Giovanni Fassina is the director of the European Legal Support Center (ELSC), the only organization in Europe and the United Kingdom that provides legal support for individuals and groups penalized for advocating for Palestinian rights. Fassina is an expert on international law and has worked for many years in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the development sector. Alice Garcia manages communications and advocacy strategies and campaigns at the ELSC. She has been working in advocacy related to Israel-Palestine since 2015. Diwan interviewed the two in late May, as ELSC was preparing to publish a report pushing back against a definition of antisemitism being advanced by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. The ELSC report, which was published on June 6, can be found here.
Michael Young: We can agree that antisemitism is a scourge, but what is it specifically that you and your colleagues are opposing in the definition of antisemitism that has been prepared by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)? And what is IHRA trying to do with this definition?
Giovanni Fassina and Alice Garcia: Yes, antisemitism is a scourge and it must be combatted, with appropriate tools. The IHRA definition of antisemitism does not offer such a tool, as hundreds of academics, including Jewish scholars specialized in Holocaust studies, antisemitism, Jewish history, and related fields, as well as hundreds of civil society organizations, including human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have confirmed. Moreover, our research shows that the definition is overwhelmingly aimed at suppressing Palestinian rights advocates in order to silence criticism of Israeli policies and practices.
First, despite having “IHRA” in its designation, the definition was not prepared by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. It was the result of a concerted effort—underway since the early 2000s—by individuals and organizations aligned with the Israeli government, to redefine antisemitism in a way that deflects and silences criticism of Israel for its human rights violations and violent repression against Palestinians. This reconceptualization of antisemitism focusing on criticism of Israel has come to be known as the “New Antisemitism” and has been documented by Antony Lerman in his 2002 book, Whatever Happened to Antisemitism? Redefinition and the Myth of the ‘Collective Jew’. Lerman is a former head of the World Jewish Congress’ Institute of Jewish Affairs.
This materialized in the early 2000s when the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) commissioned and published the “Working Definition of Antisemitism” featuring “contemporary examples of antisemitism.” This included examples relating to Israel. After the definition was criticized due to its conflation of criticism of Israel with antisemitism, the definition was abandoned by the EUMC’s successor body, the Fundamental Rights Agency, which removed it from its website in 2013. The advocates of the definition—including, individuals affiliated with the American Jewish Committee, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the European Jewish Congress, NGO Monitor, and UN Watch—lobbied other European bodies to adopt the definition. They had no success.
Consequently, they approached the IHRA, which adopted these two sentences from the EUMC definition on May 26, 2016: “A certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” This definition alone is not what we are opposing. But, eleven “contemporary examples of antisemitism” were attached to the definition, seven of which relate to Israel. For example, example 7 reads, “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.” Example 10 reads, “Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”
As we have been observing, in practice these examples are used and broadly interpreted to conflate criticism of Israel with anti-Jewish prejudice. Example 7, for instance, is constantly used to repress the assertion that the Israeli government commits the crime of apartheid against Palestinians, which is based on factual findings and documentation of experts, lawyers, and human rights advocates.
IHRA itself is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1998 by former Swedish prime minister Göran Persson “to strengthen, advance and promote Holocaust education, research and remembrance.” As part of its missions, it is of course promoting the fight against antisemitism, and since it has adopted the so-called “IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism” it has promoted it around the globe. But more problematic is how the Israeli government, allied groups, and advocacy organizations are using the definition, with the examples included, to target Palestinian rights advocacy, in an effort to silence any criticism of Israel and therefore shield it from any accountability.
MY: What was the process behind the steady transformation of the definition of antisemitism to encompass any criticism of Israel? And how does one address the fact that among the harshest critics of Israeli policies have been Jewish historians and writers?
GF and AG: Although the problematic examples were never formally adopted by the IHRA itself, they are now being treated by institutions, including the European Union, as if they were part of the definition and this is the result of years of lobbying from supporters of the “new antisemitism” theory. Jamie Stern-Weiner has written extensively on this process. In some countries, parliaments or governments have explicitly excluded the application of the examples while adopting or endorsing the IHRA definition. But the United Kingdom, for instance, decided to ignore caveats recommended by an all-party parliamentary committee. The EU has now made clear that it considers the examples tied to the IHRA definition to be an integral part of it, despite many warnings and concerns over human rights expressed by academics, human rights defenders, Jewish organizations, UN experts, and lawyers.
Internationally, individuals and organizations criticizing Israeli policies come from different backgrounds and locations. The history of Israel and Jewish history definitely interconnect at some point and therefore it is not a surprise that Jewish historians and writers think and write critically about Israel. This shows that the adherence to a Jewish culture or community can be totally disconnected from the adherence to the ideology of Zionism and the State of Israel. Indeed, many Jewish historians and writers are committed anti-Zionists or critics of Israeli policies and practices, and most likely, because of their background, they will tend to be more heard than other oppressed communities when they criticize Israel.
Many Jewish historians and writers also reject the IHRA definition because it conflates criticism of Israel with antisemitism, and this definition de facto harms Jewish individuals or Jewish organizations, as we have documented. In 2021, more than 350 leading scholars on antisemitism, Holocaust Studies, and related fields rejected the IHRA definition and joined the initiative to approve an alternative definition called the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism. In November 2022, 128 scholars specializing on antisemitism, Holocaust Studies, and related fields warned, in an open letter: “Don’t trap the United Nations in a vague and weaponized definition of antisemitism.”
MY: You have just published a report on the IHRA definition and how it is violating freedom of expression. What are the main points you make in your report?
GF and AG: The report we just published is titled “Suppressing Palestinian Rights Advocacy through the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism—Violating the Rights to Freedom of Expression and Assembly in the European Union and the UK.” Based on 53 cases where the IHRA definition was used to target Palestinian rights advocates with allegations of antisemitism that were proven to be unfounded, the report shows evidence that the IHRA definition is being implemented in ways that curtail freedom of expression and assembly, contradicting what the EU Commission has been stating for years. Cases show that this had led to self-censorship and fostered anti-Palestinian racism.
Despite what the EU Commission has also repeated, the fact that the IHRA definition is non-binding does not protect individuals and organizations from restrictions of their rights. The report shows that the IHRA definition is increasingly being implemented by public and private bodies as if it was law, although it is being branded as “non-legally binding.”
Advocates of Palestinian rights who are targeted suffer a range of unjust and harmful consequences, including loss of employment and reputational damage, cancellation of events and demonstrations, exclusion from academia or employment, and so on. Even when proven unfounded, allegations of antisemitism leave indelible marks on one’s life and those who have the resources to challenge them have to take a long and heavy legal journey to do so.
The European Commission, as well as the British government, have consistently ignored and dismissed these growing human rights concerns and failed to take measures to prevent harmful impacts on fundamental rights. We are now asking the relevant authorities to reverse their detrimental policies, and therefore to cease the adoption, endorsement, implementation, and promotion of the IHRA definition.
MY: Are you seeing any impact of the IHRA definition specifically on scholarship of the Arab-Israeli or Palestinian-Israeli conflict? If so, can you describe this?
GF and AG: There has been an impact on scholars working on this topic for several years. Academic staff and students who have faced terrifying disciplinary proceedings that look like mini trials have been impacted in so many ways. Some have had to go on sick leave because they were incapable of teaching while going through this lengthy and heavy procedure, or had health issues. Some have had to pay for lawyers. Some have left academia as a result. Some have quit social media. Others have told us they are now self-censoring in order to avoid groundless accusations, stigmatization, and even isolation from their peers. One academic told us she deleted entire passages of her forthcoming book for fear of a backlash. This is extremely detrimental to academic freedom. Among the 53 incidents which constitute the basis of our research, 35 happened in an academic setting, and the majority were in the United Kingdom. One important thing to note as well is that most of the scholars who were targeted were decolonial scholars and write and teach on Palestine, Israel, or the Middle East. Most of them were also people of color, Palestinian, or Jewish scholars. Most of the students targeted were also people of color, including Palestinians.
In the United Kingdom, universities are being pressured into adopting the IHRA definition by the government. As a result, more than 200 British universities have incorporated the definition into their policies, and limitations on academic freedom and discussion have already been reported. The IHRA definition has thus become a binding policy in many universities, which has already led to students and staff members being subjected to disciplinary proceedings. In most cases, students and academics are targeted by complaints (often anonymous) of alleged antisemitism, based on academic articles or social media posts they have published. Sometimes the complaints concerned merely sharing or “liking” posts. Even if the content of the posts had nothing to do with anti-Jewish hatred, the complainants were arguing they were in breach of the IHRA definition and therefore antisemitic.
With the implementation of the IHRA definition, we are witnessing an inversion of the burden of proof, where the complainant is not required to explain on what grounds specific conduct is antisemitic. He or she just has to point out that a social media post or “like” violates the IHRA definition, which is enough to trigger a disciplinary investigation. In the cases we documented, most of the posts concerned Israeli policies and practices, criticism of Zionism as a political ideology, or comments on international or British internal politics (including the Labor Party). These complaints were all dismissed, or the investigations concluded the allegations were unfounded.
Nevertheless, this fosters a climate of self-censorship. In Germany or Austria, several academics were excluded from events, scholarship, or disinvited after pressures from groups alleging antisemitism based on the IHRA definition, thus limiting their academic freedom and, more broadly, their freedom of expression. Notable cases include the cancellation of Palestinian academic Walaa Alqaisiya’s lecture at the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts by this same institution, a few days before she was due to speak on a panel that was part of an art program focusing on decoloniality. In Germany, Anna-Esther Younes, a German-Palestinian scholar of critical race theory, was surveilled by antisemitism watchdog Research and Information on Anti-Semitism, which sent a secret dossier to the Berlin chapter of the political party Die Linke (The Left), containing unfounded allegations of antisemitism, sexism, and support for terrorism. Younes was consequently disinvited from an event organized by Die Linke, and since then she has been unable to secure employment in academia.
Despite this worrying trend, we strongly believe that our legal intervention, the mobilization of a network of solidarity, and the many cases we have won deter the usual complainants from pursuing their unfounded allegations.
MY: Is there a risk that if the definition of antisemitism is stretched so widely, the term itself will gradually lose meaning, given that it risks being undermined by what is, essentially, a polarizing political debate? In other words, by loading the term down with political conditions, won’t the consensus over the evils of antisemitism disintegrate?
GF and AG: This question tends to extend the scope of our mandate but many opponents of the IHRA definition, indeed, say it is detrimental to the fight against antisemitism and distracts from very dangerous actual antisemitic theories and crimes. Some say that, if antisemitism should be defined, “we have better definitions than the IHRA definition that we can use in addition to or instead of the IHRA definition.” Some say that antisemitism should not be defined only by Jews.
Others, such as fifteen progressive Jewish groups from across the world, including Jewish Voice for Peace in the United States, have “urge[d] a shift from discussing how antisemitism is defined, to a focus on how antisemitism can be dismantled, alongside all forms of racism and bigotry.” To do so, they have published 5 Principles to Dismantle Antisemitism. The groups argue that the various definitions issued since–and including–the IHRA definition, risk “contributing to the intense policing of discourse on Israel-Palestine and distract from the real dangers we face as Jews today from white supremacists and the far-right.” They add: “Legislating a static definition for any particular form of bigotry weakens our society’s efforts to combat discrimination across different contexts and over time.”
While supporters of the IHRA definition are unfoundedly conflating Palestinian rights advocacy with antisemitism, in order to silence criticism of Israeli policies, it is striking to observe how actual antisemitism from white supremacism and neo-Nazis can be “excused,” authorized, or remains unpunished. In the United States, we have witnessed this bizarre alliance between Israel and anti-Semitic white supremacists. Recently, the new Israeli minister of diaspora affairs and combating antisemitism defended Elon Musk after he was accused of invoking antisemitic tropes and conspiracy theories targeting George Soros. In Europe, neo-Nazi white supremacists were allowed to march and chant antisemitic slogans in Berlin and other cities of Germany. Meanwhile, events organized in Berlin by Palestinian groups and their allies to commemorate the Nakba (the forced displacement of Palestinians starting in 1948 and continuing until today) were banned multiple times by the police, which has mentioned the IHRA definition as a seal of legitimacy.
We can assert, from our perspective, that this instrumentalization of the fight against antisemitism for the interests of the Israeli government’s agenda, including through the IHRA definition, creates another type of racism: anti-Palestinian racism. Anti-Palestinian racism has been described by the Arab-Canadian Lawyers Association (ACLA) as “a form of anti-Arab racism that silences, excludes, erases, stereotypes, defames or dehumanizes Palestinians or their narratives.” It takes various forms described in a landmark report from the ACLA, including “defaming Palestinians and their allies with slander such as being inherently antisemitic, a terrorist threat/sympathizer or opposed to democratic values.”
