Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party scored victories in three of the five metropolitan elections last weekend. President Ma Ying-jeou and his party should be justifiably relieved to have avoided losing a majority of the urban elections, which could have significantly deflated expectations for Ma’s reelection in 2012.

But there was a double-edged quality to the KMT’s overall victory: the total number of votes for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was actually larger than the winning KMT turnout (about 3.4 million vs. 3.2 million). Presidential elections in Taiwan are by popular vote and the trend in this election and the previous township elections suggest a swing in voter sentiment away from the large majorities given to the KMT in the 2008 presidential and legislative elections.

Taiwan’s many think tanks and university polling centers will chew over the data for their significance in the coming weeks and months. Some observations, however, can be made based on the preliminary results.

• The DPP has made itself more acceptable to Taiwan’s volatile, swing or “middle voters.” In 2008, the middle rushed to the KMT in the wake of provocatively anti-Chinese activities by Taiwan’s then president Chen Shui-bian. This time the DPP maintained ambiguity on its policy toward the mainland so as not to alienate its “fundamentalist” supporters who seek the island’s independence, while not scaring off middle voters who recognize China’s importance to Taiwan’s economy and security. This shift also occurred despite the fact that former DPP president Chen’s criminal case luridly took up news coverage.


• The KMT recovered some of the previously waning support of party regulars, who failed to turn out strongly in the earlier township elections. There is debate about why this occurred, some of which centers on criticism of Taiwan president Ma and party General Secretary King Pu-tsung, who has been trying to shake up old KMT election habits and riling old KMT stalwarts in the process.


• Members of the DPP have been quick to blame losing the capital, Taipei City, on the election eve incident where Sean Lien Sheng-wen, a KMT activist and son of the KMT’s emeritus chairman was shot in the face. Ironically, some from the DPP have complained that the KMT staged the shooting, an allegation similar to that of KMT leaders when former president Chen was wounded the day before his reelection in 2004. The outcome of this debate over the reason for higher KMT turnout in Saturday’s elections is likely to remain in as much doubt as the 2004 result still is today.


• The KMT needs to address its waning popular support through effective governance, an improving economy, and even more careful handling of cross-strait issues.


• The DPP now has two strong leaders in chairwoman Ts’ai Ing-wen and defeated-Taipei candidate Su Tseng-chang, who are now free from the burdens of office and can compete to head the DPP ticket to challenge President Ma in 2012.

Cross-strait relations are entering a new, more delicate phase. Prior to this election, it was clear that China worked to support incumbent Ma and his party out of fear of a return to the tensions of DPP rule and its drive for independence. China delivered important concessions on trade in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), a largely one-sided free trade agreement between China and Taiwan. There were other concessions from Beijing to Ma’s political agenda, from cross-strait direct flights, to greater “international space,” and a diplomatic truce in their competition for diplomatic recognition.

But over the next two years, Ma could become increasingly vulnerable to DPP allegations that his tilt toward China has been less productive than promised or assumed. For example, China has continued its military build-up opposite Taiwan, probably to deter the island should the DPP pro-independence forces reemerge as leaders.

Ma needs to show toughness in resisting this threat, or success in persuading China to reduce its deployments. He is more likely to choose the former because he can largely control the outcome, though he will then depend on the United States giving him the defense equipment that Taiwan requires, principally F-16 C/Ds. For the Obama administration, which will probably oblige Ma, it means that Washington will face choosing to pay a new price in its troubled relations with Beijing.

While Beijing has been generous to Taipei on the economic front because it can easily afford to be, it is more tight-fisted with Taiwan’s “international space.” Again, the mainland seems to fear that allowing Taiwan the modest recognition that participation in international organizations—such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), or the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)—would be pocketed by a successor DPP government as a way station to international recognition of Taiwan’s independence from China. Ma needs to outperform the expectations set by his opponents in this sensitive area—a difficult goal.

Indeed, in the run-up to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States in January 2011, Chinese officials have been probing for assurances that the Obama administration will not sell F-16s to Taiwan or press for its participation in functional international organizations. Beijing apparently fears Hu will be embarrassed by such U.S. actions not long after his state visit ends, much as former premier Zhu Rongji was embarrassed on a visit when then president Bill Clinton shockingly turned down China’s offer to join the World Trade Organization. But China is not likely to be successful with these appeals.

Probably most important for Ma’s reelection will be returning Taiwan’s economy to robust growth, which Taiwan’s voters expect. Both Taipei and Beijing can do something about this, but both remain vulnerable to global swings in market sentiment. After the metropolitan election’s double-edged success, the 2012 election is Ma’s to lose, but considerable recalibration will be needed in the months ahead.