In this episode of Interpreting India, Charukeshi Bhatt speaks with Pooja Bhatt, Associate Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal University, on a piece of infrastructure that is easy to overlook and very difficult to protect: subsea cables. Stretching over 1.5 million kilometres across ocean floors and carrying nearly 99% of global data traffic, these cables underpin everything from financial systems and cloud infrastructure to the everyday digital services that billions of people rely on. For India, a fast-growing digital economy with expanding data center ambitions, getting this right is not optional.
This episode explores:
Why subsea cables remain far superior to satellites for global data transfer, and what India's current footprint in the global cable network actually looks like? How do cable consortia work in practice, and what are the tensions that arise when private companies and sovereign governments have very different priorities? How real is the threat from China's rapidly expanding footprint in the global cable network, and what does the debate around trusted networks mean in practice? What has the Quad delivered on cable connectivity and resilience, and what should India's next steps be domestically and regionally?
Episode Note
Pooja opens with a mismatch that frames the entire conversation. India consumes around 20% of global internet traffic but accounts for just 2% of global subsea cable infrastructure. Even with the expansion of landing stations currently underway, the gap between India's digital ambitions and its physical cable footprint is significant. Part of this is historical: cable infrastructure was concentrated in Mumbai and Chennai, and building it out is prohibitively expensive. Part of it is structural: the raw materials, the technology, and crucially the cable-laying ships that make all of it possible are controlled by a very small number of countries.
On the question of China's expanding footprint, Pooja draws out a tension that runs through the whole conversation: private cable companies are driven by cost and scale, and will naturally gravitate towards cheaper components and partners regardless of where they come from. Sovereign concerns around espionage, trusted supply chains, and national security are a different conversation entirely, and the two do not always find a common language easily. This is where the idea of trusted networks becomes important, frameworks built around like-minded partners who share a common understanding of hardware standards, legal norms, and jurisdictional protections. Australia's approach of using its Exclusive Economic Zone provisions to protect cable infrastructure is one model Pooja thinks India should take seriously and preliminary discussions suggest it already is.
On Quad, Pooja notes that the cable connectivity and resilience partnership launched at the Leaders’ Summit was significant, and there is work happening beneath the surface even if it is not attracting media attention. She concludes by suggesting that more clarity from the government on where India stands on subsea cables, which bodies are responsible, and the national approach will help the broader conversation, especially aiding relevant stakeholders reach out to the right people within the government. That clarity, she argues, is the essential first step.