Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power
A new book provides broad trend analyses of the major Asian sub-regions, as well as an array of transnational topical studies. It also evaluates current threats to regional peace and stability, considering how the strategic environment in Asia could change.
"The Strategic Asia Program is ambitious by drawing upon the best people in the nation, by analyzing key dynamics, and by tracking changes in the region."
—Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, and written by some of America’s leading specialists including Michael Swaine, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this new study provides an authoritative, independent assessment of the implications of the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Asia and analyzes its effects on the grand strategies of the region’s major powers.
Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power includes broad trend analyses of the major Asian sub-regions, as well as an array of transnational topical studies. The reportcontains studies of five major powers in the region—the United States, China, Japan, Korea, and Russia—and regional studies on Central, South, and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. It includes special studies on trends in energy security, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and science and technology in Asia, as well as alternative outcomes to the North Korean nuclear crisis.The book also evaluates current threats to regional peace and stability, and, through innovative forecasts, considers how the strategic environment in Asia could change surprisingly and underscores the reasons for, and implications of, such strategic discontinuities.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.
China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.
U.S. unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.
Hanoi and Beijing have long treated each other as distant cousins rather than comrades in arms. That might be changing as both sides draw closer to hedge against uncertainty and America’s erratic behavior.