Most of Moscow’s military resources are tied up in Ukraine, while Beijing’s foreign policy prioritizes economic ties and avoids direct conflict.
Alexander Gabuev, Temur Umarov
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Both Russia and the European Union are at a stage when setting out their own domestic priorities and defining their respective global roles are more important than achieving an alliance.
Source: Russian International Affairs Council
The relevance of the concept of Greater Europe, stretching from Iceland and Norway in the north to Turkey in the south, and from Portugal in the west to Russia in the east, and the prospects for this concept becoming reality were discussed by Irina Busygina, Professor at the Moscow International Relations Institute (MGIMO) and RIAC expert, and Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Center in Moscow and RIAC member.
The reason is that, before you start shaping the contours and principles of any future alliance, you have to identify the rationale for internal evolution. And this is true both of the EU and Russia. What will happen to the EU over the next 5-10 years? One may hypothesize, but there is a lack of any clear vision. What will the EU’s role in international affairs be? Will it re-think and revisit its foreign policies by making itself more of an international entity? Russia, similarly, has seen a lot of developments, both in the economy and in politics. Russia’s future depends to a great extent on stronger integration across the former Soviet territories, given the realistic need for wider markets. These integration plans are designed with Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and possibly the Kyrgyz Republic in mind, first and foremost. Let me reiterate my theory: Before they can join together in an alliance, Russia and the EU must decide on the rationale for their own evolution.
That is true, and Turkey’s role has been on the rise, however, I don’t think it is in any sense as important as that of Russia or the EU. Turkey’s leadership has been pursuing EU membership, although it may well not be the best policy for the country. A strategic partnership between Turkey and the EU would have much better prospects for the country in future.
I would think these institutions are well established, although they may be facing certain quality issues. And with the principal issue being lack of trust, the difficult challenge is to bridge this gap. This lack of trust in practice takes two main forms: Russia’s mistrust in the goals and objectives of EU foreign policy, and the lack of trust that Central and East European EU countries have towards Russia.
We sure can. Building trust is one of the problems most commonly addressed by security communities. It is not about commitment or economic integration; the goal here is to achieve a state in which war, as an instrument of policy in relations within a certain group of nations, is ruled out in principle. It is essentially a new type of relations: Members of the security community will not always cooperate on a broad range of issues or share each other’s values. But they have confidence in one thing: Any dispute will be addressed exclusively by non-violent means.
It would be naive to hope that building a security community will automatically remove all contradictions and tensions among community members. Conflicts will not disappear with the emergence of the security community, but military force will not be contemplated as a form of resolution.
I would like to highlight another important proposition that is in line with your thinking: Greater Europe should not be built as an exclusive project, which would put dividing lines between the European and non-European spaces. It is therefore both imperative and feasible to engage the United States as “non-European Europeans.” However, such grand ideas need further conceptualization. I therefore see a positive side to the current divergence between Russia and the European Union, and more specifically, a potential opportunity to lend meaning to the pause that has occurred. This will give the EU and Russia time to consider the rationale of their further steps.
This interview originally appeared on the Russian International Affairs Council site.
Irina Busygina
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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