REQUIRED IMAGE
In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limitIndia's potential nuclear arsenal and that any limitations inIndia's nuclear fuel stockpile stem from short-term problems that, in fact, give theU.S.little leverage overIndia. Tellis argues that Indian policy-makers display no intention nor practice of dramatically building up their nuclear weapon arsenal and that the proposed U.S.-India deal will not causeIndiato do so or augment its capacity to do so in significant ways.
The report states thatIndiais not seeking to maximize its nuclear arsenal as demonstrated byIndia’s decision to produce far less fissile material than its capacity allows given its natural uranium reserves. Tellis argues thatIndia’s short-term deficiency of uranium fuel is due to technical hindrances in its uranium mining and milling practices. He maintains thatIndiahas the capability to rectify this shortcoming independently.
Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse withIndiawhatsoever, because the resulting gains from trade would inevitably free up some domestic Indian resources that would be of use toNew Delhi’s weapons program.”
To access the full report, click here.
In a new report, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India’s Nuclear Arsenal, Carnegie Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis argues empirically that natural uranium resources do not limit
The report states that
Tellis also addresses the contentious issue of whether the deal violates Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He states that the NPT legally allows for nuclear cooperation between nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states on safeguarded facilities, even if the country has not committed to full-scope safeguards. Tellis asserts that critiques that the U.S.-India nuclear deal violates Article I lead “inexorably to the conclusion that no party to the NPT should have any economic intercourse with
To access the full report, click here.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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