• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "C. Raja Mohan"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie China",
    "Carnegie India"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "China’s Foreign Relations",
    "China and the Developing World"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie India",
  "programAffiliation": "SAP",
  "programs": [
    "South Asia"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Asia",
    "South Asia",
    "India",
    "East Asia",
    "China",
    "Southeast Asia",
    "Myanmar"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie India

Raja Mandala: The Great Wall of China

India claims it will “look east” in its foreign policy, but it continues to be distracted by the West. Meanwhile, China is becoming a more attractive partner for others in the region.

Link Copied
By C. Raja Mohan
Published on Aug 23, 2016

Source: Indian Express

For some decades now, India’s strategic opportunities have been mostly in the east. Yet, for the all the talk of “looking east” and “acting east”, Delhi is easily distracted by the endless provocations on its west. The renewed diplomatic engagement with Nepal last week, following the recent regime change in Kathmandu, and this week’s outreach to Burma’s first democratically elected government in many decades, underline the expansive possibilities in the east. Delhi can’t let its obsession with the west come in the way of realising the full potential of the east. (Before you object to the use of the term “Burma”, do note that Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the foreign minister, state counsellor and the dominant figure in the new democratic government prefers this name to describe her nation. But she also added that she will not object to the use of “Myanmar”. “You are free to use either,” she told the diplomats in the Burmese capital, Yangon, in April, this year).

If there is one factor that is common to both the fronts, it is China. Modi’s remarks on Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir highlighted China’s deeper involvement in India’s unending squabbles with Pakistan. Beijing figures prominently in the great game to the east; China has exercised influence there for long.

Consider the following: The new prime minister of Nepal, Prachanda, whose return to power was seen as a big political gain for India, insists on a “balanced policy” towards Delhi and Beijing. Soon after he took charge, Prachanda dispatched his two deputy prime ministers as special envoys to Delhi and Beijing.

In Burma, Suu Kyi chose Beijing as the first port of call among the major powers, despite the fact that China was the strongest supporter of the military regime in the last three decades. Barely a day after her return from her five-day visit to Beijing, Suu Kyi was receiving India’s External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj.

Unlike in the west, where Delhi does not have much room to alter the dynamics of the deepening Sino-Pak alliance, it remains the most important external actor in Nepal. It also has considerable potential to emerge as an influential force in Burma. But it has to contend with China’s power in both the countries.

Objective observers of Nepal will be aware that Delhi no longer has a free hand in Kathmandu and Beijing’s capacity to influence the internal politics of Nepal has significantly increased in recent years. China has always had a larger influence in Burma’s domestic politics.

Given the salience of geography, the downturn in Indo-Nepal relations, during the tenure of the K.P. Oli-led government, was not likely to be permanent. The same holds true for China’s relations with Burma. Since 2011, ties between Beijing and Yangon were on a downhill, as the military government suspended the Myitsone dam project that Beijing was preparing to build on the Irrawaddy river.

As the military government prepared for a democratic transition and to diversify its external relations — away from its dependence on Beijing — the US moved quickly to lift some of the sanctions it had imposed on Burma. Following the US lead, Japan and European powers checked into Yangon. If Beijing seemed to have a free run in Burma from the late-1980s to the turn of the 2010s, it now faced severe competition. But as with Delhi in Nepal, geography guarantees an enduring role for Beijing in Burma.

One of the major outcomes of Suu Kyi’s Beijing trip was China’s commitment to bring three rebel groups in northern Burma that have long had ties to Beijing to the peace process. Settling the conflict with the minority groups is at the top of Suu Kyi’s political agenda. She has set up a commission to review the Chinese dam projects, supported Beijing’s Silk Road initiatives, and chosen to be silent on the South China Sea dispute.

This does not mean Suu Kyi is taking Burma back into Beijing’s fold. China has to work hard in Burma to retain its influence as Suu Kyi seeks a balanced relationship with all major powers. The next stop on Suu Kyi’s travel schedule is Washington. Her talks with Swaraj this week are part of the same process.

Although geography gives India many advantages in both Nepal and Burma, Delhi has been unable to reinforce it with other instruments such as economic diplomacy. China’s ability to deliver large quantities of aid and implement major infrastructure projects on short order makes it an attractive partner for both Kathmandu and Yangon.

India, in contrast, has acquired an unenviable reputation in both Nepal and Burma for “all talk and no action”s. As Delhi prepares for an intensive round of high level political engagement with Nepal and Burma — President Pranab Mukherjee is likely to travel to Kathmandu soon and Delhi will host the Burmese president, Htin Kyaw — it needs a plan for vigorous commercial engagement with both neighbours.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

About the Author

C. Raja Mohan

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie India

A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control.

    Recent Work

  • Article
    Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership

      C. Raja Mohan, Darshana M. Baruah

  • Commentary
    Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Crossroads: Views From Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi
      • Alexander Gabuev
      • +1

      Alexander Gabuev, Paul Haenle, C. Raja Mohan, …

C. Raja Mohan
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie India
Foreign PolicyAsiaSouth AsiaIndiaEast AsiaChinaSoutheast AsiaMyanmar

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • The nuclear missile formation passes through Tian'anmen Square during a military parade on September 3, 2025 in Beijing, China.
    Paper
    Untangling the Nuclear Knot: A Constructive Agenda for Managing China’s Nuclear Relations with the United States and Its Allies

    The nuclear relationship between China and the United States is increasingly shaped by widening perception gaps rather than deliberate strategic design.

      Tong Zhao

  • Commentary
    China Financial Markets
    Who Paid for China’s Last Debt Cleanup, and Who Will Pay for the Next?

    China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today.

      Michael Pettis

  • Robot arm with disposable test tube virus sampling in laboratory
    Commentary
    Caught in the Middle: Chinese Biotech Firms’ Divergent Responses to U.S. Sanctions

    Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.

      Xue Gong

  • An aerial drone photo taken on June 4, 2026 shows a wind-photovoltaic power storage station of Huadian Inner Mongolia New Energy Co., Ltd. as part of the Horinger data center cluster green energy supply demonstration project, in Hohhot, north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
    Commentary
    Are Data Centers the Solution to China’s Renewables Excess Capacity?

    China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Commentary
    Emissary
    Trump and Xi Are Angling for Three Years of Stability

    But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.