James Schwemlein
{
"authors": [
"James Schwemlein"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "SAP",
"programs": [
"South Asia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"South Asia",
"Pakistan",
"East Asia",
"China"
],
"topics": [
"Economy",
"Security"
]
}Source: Getty
Flawed by Design: The Challenge of Flawed Democracies to China’s Rise
BRI recipient states undergoing democratic transitions are asserting greater influence over the direction of China’s efforts. This is likely to continue as long as China’s flawed business model remains unchanged.
Source: Asian Affairs
Much ink has been spilled about China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), President Xi Jinping’s grand vision for leveraging China’s growing wealth to expand economic, political, and military influence. The initiative is typically defined as encompassing projects in some 65 countries across three continents, and in sum it represents the greatest directed investment in history with an estimated value of over $1 trillion over the lifetime of the initiative.1 But five years in, Xi’s “project of the century” is facing turbulence – from indications that China’s economy is slowing, routine construction and project management delays, and most interestingly efforts on the part of recipient countries to assert greater control over the direction of China’s efforts.
Much attention has been paid to the notion of local challenges to China’s BRI. But this commentary is misdirected. At this point, the issue is not an expansion of authoritarianism or the proliferation of a “China model.”2 Nor is it that local “pushback” marks emerging “resistance” to China’s effort, or indeed to China’s rise to great power status. Rather, what has been referred to as “pushback” or “resistance” should be understood narrowly as tactical efforts to amend, renegotiate, or cancel contracts or initiatives previously agreed and announced by Beijing and its local governmental partners. These signs need to be understood in more localized terms than they are typically applied. It is a mistake to confuse local efforts to assert greater influence or control over Chinese investments as a rebuke against China’s rise to global power status. Individual states may choose to curtail or alter Chinese investment plans, but China will remain a large, potentially dominant, actor in most Asian markets, despite tactical challenges against some of its individual programmes.3
This article posits that incidents where recipient states have attempt to assert greater influence share a common characteristic–democracy. Or, to be more precise, partial or flawed democracy.
Notes
1. https://www.fbicgroup.com/sites/default/files/B&R_Initiative_65_Countries_and_ Beyond.pdf (accessed 14 March 2019).
2. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/16/on-chinas-new-silk-road-democracy-pays-atoll/ (accessed 14 March 2019).
3. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-24/why-democracies-areturning-against-belt-and-road (accessed 14 March 2019).
About the Author
Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program
James Schwemlein was a nonresident scholar in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- The Military Disrupts Pakistan’s Democracy Once AgainCommentary
- Why Imran Khan Isn’t Going AwayQ&A
James Schwemlein
Recent Work
More Work from Carnegie China
- When It Comes to Superpower Geopolitics, Malaysia Is Staunchly NonpartisanCommentary
For Malaysia, the conjunction that works is “and” not “or” when it comes to the United States and China.
Elina Noor
- ASEAN-China Digital Cooperation: Deeper but Clear-Eyed EngagementCommentary
ASEAN needs to determine how to balance perpetuating the benefits of technology cooperation with China while mitigating the risks of getting caught in the crosshairs of U.S.-China gamesmanship.
Elina Noor
- Neither Comrade nor Ally: Decoding Vietnam’s First Army Drill with ChinaCommentary
In July 2025, Vietnam and China held their first joint army drill, a modest but symbolic move reflecting Hanoi’s strategic hedging amid U.S.–China rivalry.
Nguyễn Khắc Giang
- Today’s Rare Earths Conflict Echoes the 1973 Oil Crisis — But It’s Not the SameCommentary
Regulation, not embargo, allows Beijing to shape how other countries and firms adapt to its terms.
Alvin Camba
- How China’s Growth Model Determines Its Climate PerformanceCommentary
Rather than climate ambitions, compatibility with investment and exports is why China supports both green and high-emission technologies.
Mathias Larsen