But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.
Damien Ma
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National Security Strategies are typically less detailed foreign policy to do lists than broad principles and platitudes designed to persuade people that an administration has a compelling and effective strategy. A year in it’s not at all clear that the Trump administration has one.
Source: USA Today
Who says Donald Trump doesn’t have a foreign policy? He does, but it wasn’t the one he rolled out in a speech Monday on his administration’s national security strategy.
Much of the speech contains language quite consistent with Trumpian values, particularly the focus on America first, homeland security, trade protectionism, America’s sovereignty, and withdrawal from Paris Climate and Trans-Pacific Partnership. But it’s also full of bromides, slogans and platitudes to persuade Congress, the media and the public that the administration has a coherent strategy to protect U.S. interests in a turbulent world.
Still, there is little in the speech that reflects much of what Trump has actually done in foreign policy or why. Here’s a more politically inconvenient guide to Trump’s foreign policy. And unlike the national security strategy, it may well provide clues as to how he’ll operate for the remainder of his presidency....
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program
Richard Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program. His work focuses on U.S. policy toward Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis.
Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program
Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.
Damien Ma
U.S. unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.
Chong Ja Ian
Hanoi and Beijing have long treated each other as distant cousins rather than comrades in arms. That might be changing as both sides draw closer to hedge against uncertainty and America’s erratic behavior.
Nguyễn Khắc Giang
Across Asia, China is better positioned to withstand energy shocks from the fallout of the Iran war. Its abundant coal capacity can ensure stability in the near term. Yet at the same time, the country’s energy transition away from coal will make it even less vulnerable during the next shock.
Damien Ma
Malaysia’s chairmanship sought to fend off short-term challenges while laying the groundwork for minimizing ASEAN’s longer-term exposure to external stresses.
Elina Noor