As Israel’s campaign in Lebanon grinds on, several questions have yet to be answered. What happens next to Hezbollah? What is the Israeli military’s ultimate objective? And to what did Israel and the United States agree that allowed the Americans to alter a proposal they had presented several months ago for ending the fighting between Hezbollah and Israeli forces?
The first sign that something had changed in the American attitude came in early October, when the U.S. special envoy Amos Hochstein told Lebanon’s caretaker prime minister, Najib Mikati, that the offer he had passed on to the Lebanese last June was now “off the table,” because of changed conditions on the ground. Hochstein’s proposal had called for Hezbollah to retreat from the border to a distance of some 30 kilometers, behind the Litani River, followed by the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the border area, alongside the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
The Hochstein plan more or less echoed Security Council Resolution 1701, which put an end to the 2006 Lebanon war and, in theory, governs relations between Lebanon and Israel along their joint border. By withdrawing his plan, however, Hochstein indicated Washington was thinking of something more than Resolution 1701; or rather was adopting the Israeli position that the resolution is no longer sufficient, as it has no implementation mechanism ensuring Hezbollah stays far from Israel’s territory.
Indeed, news reports in early October seemed to confirm that the Biden administration was engaged in far more ambitious thinking. With Hezbollah’s political and military leadership largely decapitated after the assassinations of secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, his expected successor Hashem Safieddine, and several senior military commanders, the Americans are now seeking to fundamentally alter the balance of power in Lebanon. As State Department spokesman Matthew Miller put it, “What we want to see come out of this situation, ultimately, is Lebanon able to break the grip that Hezbollah has had on the country—more than a grip, break the stranglehold that Hezbollah has had on the country and remove [the] Hezbollah veto over a president.”
Having Lebanon elect a new president is a priority for the Americans, who believe this is a necessary first step in consolidating a post-Hezbollah order. Not surprisingly, the person they view as most apt to embark on such an endeavor is the armed forces commander, Joseph Aoun, who represents the single national institution that retains the respect of most Lebanese. Aoun embodies a logic of state authority, against Hezbollah’s logic of open-ended resistance. However, those hurrying to declare Hezbollah dead should be very careful. Trying to impose a new reality that the party would regard as a threat to its vital interests is a recipe for civil war. For all the decades-long crises Lebanon has faced, one thing has remained constant: major decisions, when not taken by consensus, tend to generate sectarian conflict.
This can be frustrating for foreign governments. But now is the worst moment to strong-arm the Shiite community into decisions Hezbollah opposes. The community is traumatized, dislocated, and heavily armed, without a leader capable of controlling the widespread resentment and humiliation Shiites must feel as the only community targeted by Israel. To foreign decisionmakers, now may seem to be a good time to press an advantage against Hezbollah. But has anyone thought about the aftermath? Once the party regains its footing, what will its reaction be with respect to its sectarian partners in the state? Hezbollah will spread a narrative that they exploited the Israeli onslaught to once again marginalize Shiites, and this message will allow Hezbollah to absorb and redirect internally the anger many in the community must feel for having lost everything because of Israel’s destructive rage.
According to influential voices in Washington, there has been talk recently of sanctioning the parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, if he does not call for a session of parliament to elect a new president. One has to wonder who came up with such an incredibly stupid idea. Berri heads the only functioning governing institution in Lebanon, parliament, and sits at the intersection of the two logics, of resistance and the state, prevailing today. By sanctioning Berri, not only would the Americans neutralize him as someone who could help bring about a consensual solution to Lebanon’s certain postwar crisis, and who could eventually bring Hezbollah into any such arrangement; they would also undermine parliament itself, leaving Lebanon in an institutional vacuum.
There seems to be a misunderstanding about what Hezbollah is. To Americans and Israelis, the organization is simply “an Iranian proxy” force, meaning that if you kill its leaders, you resolve your problem. Yet Hezbollah is also anchored in one of Lebanon’s largest communities, and its symbolism has become part of the collective Shiite identity. In other words, all efforts to weaken the party will be interpreted by a significant number of Shiites as an effort to incapacitate the community at large. That is why many Shiite displaced today remain loyal to Hezbollah, despite the fact that its colossal miscalculation with regard to Israel—the second such miscalculation it has made in eighteen years—has led to the devastation of Hezbollah-controlled areas, provoking the displacement of some 1.2 million people.
One figure with whom the United States has had particularly good relations is the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, who evidently has taken it upon himself to lead the charge against Hezbollah. At a conference at his residence this past weekend, Geagea reiterated his support for United Nations resolutions on Lebanon, above all Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament. The problem is that few of those opposed to Hezbollah will follow Geagea into a confrontation with the party that might exacerbate sectarian hostilities. Complicating matters for the Americans, Geagea is unenthusiastic about Joseph Aoun, even if he might well go along with an internationally-sanctioned package deal that brings Aoun to power.
On another level, the Americans have to determine how Israeli military plans in Lebanon play into all this. The Israelis have left themselves with a range of options. One apparently aims to implement Resolution 1559 by forcibly disarming Hezbollah, and another seeks to strengthen security arrangements along the border in southern Lebanon. The former objective could entail a much longer campaign in Lebanon, and quite possibly an Israeli invasion up to the Awali River and Sidon, from where the Israelis could take their time to destroy Hezbollah weapons caches nationwide. The latter goal may mean the Israelis occupy the entire area between the Litani River and the border, hold on to the territory, and condition their withdrawal on passage of a tougher UN resolution than 1701.
As revealed by the Lebanese journalist Mounir Rabih, a preliminary draft proposal of such a resolution is currently circulating in the Security Council for discussion. Essentially, the text combines the objectives in Resolutions 1559 and 1701—including a withdrawal of Hezbollah to the Litani and its disarmament, as well as other steps, including early parliamentary elections and a presidential election. However, the text’s chances of being adopted are limited, according to Rabih, but it probably serves as an opening gambit in negotiations. Paradoxically, this situation gives Israel leverage: The Israelis’ threat of widening their campaign in Lebanon can be used to force the Security Council to pass what Israel considers a satisfactory version of the draft; and if the Israelis and Americans are blocked in the council, they might try to exploit this blockage by justifying a continuing Israeli military operation in Lebanon.
The push to weaken Hezbollah’s hold on the Lebanese system and replace its military force with the Lebanese army is something many Lebanese would favor. But this definitely won’t be done successfully from Washington or Israel. At most, Lebanese parties may be able to compel Hezbollah to enter into negotiations over a new national defense strategy, and to do so they will undoubtedly need Berri’s collaboration. Even then, nothing is guaranteed, since the ultimate decisionmaker on the party’s weapons is Iran.
However, there may be an opening here, given that the horrific destruction Israel has visited on Hezbollah’s environment suggests the party will not be able to engage in new military adventures for decades, if ever. The Shiite community cannot take any more. In light of this, Iran may shift its priorities from rearming Hezbollah to safeguarding and reviving the battered Shiite community, in such a way as to maintain its influence in Lebanon. If it fails to do so, Lebanon’s Shiites may conclude they are there only to serve as Iranian cannon fodder, harming Tehran irreparably.
