The summer was hot in northeastern Syria, as has been the transition to autumn. The season began with increased tensions between U.S. forces, which maintain a presence in the northeast, on the one hand, and Russia, Iran, and the Syrian regime on the other. According to U.S. officials and leaked documents from the Pentagon, since late 2022 Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus have been cooperating to increase pressure on U.S. forces and drive them out of the northeast. Russia has harassed U.S. and allied aircraft, and has also damaged U.S. drones. Iran-linked groups, in turn, have attacked American forces and carried out escalatory moves such as transporting anti-aircraft missiles into Deir al-Zor Governorate.
However, the United States has shown no signs of leaving the region. On the contrary, in June it reinforced its fleet of aircraft there, including deploying advanced F-22s and F-35s. On August 9, reports surfaced that representatives of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hezbollah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, and other Iranian proxies had gathered near the Lebanese-Syrian border to discuss how to deter possible attacks on their positions in Deir al-Zor. At around the same time, Washington reportedly moved more forces into northeastern Syria through Iraq and was thought to be discussing with Turkey the transfer of Syrian opposition fighters from the northwest to the U.S. military base in Tanf, near Jordan’s border. This suggested that the Americans were preparing to block the Syrian-Iraqi border and prevent pro-Iran forces from crossing freely.
For a time, the northeast seemed to be on the brink of a major military confrontation. However, the opposite happened as the situation quickly deescalated. There were multiple reasons for this, not least a U.S.-Iranian agreement in early August on prisoners and on the release of Iranian assets by Washington. It wouldn’t be surprising, therefore, if the deescalation was a part of this quid pro quo. This followed reports in June that the United States and Iran were about to agree to a “political ceasefire,” one of whose clauses was that Tehran would “halt lethal attacks on American contractors in Syria and Iraq by its proxies in the region.”
One could argue that the ratcheting down of U.S.-Iranian tensions was a case of Tehran outmaneuvering Russia and the Syrian regime (who relied on Iran to do the heavy lifting with Washington), helping to secure Iran’s continued dominance in the area. Indeed, Tehran appears to be satisfied with the status quo in Eastern Syria, and any change in its position could be tied to its relations with Washington, rather than with Moscow or the regime in Damascus.
However, in late August Eastern Syria again heated up, this time because of local tensions between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Arab tribes in eastern Deir al-Zor Governorate. The spark was the arrest of Ahmed al-Khabil and several of his comrades.* Khabil headed the Deir al-Zor Military Council that is subordinate to SDF. Reports suggested that initially it was Khabil’s supporters who rebelled against the SDF, but a chain of events, including the SDF’s killing of civilians, broadened the circle of rebellion to include clans outside Khabil’s stronghold. Ten days later, the SDF, reestablished control over areas that tribal forces had taken, without any major opposition from the U.S.
A number of factors are worth mentioning in the context of the conflict in the northeast, or beyond that the broader Syrian conflict. First, arguably, the core catalyst of the tribal rebellion was not really Bakhil’s arrest, but the tribes’ pursuit of a greater autonomy from the SDF and the Kurds in Deir al-Zor, as well as other longstanding grievances. The Arab tribes are already more autonomous in Deir al-Zor than they are in Raqqa, nevertheless it is Kurdish leaders in the region who pull the strings. A second likely reason for the rebellion was to secure greater access to the area’s economic resources, including oil. The local population in Deir al-Zor has complained that after the defeat of the Islamic State, they benefited little from their governorate’s wealth. Greater autonomy could mean that they have a much wider latitude to exploit these resources.
Another factor worth mentioning is that the SDF faced a critical challenge to its power, but appears to have overcome it smoothly, at least for now. The SDF showed it was strong enough to crush a revolt by local armed clans that could threaten the project of Kurdish autonomy in eastern and northeastern Syria. The revolt also illustrated the limited appetite (or ability) of tribes to wage a real war against SDF.
A third factor is that this local conflict quickly took on a regional dimension. Turkey criticized the SDF and the United States, and tribal forces mobilized in Turkish-controlled areas began putting pressure on the SDF along the front lines near Tal Tamer and Manbij. The SDF, in turn, blamed the Syrian regime and Iran for the uprising. While the regime voiced support for the tribes, and may have extended assistance, Iran’s role remained ambiguous. It made no clear statement backing the tribes, let alone supplied them with weapons. Iran is always a good scapegoat for the SDF, however, as this attracts attention away from the historically good relationship between Tehran and the Kurdistan Workers Party, whose Syrian component represents a major portion of the SDF. It also begs the question: Had Iran really supported the tribes, could the SDF have defeated the revolt within days?
The whole of northern Syria, from east to west, is part of one broad security ecosystem. After Iran appeared to outmaneuver Russia and the Syrian regime by deescalating with the United States, it was questionable to what extent Damascus could rely on Tehran to destabilize the U.S. presence in the northeast. Russia’s dangerous maneuvers in the air and the regime’s timid attempts to trigger a “popular resistance” against U.S. forces will have little impact on Washington and the SDF without the active involvement of Iran, who, with its proxies, is the only party that can escalate against the Americans. If Iran is not interested in doing so, Damascus and Moscow will have to look for another partner.
The only other partner available is Turkey. Ankara has a genuine interest in seeing an end to U.S. support for the Kurds, an attitude shared by Russia and the Syrian regime. Therefore, if the United States and Iran adhere to rules of the game in Eastern Syria that limit bilateral tensions, this could reinforce the SDF. This, in turn, could become a catalyst for closer cooperation involving Moscow, Damascus, and Ankara, which would provide an incentive for a rapprochement between Syria and Turkey, whose dispute has hindered the containment of the Kurds.
If Iran’s calculations in the northeast are increasingly tied to its relations with the United States, then Russia and the Syrian regime might not want to remain hostages to such considerations. This presents an additional reason for Russia to pressure Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to be more amenable to negotiations with Turkey, and for Assad himself to embrace such contacts. Syria and Turkey may be enemies, but their interests in the northeast may be more aligned than they are with Iran’s.
*In an earlier version of this article, Ahmad al-Khabil was mistakenly rendered Ahmad al-Bakhil.
