Former Ambassadors to United States and Russia Call for Urgent Action to Arrest Downward Spiral in Relations
Meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington for a two-day conference on U.S.–Russia relations, Ambassadors Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, James F. Collins, Yuri V. Dubinin, Arthur A. Hartman, Jack F. Matlock Jr., and Thomas R. Pickering called for reflection and restraint on both sides and urged that Russian–American relations not be left hostage to political inertia.
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Published on Sep 23, 2008
WASHINGTON, Sept 23—Warning that without urgent attention, U.S.–Russia relations could lead to a protracted period of confrontation and counterproductive activity, a group of former Ambassadors urged Washington and Moscow to make every effort to relieve the immediate tensions surrounding the unstable situation in the Caucasus. In a joint statement they also outlined steps to help both governments work together more effectively on key issues of mutual interest, including arms control, Euro–Atlantic regional security, terrorism, and financial issues.
Meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington for a two-day conference on U.S.–Russia relations, Ambassadors Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, James F. Collins, Yuri V. Dubinin, Arthur A. Hartman, Jack F. Matlock Jr., and Thomas R. Pickering called for reflection and restraint on both sides and urged that Russian–American relations not be left hostage to political inertia.
The Carnegie Russia and Eurasia Program has, since the end of the Cold War, led the field on Eurasian security, including strategic nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, development, economic and social issues, governance, and the rule of law.
The Carnegie Moscow Center was established in 1993 and accommodates foreign and Russian researchers collaborating with Carnegie’s global network of scholars on a broad range of contemporary policy issues relevant to Russia—military, political, and economic.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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