Commentary
Duyeon Kim, Andrei Lankov, Leon V. Sigal
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Source: Getty
Other
Decoding the U.S.-South Korea Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
The successor agreement to the U.S.-South Korean 1974 civil nuclear cooperation accord reflects the interdependence of the American and South Korean nuclear industries as an equal partnership.
By Duyeon Kim
Published on Sep 30, 2015
Source: CSIS
On June 15, the United States and South Korea signed a successor agreement to their 1974 civil nuclear cooperation accord. Updating the existing agreement took over four years of challenging negotiations complicated by Seoul’s demands for the right to enrich uranium and reprocess (or pyroprocess) spent nuclear fuel to which Washington objected. What began as nearly irreconcilable political differences resulted in win-win compromises that strike a balance between maintaining the U.S.' core nonproliferation policy and reflecting South Korea’s industrial maturity and desire to advance its civil nuclear program while establishing pathways for an unprecedented level of cooperation between the two allies. The new agreement reflects the interdependence of the American and South Korean nuclear industries as an equal partnership—from a unilateral obligation to reciprocal consent rights and obligations—as well as mature, strong bilateral relationship...This report was originally published by CSIS
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About the Author
Duyeon Kim
Former Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Asia Program
Kim is an expert on nuclear nonproliferation, diplomacy, and Northeast Asia.
- Three Dimensions: Can North Korea be Contained?
- Getting Japan–South Korea Relations Back on TrackArticle
James L. Schoff, Duyeon Kim
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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