In 2008, the 46 participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to exempt India from the comprehensive IAEA safeguards requirement of the NSG Guidelines. This “India exemption” permits suppliers to conduct civil nuclear trade with India, one of the three states that never joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).¹ The nuclear policy community widely believes this exemption undermines the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

1. Undertake to comply (as have the five NPT nuclear-weapon states) with the requirements of Articles I, III.2 and VI of the NPT;


2. Have in force a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA whereby the non-NPT State undertakes to place all new nuclear facilities located outside existing military nuclear sites on the list of facilities eligible to be safeguarded by the IAEA under INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements (with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with IAEA document GOV/1621 of August 1973);⁵


3. Have ratified an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement (as already done by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states);


4. Not be in material breach of an IAEA safeguards agreement; 


5. Commit not to export or transfer items specified in INFCIRC/254/ Parts 1 and 2 to a NNWS unless such State has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)⁶ and an Additional Protocol (AP)⁷ in force with the IAEA, and is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation. This export condition has been accepted by a very large majority of NSG members and should be agreed upon by any new member; 


6. Have in place legal measures to ensure the effective and uninterrupted implementation of the NSG Guidelines (both Part 1 and Part 2), including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations; 


7. Commit to share information on “catch all” denials with the IAEA and the members of the NSG;


8. Have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),⁸ as specifically requested of India and Pakistan under UNSC Resolution 1172, with the understanding that its ratification will be automatically completed upon ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. and China.  If another state in the region proceeds with a nuclear test, this could constitute an event as defined in Article IX.2 of the CTBT, thereby justifying withdrawal. 


9. Commit, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosion tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s “13 Steps;”


10. Fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that relate to nuclear proliferation or terrorism (in particular, Resolution 1540);


11. Adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and have in place the corresponding export control legislation;


12. Have ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended in 2005;


13. Be party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/290 (April 2005);


14. Pending completion of a formal treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, commit to implement in good faith Step 3 of the “13 Steps” and “agree on a program of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.”

^{1. The other two being Israel and Pakistan.}