George Perkovich
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The Iranian Nuclear Challenge: Five Options
Source: Congressional Program: Political Islam: Challenges for U.S. Policy
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. and a few other states have been highly concerned that
Iran’s revived nuclear program was intended, at least in part, to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons. In 2003, acting on tips, the International Atomic Energy Agency began an intensive investigation that has uncovered a long list of Iranian violations of obligations to report nuclear transactions and activities. These violations of safeguard agreements center around Iran’s quest for equipment and materials to enable it to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, as well as experiments associated with other materials that can be essential in making nuclear weapons, such as polonium. In each instance, Iran has argued that the undeclared activity, while violating Iran’s reporting obligations, was for peaceful purposes, and therefore not a core violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The IAEA’s investigators also discovered activities that point to the involvement of military
institutions, which, if proved, would violate Iran’s core NPT obligation to use nuclear energy
solely for peaceful purposes. IAEA’s discovery of a document detailing how to manufacture
metallic uranium spheres, who’s only known purpose is in nuclear weapons, buttresses
suppositions that Iran has done more than violate its safeguards agreement.
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About the Author
Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow
George Perkovich is the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. He works primarily on nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues, and is leading a study on nuclear signaling in the 21st century.
- How to Assess Nuclear ‘Threats’ in the Twenty-First CenturyPaper
- “A House of Dynamite” Shows Why No Leader Should Have a Nuclear TriggerCommentary
George Perkovich
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Europe
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The U.S.-Iran war has crossed a dangerous threshold: water infrastructure in the Gulf is now a target. Ecological statecraft is no longer peripheral to security, it's part of its foundations.
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