French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
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On January 19 French president Jacques Chirac announced slight changes to the county’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Chirac seemed to expand the definition ofFrance’s vital interests to include oil. He would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons and protect these interests, he said, and to deter any terrorist attacks on those interests. Shortly after, French Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie amplified this new crease in French strategy in speeches to the public and to French parliament members.
Some French experts say that Chirac’s speech had nothing to do with a growing Iranian threat. “One knows that this type of speech is prepared several months in advance and by definition cannot be directly linked to current affairs,” wrote Bruno Tertrais, a senior associate at the Foundation for Strategic Research in an analysis entitled La Dissuasion Revisitée (Deterrence Revisited). (Read More)
On January 19 French president Jacques Chirac announced slight changes to the county’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Chirac seemed to expand the definition of
The integrity of our territory, the protection of our population, the free exercise of our sovereignty will always form the heart of our vital interests. But our interests are not limited to just these. The definition of these interests evolves with the rhythm of the world, a world marked by the increasing interdependence of the European countries and also by the effects of globalization. For example, the guarantee of our strategic supplies or the defense of allied nations is, among others, interests which are important to protect.
Some French experts say that Chirac’s speech had nothing to do with a growing Iranian threat. “One knows that this type of speech is prepared several months in advance and by definition cannot be directly linked to current affairs,” wrote Bruno Tertrais, a senior associate at the Foundation for Strategic Research in an analysis entitled La Dissuasion Revisitée (Deterrence Revisited).
Others see direct linkage. Chirac specifically calls some of
Chirac’s deterrence policy speech highlights another new element in French policy. This nouveauté was brought on by post 9-11 terrorist threat perception and the suspension of European-Iranian negotiations. Chirac said:
The leaders of those nations, who would resort to terrorist means against us, as well as those who may consider the use, in any way, of weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they will expose themselves to a firm and adequate response on our part. That response may be conventional, but it can also be of another kind.
Recently,
Defense Minister Alliot-Marie said, “These evolutions are aimed at better taking into account the psychology of the enemy.” It is a falsity she said for a potential enemy to “think that
While some French experts claim that Chirac’s speech does not show a large difference in French deterrence policy, the new statement does expand the definition of France’s vital interests and portrays a France ready to use nuclear weapons against even a non-nuclear enemy–which may include Iran and definitely includes any state sponsor or accomplice of a terrorist attack on France’s vital interests.
French Nuclear Forces, 2005, Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Jill Marie Parillo
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
French President Emmanuel Macron has unveiled his country’s new nuclear doctrine. Are the changes he has made enough to reassure France’s European partners in the current geopolitical context?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
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