• Research
  • Politika
  • About
Carnegie Russia Eurasia center logoCarnegie lettermark logo
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Zainab Usman",
    "Katie Auth"
  ],
  "type": "other",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Africa’s External Relations",
    "Investments in Africa",
    "Trade and Investment"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "africa",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "AFP",
  "programs": [
    "Africa"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "United States",
    "North Africa",
    "Southern, Eastern, and Western Africa",
    "China"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economy",
    "Trade"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Other

The Three Issues That Will Make or Break the Prosper Africa Initiative

The success of the new U.S. investment strategy may ultimately depend on how a bill in Congress addresses these key components.

Link Copied
By Zainab Usman and Katie Auth
Published on May 18, 2022

The U.S. government’s Prosper Africa program, launched in 2019, aims to double two-way trade and investment between the United States and African countries and, in doing so, to put a new face on American foreign policy in Africa. Despite the initiative’s embrace by two separate administrations, it has so far been slow to live up to expectations. The Prosper Africa Act, a draft piece of bipartisan legislation put forward in the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, now languishes in Congress, overshadowed by other crises and attracting little attention. Allowing the legislation to expire is a mistake. To help ensure its success, the Prosper Africa Act’s sponsors should address three key issues around its scope, strategic positioning, and diaspora engagement.

Today’s shifting geopolitical landscape makes the goals of Prosper Africa more important than ever before. U.S.-Africa relations have historically focused on humanitarian and security concerns, but Africa’s major economies have grown rapidly and should play a much broader and more strategic role in U.S. foreign policy. Since 2009, when China edged out the United States as Africa’s largest bilateral trade partner, U.S.-Africa trade has declined from a peak of $142 billion in 2008 to just $64 billion in 2021. Outside of extractive industries, American business presence on the continent in some places trails that of countries like Turkey and India. With its explicit focus on specific projects (for example, infrastructure development or export of U.S. goods), job creation, and shared prosperity, Prosper Africa aims to accelerate and expand an ongoing shift in U.S. foreign assistance toward more investment-driven approaches.

Recent disruptions in the global economy further reinforce the salience of Prosper Africa’s objectives. The increased financial flows and business engagement it envisions could be pivotal in helping African countries recover from massive economic shocks brought on by the coronavirus pandemic and by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They could also be essential for building infrastructure and public services to support economic transformations underpinning both U.S. and African interests, including clean energy transitions.

However, an investment-driven initiative needs stability to attract private-sector partners, and they will hesitate to engage with a program that may not last beyond an election cycle. That’s why the Prosper Africa Act is crucial. The bill would ensure that Prosper Africa is an established, non-partisan component of U.S. foreign assistance, making it more likely this presidential initiative continues under future administrations. Furthermore, the Prosper Africa Act would provide congressional backing for the initiative’s structure and mandate and make several significant improvements to the executive program, including reworking its advisory council structure to include a wider and more diverse set of private-sector actors (including those from the African diaspora) than has historically been prioritized by U.S. investment platforms.

These worthy goals notwithstanding, the success of Prosper Africa may ultimately depend on how the initiative and the draft bill in Congress put forward to back it address three key issues.

First, the bill needs revision. Its expansive scope purposefully allows for flexibility but could prove unwieldy. The draft legislation is written without an explicit focus on any specific sectors of the economy. This is based on the rationale that the private sector’s interests and capacity should drive its areas of focus, and the U.S. government should not artificially narrow the range of priority investments. But an initiative designed to serve as a one-stop shop for effectively everything may struggle to be efficient and focused enough to succeed. Congress should consider prioritizing a few specific industries based on criteria such as the U.S. private sector’s comparative advantage in spaces like pharmaceuticals, digital technologies, and higher education.

Second, the United States should utilize Prosper Africa to align its own strategic geopolitical and economic priorities with those of its African partners. For example, Prosper Africa could be a tool to help the United States diversify its critical minerals and technology supply chains away from China and Russia by facilitating investment in refining and processing of lithium, cobalt, nickel, and other minerals crucial for clean energy in countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia while also strengthening social and environmental safeguards. A potential project still under review by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to finance the redevelopment of two lithium mines in Namibia is an example of Africa’s potential.

Finally, the U.S. Congress should also consider more ways of engaging African partners—especially those in anchor economies such as Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa—in shaping the legislation and the initiative. Policymakers, businesses, and civil society—both in Africa and in the U.S.-based African diaspora—have an important opportunity to help influence its content and direction and to ensure that it speaks not only to U.S. interests, but to the mutual benefits to be gained by both the United States and its African partners through a closer, more investment-focused relationship.

For decades, humanitarian and security concerns have dominated U.S. engagement with Africa, precisely because the United States rarely considered Africa a region of strategic interest. Now, in a changing geopolitical landscape, the United States needs to rethink its relationship with the continent. The Prosper Africa Act and the initiative it seeks to bolster represent a landmark effort to strengthen U.S. economic and business engagement in Africa—a move that would benefit all partners. Yet to realize its full promise, the Prosper Africa Act must balance the bill’s expansive scope with some sectoral specificity, frame the initiative as one that aligns U.S. strategic economic priorities with those of African partners, and proactively engage stakeholders in key African markets, especially their U.S.-based diaspora. In an emerging multipolar world with rising powers, Congress should move to pass the Prosper Africa Act to ensure the United States secures a place as the economic partner of choice for Africa.

About the Authors

Zainab Usman

Former Director, Africa Program

Zainab Usman was a senior fellow and the inaugural director of the Africa Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Katie Auth

Nonresident Scholar, Africa Program

Katie Auth is a nonresident scholar with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Africa Program.

Authors

Zainab Usman
Former Director, Africa Program
Zainab Usman
Katie Auth
Nonresident Scholar, Africa Program
Katie Auth
EconomyTradeUnited StatesNorth AfricaSouthern, Eastern, and Western AfricaChina

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Lukashenko’s Bromance With Trump Has a Sell-By Date

    Lukashenko is willing to make big sacrifices for an invitation to Mar-a-Lago or the White House. He also knows that the clock is ticking: he must squeeze as much out of the Trump administration as he can before congressional elections in November leave Trump hamstrung or distracted.

      Artyom Shraibman

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What the Russian Energy Sector Stands to Gain From War in the Middle East

    The future trajectory of the U.S.-Iran war remains uncertain, but its impact on global energy trade flows and ties will be far-reaching. Moscow is likely to become a key beneficiary of these changes; the crisis in the Gulf also strengthens Russia’s hand in its relationships with China and India, where advantages might prove more durable.

      • Sergey Vakulenko

      Sergey Vakulenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Beyond Oil: Hormuz Closure Puts Russia in the Lead in the Fertilizer Market

    The Kremlin expects to not only profit from rising fertilizer prices but also exact revenge for the collapse of the 2023 grain deal.

      Alexandra Prokopenko

  • Paper
    A Tight Spot: Challenges Facing the Russian Oil Sector Through 2035

    Russian oil production is remarkably resilient to significant price changes, but significant political headwinds may lead to a drop regardless of economics.

      • Sergey Vakulenko

      Sergey Vakulenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Why Are China and Russia Not Rushing to Help Iran?

    Most of Moscow’s military resources are tied up in Ukraine, while Beijing’s foreign policy prioritizes economic ties and avoids direct conflict.   

      • Alexander Gabuev

      Alexander Gabuev, Temur Umarov

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Carnegie Russia Eurasia logo, white
  • Research
  • Politika
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.