Hamas’s operational success on October 7 has placed Iran, and with it Hezbollah, between a rock and a hard place as they try to calibrate their response to the ongoing conflict with Israel. If they use all the firepower at their disposal, there could be a rapid escalation into a broader regional war, and perhaps even a global conflict. And if they remain on the sidelines, this could undermine their “unity of the arenas” strategy, in which they sought to heighten coordination among members of the so-called Axis of Resistance, including Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, pro-Iranian militias from the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, in Yemen.
The speech on Friday of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah reflected this unease. He lauded the October 7 operation, clarified that it was purely Palestinian, and expressed full solidarity with the Palestinian armed factions. But Nasrallah refrained from expanding the conflict with Israel. In the face of mounting criticism by some Hamas leaders for not doing more, he clarified that Hezbollah’s actions along Lebanon’s southern border were reducing Israeli pressure on Hamas. While the fighting seems relatively contained for now, Nasrallah implied that it might escalate in the future, depending on the situation in Gaza and Israeli actions in Lebanon. He also reminded his audience that Israel has often been forced to step back from its maximalist positions, as in the 2006 war when it had to accept a prisoner swap after a 33-day bombing campaign in Lebanon, which Israel had prepared by saying it sought Hezbollah’s elimination.
Iran has spent the better part of the last four decades building up its network of influence across the region and carving out successive circles of deterrence around Israel. This began with Hezbollah, which was created in 1982–1984, in the aftermath of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon that forced the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership out of the country. Iran has invested time and billions of dollars to build up a network of allies and proxies that spans the Middle East. It has taken advantage of political opportunities and security vacuums to establish or support the array of nonstate actors in the Axis of Resistance.
Most recently, the so-called Abraham Accords signed between Israel and three Arab countries in particular—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco—provided Iran with new openings. These agreements, which were seen as anchors for a new security and economic order in the Middle East, supported by the United States, offered normalization with Israel without mentioning Palestine or the Palestinians. They undermined United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, all of them based on the principle of land for peace. This left the Palestinians stranded, without political backing from states in the region. A Saudi peace deal with Israel, which was being negotiated when Hamas’s October 7 attacks occurred, would have been the final nail in the coffin of Palestinian aspirations for self-determination.
Iran and Hezbollah moved into the vacuum, restoring ties with Hamas, after nearly a decade of estrangement because of Hamas’s opposition to the Assad regime, an Iranian ally, during the uprising in Syria. When Saudi Arabia and Iran improved relations earlier this year, Riyadh implicitly and pragmatically appeared to accept the Axis of Resistance. At the same time, Iran was talking to the Biden administration. Both sides concluded a deal in September in which Iran released several U.S. citizens from prison in exchange for Washington’s agreement to unblock $6 billion in Iranian assets frozen in South Korean banks.
Overall, things were moving in a positive manner for Iran. However, Hamas’s operational success on October 7 may have placed this in jeopardy. Today, Tehran and Hezbollah must balance keeping the Axis of Resistance united and reducing Israeli pressure on Hamas in Gaza with avoiding an expansion of the war that could cripple Iranian assets in the Middle East. Already, the conflict has taken on regional characteristics. Iran’s allies have fired missiles at Israel from Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, while U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq have been bombed close to 60 times in the past three weeks. The rising bloodshed in southern Lebanon means the likelihood of containing the conflict might be shrinking.
Such an escalation could happen in different ways. Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel could intensify the number of daily bombings they carry out and the types of weapons they employ. Israel has used bombs with banned white phosphorous in both Lebanon and Gaza, while Hezbollah has deployed new weapons in the conflict arena, including suicide drones. Cross-border bombings might also increase in scope, by reaching more deeply inside Lebanon and Israel. Indeed, in the past few weeks the target area in either country has expanded from 2 kilometers to 16 kilometers. This increasing scope can also encompass the sources of the bombing, with Iraqi armed groups and the Houthis already firing at Israel from their respective countries, while Syrian territory was also used to fire at Israel.
Even though no one seems to want a military escalation, this is a war being driven by Israel’s highly emotional response to the extreme pain inflicted on it on October 7. That is why there remains a high risk that the conflict can escalate beyond the horrors we are witnessing in Gaza. In Lebanon, regional and international diplomacy may have been effective in momentarily preventing the worst. Yet, Israel is also increasingly killing journalists and civilians on the Lebanese side of the border and, despite the asymmetry in power, Hezbollah and its allies are deploying different tactics in attacks against Israel. Only today, Hamas claimed to have launched sixteen long-range rockets toward the city of Haifa from Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States has signaled that it is ready to strike Hezbollah or Iran directly should either of them attack Israel. Iran, in turn, has also warned Washington and Israel of the costs of escalating attacks on Gaza. So even if no one wants a wider conflict, all the dynamics are making this more probable.
Certainly, many flashpoints remain in this tense environment. One is the wanton destruction of Gaza and the mounting death toll there, with at least 10,000 people killed, half of them children. Another is that Israel does not seem to have a policy for managing the catastrophe in Gaza once the hostilities are over. Rising tensions in the West Bank represent a third tinderbox in the making. More than 60 Palestinians have been killed, mainly by settlers, who have also uprooted communities. And any adverse move by the Israelis in Jerusalem can further inflame matters. Jordan and Egypt are especially concerned by the prospect that Israel is seeking to ethnically cleanse Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
Those urging Israel to invade Gaza and destroy Lebanon while pursuing maximalist goals are pushing their ally into a strategic disaster. The idea that Israel can destroy Hamas militarily seems unattainable, as was its promise in 2006 to do the same to Hezbollah. There needs to be an immediate ceasefire to spare the people of Gaza, a redirection of Israeli aims to avoid the worst outcomes, and negotiations to end the occupation. The longer this war continues, the greater the risk of miscalculation, meaning more unbearable losses for countries in the region, and far beyond.
