Commentary
- +1
Paul Haenle, Xue Gong, Ngeow Chow Bing, …
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Source: Getty
In The Media
The Next U.S. President and Beyond
China supports Trump’s electoral win, but the political rhetoric surrounding tariffs on Chinese imports will not serve either countries’ interests if enacted.
By Paul Haenle
Published on Nov 14, 2016
Source: China Daily
China Daily: The American Chamber of Commerce in China held a seminar on "The Next U.S. President and Beyond" in Beijing. The following is an excerpt of the speech made by Paul Haenle.
Paul Haenle: Many Chinese scholars have come to the conclusion that Donald Trump is better for China (than Hillary Clinton). They like Trump because he talks about the United States growing inward instead of continuing its leadership role in the world. When he says the United States has exceeded its reach in the Middle East and that he will not pay much attention to Asia, it sounds good to the Chinese.
In reality, however, we have very little understanding of what Trump's China policy will look like. During the presidential campaign, he used very general and broad political rhetoric to appeal to the voters. This rhetoric worked. It got him elected. But now, he has to select his cabinet and key advisors, and devise comprehensive policies on key areas. Until that has been completed, there will be a lot of uncertainty about future China-U.S. ties.
No one likes uncertainty, and even though many Chinese like Trump because he has indicated the United States could pull back from Asia, the Chinese leadership doesn't like surprises. Trump's threat to impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from China would also threaten the interests of U.S. exporters that need access to foreign markets, as well as U.S. businesses that rely on commodities or products made overseas.
Other countries could retaliate in ways that are damaging to U.S. interests. This kind of rhetoric might make voters feel better during the campaign, but my own view is that such an approach will not work in practical terms. Imposing such a large tariff could actually hurt Americans as much (if not more) as China and would in that sense likely be a case of cutting our nose off to spite our face.
I do expect a tougher posture by the incoming Trump administration on issues related to international trade and commerce, including a major push for reciprocity in bilateral economic relations. But only time will tell how specifically this will be implemented.
This piece was republished with permission from China Daily.
About the Author
Paul Haenle
Former Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie China
Paul Haenle held the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He served as the White House China director on the National Security Council staffs of former presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
- Carnegie China Scholars on the Biden-Xi Meeting
- Biden and Xi Meet at APECQ&A
Paul Haenle, Chong Ja Ian
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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