcos has strengthened the country’s alliance with the United States; has forged strategic partnerships with Japan, Australia, and Vietnam; and has concluded security cooperation arrangements with like-minded countries. The Philippines has likewise actively pursued minilateral arrangements, such as trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan and quadrilateral cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia.
Additionally, the gains at the interstate level must be complemented by a communications strategy deployed at the substate level to address the vast information ecosystem on which many Filipinos depend. The fact that the Philippines relies heavily on social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, X, and TikTok means that the amount of readily available information is inversely proportional to accountability measures regarding the spread of misinformation and disinformation. This lack of accountability made the Philippines ripe for information campaigns and discourse in the maritime domain. Without an effective communications strategy aimed at domestic audiences, the gains the Philippines has made at the international level will be futile.
As the Philippines works toward calibrating its transparency approach, there are several things to bear in mind. The first is Marcos’s July 22 state-of-the-nation address. Marcos reiterated the importance of the West Philippine Sea and urged the country not to waver, instilling this message in the national consciousness. The president likewise banned Philippine offshore gaming operators, effective immediately. How this will impacts Philippine-China bilateral ties remains to be seen. Vice President Sara Duterte, the daughter of the former president, did not attend Marcos’s speech because she designated herself as the designated survivor. The announcement is indicative of the fissures between the Marcos and Duterte families, and it will be interesting to see how this plays out in the upcoming midterm elections in May 2025. Up for grabs are seats in the House of Representatives, where the Duterte family seems to be consolidating its power in preparation for a bid for the presidency in the next round of national elections in 2028. The U.S. elections in November 2024 are another thing to watch out for, especially since former president Donald Trump’s potential return to the White House would have implications for America’s alliances in the region. Finally, domestic dynamics and geopolitical developments in the Philippines will undoubtedly contribute to Manila’s assumption of the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2026. This time, the Philippines should rally its neighboring countries and stand up for international law and the rules-based order.
