With the growth in points of friction between the great powers, organizations like the SCO will continue to play a role in the strategic adaptation of the smaller powers caught between them.
Temur Umarov
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The international community has yet to create the conditions for a sustainable Afghan state and a viable government in Kabul that can survive a U.S. withdrawal. The focus needs to shift to an alternative strategy that de-escalates combat, thereby neutralizing insurgency momentum and Taliban appeals for Jihad, while protecting infrastructure that allows stable Afghan institutions to develop.
WASHINGTON, Feb 3—After seven years of war, the international community has yet to create the conditions for a sustainable Afghan state and a viable government in Kabul that can survive a U.S. withdrawal. In a new policy brief, Afghanistan expert Gilles Dorronsoro offers an alternative strategy that de-escalates combat, thereby neutralizing insurgency momentum and Taliban appeals for Jihad, while protecting important infrastructure that allows strong and stable Afghan institutions to develop.
Dorronsoro explains that while the current U.S. debate is focused on how many additional troops to send to Afghanistan, increasing the number of troops is unlikely to make a difference without a defined policy and strategy.
Key Recommendations:
Dorronsoro concludes:
“The Taliban have been able to adapt very quickly to allied tactics. Their learning curve is good, and they have the psychological momentum. The situation in 2009 is probably going to deteriorate, but the results of any increase in troop numbers will be difficult to assess before the summer of 2010. In the event of failure, the U.S. administration will have very few options left, because sending another 30,000 troops would present a political challenge. This is why it is especially important to concentrate attention on areas where the troops can make a real difference (i.e., Kabul and not Helmand), allowing the allies to build sustainable Afghan institutions and eventually withdraw their military forces.”
###
NOTES
Direct link to the PDF: www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_war-strategy.pdf
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
With the growth in points of friction between the great powers, organizations like the SCO will continue to play a role in the strategic adaptation of the smaller powers caught between them.
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