Evidently, we’re back to the point where Israel is threatening to embark on a major military operation in Lebanon. This could be the real thing, or it could be, once again, an effort to increase Israeli pressure in indirect negotiations with Hezbollah so the party will accept new security arrangements along the Lebanese-Israeli border.
In a conversation on Monday between the U.S. special presidential envoy Amos Hochstein and the Israeli defense minister, Yoav Gallant, reported by the New York Times, the minister reportedly stated that “‘military action’ was ‘the only way’ to end months of cross-border violence between Israel and Hezbollah ...” This came as Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, declared that returning Israelis to their homes in the north was now a war goal.
Despite all the martial talk, it remains unclear what the Israelis hope to gain from escalating the war in Lebanon, which may involve an attempt to invade the country’s south. The equation hasn’t changed fundamentally in months. It seems Israel has two major options in dealing with Lebanon: widening the free-fire zone along the border so that Hezbollah cannot mount cross-border attacks; or, occupying parts of southern Lebanon and creating another version of the security belt Israel established decades ago, which means maintaining an occupying force in Lebanese territory indefinitely.
How either of these options will restore stability and security to northern Israel is a mystery. The de facto free-fire zone along the border today has not protected Israel. And even if Israeli forces enter Lebanon, Hezbollah can fire over their heads and cause much destruction in the north. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary general, underlined this in a speech last Saturday, warning that if Israel provoked a wide-ranging war, this would only create “hundreds of thousands of more [Israeli] displaced” from the north. There is no way Hezbollah will allow a return of Israelis if Israel’s military enters Lebanon, and the party can easily hit the north from beyond the Litani River if Israel tries to push it that far back.
Perhaps the Israelis have found a magical formula to address the situation. But if so, there seems to be no consensus over this in the Israeli cabinet, amid reports that it remains divided over an operation in Lebanon. Another question is how far both sides are willing to escalate. Hochstein reportedly told Gallant he did not believe an Israeli military operation would bring the inhabitants of the north back home, and worried that it might actually trigger a regional conflict. But is his second point necessarily true?
It is certainly conceivable that Hezbollah and its allies would begin hitting civilian targets and infrastructure in Israel if Israeli forces cross into Lebanon. However, if the Israelis refrain from striking Lebanese cities and infrastructure, it is also possible Hezbollah would think twice about a major escalation to those levels, at least immediately, preferring to let the war on the ground define their options. The party has traditionally portrayed its ability to bomb Israeli cities as reactions to Israel’s doing so first. If Hezbollah is able to cause major casualties in the ranks of Israeli soldiers entering Lebanon while avoiding an escalation to the bombing of cities and infrastructure, this may be preferable in that it could sidestep any domestic negative backlash against the party’s choices.
It is also possible that the militaristic rhetoric coming out of Israel these days is simply more of what we’ve seen in the past, namely an effort to increase its leverage over Hezbollah so it agrees to a negotiated settlement. In this regard, Hochstein may well have leaked his conversation with Gallant to the New York Times in order to make Hezbollah more amenable to his proposals in the indirect talks they are conducting. If Israeli newspaper reports are true that several key Israeli ministers, including Ron Dermer, the strategic affairs minister and a Netanyahu ally, oppose a campaign in the north, then it could be that the prime minister is using such a threat to widen his margin of maneuver elsewhere.
Certainly, there seemed to be no urgency to return the inhabitants of the north last July, when Israel’s education minister, Yoav Kisch, announced that students from communities there would return to classes in the areas to which they had been displaced. The anger of northern communities is something Netanyahu must take seriously, but not more than that of the hundreds of thousands of Israelis who blame the prime minister for being seemingly indifferent to the fate of Israel’s hostages in Gaza. Just as Netanyahu has been able to resist the latter, so too will he push back against the former if he feels that a Lebanon war might threaten his political survival.
Many may laugh at such a conclusion, given Israel’s overwhelming military superiority over Hezbollah. The problem is that there are no real endpoints in an Israeli war with the party. At what stage can Netanyahu declare victory? There is none. If Israeli forces do succeed in advancing into Lebanon, every hill ahead of them would become a location from where Hezbollah could fire, justifying taking that hill and pushing Israel deeper into a quagmire. It may well be that Israel does not want to be drawn endlessly into Lebanon, but Hezbollah may see an advantage in this—particularly when Israeli forces have no clear objective to work toward.
Netanyahu is aware of all this, which is why he may be thinking twice about entering into a hornet’s nest in Lebanon. But the prime minister is a formidable contortionist—now satisfying his extremist right-wing allies, then throwing a bone to the hostages’ families, here loudly telling northern Israelis that he hasn’t forgotten them, there leading the Americans on after having taken their modest measure. A Lebanon war could be just the latest of his manipulations. But then again it may not be. But one thing is certain: Benjamin Netanyahu will not embark on a war that could cost him severely and, therefore, undermine his political survival.
