Commentary
Katherine Charlet, Danielle Citron
{
"authors": [
"Katherine Charlet"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "TIA",
"programs": [
"Technology and International Affairs"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"United States",
"Iran"
],
"topics": [
"Technology"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
How the U.S. Approach to Cyber Conflict Evolved in 2018—and What Could Come Next
In 2018, the United States took many important steps to advance its approach to cyber conflict. A review of these developments suggests signs of progress but also significant challenges ahead.
Published on Dec 26, 2018
Source: World Politics Review
2018 was in many ways a watershed year for the United States in cyberspace. Washington revamped its cyber strategy. It loosened authorities for military cyber operators. It responded to large-scale global cyberattacks. And it dealt with chilling intrusions on its critical infrastructure. Looking back, though, what did all these changes mean, and how well did U.S. cyber policy fare?
Let’s start with the good news. In two particular areas—attribution and indictments—the United States has shown clear improvements in responding to inappropriate behavior in cyberspace. Over the past year, the Department of Justice significantly increased the pace of indictments against Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean individuals for state-linked cyber activities. The department announced, for example, only one such indictment in 2014, but at least eight in 2018. Such steps, with some exceptions, are not usually enough to change national policies, and more data and analysis are needed to judge their real impact. In theory, though, and especially over the longer term, indictments and sanctions can make it harder for countries to recruit young talented hackers, who may not want to be restricted from travelling to or dealing financially with the United States and Europe.
About the Author
Katherine Charlet
Former Director, Technology and International Affairs Program
Katherine Charlet was the inaugural director of Carnegie’s Technology and International Affairs Program.
- Campaigns Must Prepare for Deepfakes: This Is What Their Plan Should Look Like
- What the Machine Learning Value Chain Means for GeopoliticsArticle
- +3
Charlotte Stanton, Vivien Lung, Nancy (Hanzhuo) Zhang, …
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Russia’s Elite Conflict Over Internet Restrictions Does Not Herald Regime CollapseCommentary
A much-discussed disagreement over internet restrictions in Russia was never an existential threat for Putin: It was about elite groups protecting their interests.
Alexandra Prokopenko
- As Trump Threatens to Quit NATO, the Baltic States Are Playing for TimeCommentary
Governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want to ensure that a U.S. military withdrawal would not leave them dangerously exposed to a Russian attack.
Sergejs Potapkins
- Why Is Belarus’s Approach to Online Censorship So Different From Russia’s?Commentary
For Lukashenko, abandoning Western internet services and embracing Russian equivalents would mean tying himself even closer to Moscow.
Artyom Shraibman
- Who Is Responsible for the Demise of the Russian Internet?Commentary
The Russian state has opted for complete ideological control of the internet and is prepared to bear the associated costs.
Maria Kolomychenko
- Russia Is Meddling for Meddling’s Sake in the Middle EastCommentary
The Russian leadership wants to avoid a dangerous precedent in which it is squeezed out of Iran by the United States and Israel—and left powerless to respond in any meaningful way.
Nikita Smagin
