Article
Henri J. Barkey
{
"authors": [
"Henri J. Barkey"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Europe"
],
"collections": [
"Turkey’s Transformation"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "MEP",
"programs": [
"Middle East"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Middle East",
"Türkiye",
"Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
Turkey: Regime in Crisis
Turkey's constitution, imposed by the military in 1982, must be redrafted if the country is to move towards a more responsive political system and avoid repeating the cycle of paralysis followed by heavy-handed military and judicial intervention.
Published on Mar 3, 2010
Source: National Interest
Although the two service chiefs and the deputy chief of staff were released, the sight of so many high-ranking officers being hauled in front of judges is unprecedented. It is too early to tell whether these arrests will solidify the attitudes of hard-line officers who are itching to topple the government, or whether the era of coups and other forms of unconstitutional attempts at overthrowing the system is over. All signs do point to the latter; and, in any case, there is still a significant threshold to cross—the expected change in military command in August.
What is clear, however, is that unless Turkey manages to devise a new constitution to replace the one imposed by the military in 1982, it will face increasing instability and likely become prone to erratic foreign-policy behavior.
This crisis is the culmination of profound shifts in Turkish society. The emergence of a conservative and pious business elite, made possible by the economic reforms of the 1980s, lay the groundwork for Erdogan’s Islam-influenced Justice and Development Party (AKP), which rose to power in 2002. For secularist elites, who are wedded to a doctrinaire vision of the Turkish state that does not acknowledge society’s deep religious roots—or the existence of the Kurds, for that matter—AKP’s commanding majority has been viewed with alarm, if not panic.
On one side are the AKP and its allies: some liberal intellectual elites, the conservative business elites and the religious orders. On the other are the forces of the secular state apparatus, composed primarily of the army, the bureaucracy, an important segment of the press establishment, academics, old-line political parties, and of course the judiciary.
Caught between and running scared are the old Western-oriented business elites, represented by TUSIAD, the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association, and some intellectual elites who are not aligned with the AKP. These intellectuals sympathize with the party’s broad goals, but not with its leadership or its Islamist origins.
The military and judiciary have taken it upon themselves to protect Turkish “democracy” by any means. Four times since 1960, the military has intervened to overthrow governments, and the judiciary routinely bans political parties and politicians of which it does not approve.
What is new, however, is the Turks’ increasing resistance to military and judiciary conceptions of politics. The resistance comes from a more diverse population, a strengthening civil society and other forces, the most important of which is Taraf, a small daily newspaper. Taraf’s willingness to publish damaging stories about the armed forces, something mainstream newspapers have always shied away from, has energized individuals in various state offices to leak damaging information.
This is hardly a struggle between angels and demons, but the primary culprit is the military establishment, which has missed the signs of change. Its actions have backfired and further damaged its reputation. The most egregious case of army interference in domestic politics occurred on April 27, 2007, when its chief of staff issued a clumsily written statement on the Turkish Armed Forces website warning against the selection of Abdullah Gül as president of the republic. The army’s opposition derived primarily if not exclusively from the fact that Gül’s wife wore a turban—an unacceptable wardrobe choice, since he would be occupying the position once held by Atatürk, the founder of the secular Turkish republic, in whose name the military acts.
This forced the AKP to call for elections, which it won with an overwhelming mandate, but after which it has not succeeded in enacting reforms. This is in part because the secular state establishment sought revenge by trying to ban the AKP altogether, an attempt that almost succeeded. The AKP has yet to grow into a classical liberal party that embraces openness, freedom of thought and the rule of law. Instead, it has replicated all the ills of Turkish parties past, including one-man domination, the use of government power to squelch the opposition, and the lack of a comprehensive vision that transcends the immediate concerns of its own pious core constituency.
As a result, a new Turkish constitution remains both a distant dream and an absolute necessity. Turkey needs to overhaul its archaic political institutions that have prevented the evolution of dynamic and responsive politics. The resulting paralysis has always been an invitation to greater military involvement.
For the United States, Turkey’s traditional ally, this is a most unappealing scenario. The White House does not want to see Turkey wallow in crises, nor will it countenance a coup by any means. The former might simply be written in the stars—but Washington can be crystal clear that it will not accept the latter.
About the Author
Henri J. Barkey
Former Visiting Scholar, Middle East Program
Barkey served as a member of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, working primarily on issues related to the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and intelligence from 1998 to 2000.
- Winners and Losers in Turkey’s Election
- The Road to Turkey’s June Elections: Crises, Strategies, and OutcomesArticle
Henri J. Barkey
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Is Frustration With Armenia’s Pashinyan Enough to Bring the Pro-Russia Opposition to Power?Commentary
It’s true that many Armenians would vote for anyone just to be rid of Pashinyan, whom they blame for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, but the pro-Russia opposition is unlikely to be able to channel that frustration into an electoral victory.
Mikayel Zolyan
- Will Hungary’s New Leader Really Change EU Policy on Russia and Ukraine?Commentary
Orbán created an image for himself as virtually the only opponent of aid to Ukraine in the entire EU. But in reality, he was simply willing to use his veto to absorb all the backlash, allowing other opponents to remain in the shadows.
Maksim Samorukov
- The Afghanistan–Pakistan War Poses Awkward Questions for RussiaCommentary
Not only does the fighting jeopardize regional security, it undermines Russian attempts to promote alternatives to the Western-dominated world order.
Ruslan Suleymanov
- After Ilia II: What Will a New Patriarch Mean for Georgia?Commentary
The front-runner to succeed Ilia II, Metropolitan Shio, is prone to harsh anti-Western rhetoric and frequent criticism of “liberal ideologies” that he claims threaten the Georgian state. This raises fears that under his leadership the Georgian Orthodox Church will lose its unifying role and become an instrument of ultraconservative ideology.
Bashir Kitachaev
- Tokayev’s New Constitution Is a Bet on Stability—At Freedom’s ExpenseCommentary
Kazakhstan’s new constitution is an embodiment of the ruling elite’s fears and a self-serving attempt to preserve the status quo while they still can.
Serik Beysembaev
