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The Illusion of Oslo

Three decades after the signing of the first Palestinian-Israeli accord, what remains is an Israeli mechanism to control Palestinians on the cheap.

Published on September 13, 2023

Thirty years ago today, on September 13, 1993, Palestinians and Israelis signed the Oslo I Accord. The agreement resulted in mutual recognition between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel and launched a so-called peace process. The accords also led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, which emerged as the official representative body of Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967 and the main manager of their economic activities and everyday lives. At the time, Palestinians were hoping to establish an independent sovereign state and achieve economic prosperity. However, 30 years later, they find themselves further than ever from attaining these goals.

Despite the institutional changes brought about by the Oslo process, Israel maintained ultimate control over the occupied territories and its population, as the PA was granted very limited sovereignty. The Oslo Accords—Oslo I and then Oslo II, signed in September 1995—allowed Israel to retain control over key Palestinian resources, including, water, electricity, and energy. Israel also maintained full domination over external borders and thus over international market access for Palestinian trade.

The Israelis were given full control over the PA’s fiscal revenues as well, through a clearance revenue system. According to this system, Israel collects, on behalf of the PA, taxes on imports to the Palestinian market, indirect taxes on Israeli goods exported to the occupied territories, and income taxes and social transfers from Palestinians employed in Israel or in Israeli settlements. Israel then transfers these taxes to the PA, subject to a 3 percent administration fee.

Therefore, while the Israeli military withdrew from directly managing the economy of the occupied territories and reduced its military presence, it continued to act as the main authority. It controlled every aspect of Palestinian life, including finances, trade, access to the outside world, as well as Palestinian economic and human resources. The economy of the occupied territories thus remained dependent on Israel’s economy in the post-Oslo period, as was the case during the pre-Oslo phase.

Furthermore, the main premise of the Oslo I Accord—recognition of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as a unified territorial entity—was effectively rendered null and void through Israel’s fragmentation of Palestinian space. Israel’s closure regime, which was introduced in the early 1990s, the system of movement and access restrictions, the territorial and administrative division of the West Bank into areas A, B, and C, which was agreed in the Oslo II Accord, the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements, and the building of a separation wall, all led to the geographic fragmentation of the West Bank, which has also become separated from the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

This geographic reality has been associated with the economic fragmentation of the occupied territories into different economic enclaves. These encompass the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, Area C in the West Bank, Ramallah in the central West Bank, the northern West Bank, and the southern West Bank. This spatial and economic reality, where the map of the West Bank looks like a slice of Swiss cheese, has made it impossible to establish a sovereign independent Palestinian state.

Against this background, what have the Oslo Accords achieved in reality? Or what did they aim to achieve? The Oslo process was mainly a project to reorganize Israeli authority, through the establishment of the PA as an institution of indirect rule to which Israel outsourced its responsibilities for the occupied population, as direct rule over Palestinians was becoming financially and militarily very costly. This was especially true after the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987.

Israel’s strategic interests in Oslo were clearly expressed by a former advisor to prime minister Ariel Sharon, Dov Weisglass, who wrote this in 2012: “Today, as a result of the Oslo Accords, the PA, not Israel, is responsible for the daily life of some 3.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza... A Palestinian once told me that the Oslo deal was ‘a brilliant Israeli arrangement.’ How so? I asked him. ‘It created the only prison in the world where the prisoners have to provide for themselves, without the management’s participation.’ Israel has the authority of the sovereign in the territories—without the obligations. This situation is a direct result of the Oslo Accords.”

A key aspect of the PA as an institution of indirect rule, is that it was locked into the status of security subcontractor. It was made responsible for meeting Israel’s political and security concerns through security coordination with the Israelis. The PA therefore became Israel’s arm in repressing Palestinian resistance against the occupation.

Overall, the Oslo Accords not only institutionalized the power imbalance between Palestinians and Israelis. They also gave Israel the means to run a relatively cheap occupation, since the PA and the international donor community became important actors in administering the Palestinian population. The Oslo process was also economically beneficial to Israel, especially since it lifted the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel. This permitted Israel to fully integrate into the global economy. It is no surprise, then, that the late Edward Said called the Oslo Accords “a Palestinian Versailles.”

Despite persistent Israeli efforts to divide Palestinians and annihilate the question of Palestine, especially with the current far-right government; and despite the PA’s clinging to Oslo and its growing weakness and lack of legitimacy, history tells us that Palestinians will not give up until they achieve freedom, dignity, and justice. 

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.