Syria’s approach to Iran’s “unity of the arenas” strategy, in which the different groups that form the pro-Tehran Axis of Resistance coordinate their actions against Israel, has been consistently inconsistent. Damascus refrained from opening an active front after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack against Israel, and maintained this attitude even after Israel turned its guns against Hezbollah.
For the regime in Damascus, survival has taken precedence over everything else. The regime of President Bashar al-Assad has signaled its desire to avoid a confrontation with Israel amid mounting challenges. However, given Assad’s close ties with Iran, Hezbollah’s presence across the border in Lebanon, and Syria’s role as a transit hub for weapons from Iran to the party, the road ahead promises to be a highly precarious one.
In the aftermath of October 7, the Syrian regime found itself in a somewhat improved position. Syria had regained some of its lost significance as the Middle East reemerged as a global focal point, with Russia and the Arab states once again paying attention to the country. The “unity of the arenas” strategy was never a factor in Syrian foreign policy. Damascus saw the Gaza war as another opportunity to advance its own interests, by exploiting the circumstances to strengthen bilateral relations, especially with the Arab countries. The regime was also hoping to benefit from a potential deal that might have involved Gaza, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Iran, and other regional actors. However, Israel had very different plans.
When the flames of war spread beyond Gaza and engulfed Lebanon, amid escalating direct attacks between Iran and Israel, Syria suddenly found itself perilously close to the main theater of conflict. Once again, it refrained from implementing the “unity of the arenas” strategy, trying hard to avoid Israeli reprisals. The expansion of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Syria in 2013 helped the Assad regime to survive the uprising at home, but now the party had become a liability that could invite Israeli intervention in Syria.
In parallel to its war in Lebanon, Israel has escalated its strikes in Syria to include Iranian-Hezbollah assets, a weapons warehouse near the Russian-controlled Hmeimim air base (thereby also sending a message to the Russians), and a villa belonging to Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother, who leads the elite Fourth Armored Division and is regarded as Iran’s main ally in Damascus.
Moreover, reports suggest that Israel is reinforcing its forces in the Golan Heights and demining some areas, which could be preparation for opening a new front. Such moves appear to be causing great anxiety in Damascus. On October 5 Assad issued an administrative order to recall officers from the reserve and sent its elite forces to Idlib in the north, not toward the Golan. The Fourth Armored Division is reportedly distancing itself from Hezbollah, and the regime has withdrawn some pro-regime militias from the Golan front. More recently, it has also restricted Hezbollah’s movement and confiscated weaponry. While it is difficult to verify all such reports, the message appears to be crystal clear.
Beyond its military impact, any Israeli blow against Hezbollah could weaken the Syrian regime’s influence in Lebanon. Economically, the impact of the Israeli attacks has already begun disrupting Lebanon’s role as a financial and trade lifeline for Syria. On the humanitarian front, the outlook is equally bleak. Since September 24, around 473,000 people, both Syrians and Lebanese, have fled from Lebanon to Syria. This is a burden the regime neither wanted nor can afford without international assistance, but now has to accept. For comparison, after the devastating earthquake of 2023, the Syria Flash Appeal raised $170 million in less than a month. In the current displacement crisis, so far United Nations agencies have only managed to raise just under $8 million out of the $135 million needed.
The threats emanating from Israel in the southwest are the most worrisome, however they are not the only ones the Assad regime is facing. The front with Türkiye in the northwest has also seen crucial developments. The Turks have been reinforcing their positions, bringing large reinforcements and weapons into Idlib and the Euphrates Shield area. Meanwhile, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other armed groups are mobilizing their forces near the Idlib and Aleppo frontlines.
While this doesn’t necessarily mean that a war is imminent, it reflects Ankara’s concern that the confrontation between Israel and Iran could lead to a change in Syria’s geopolitical map. This would be due to a sudden weakening of the Syrian regime, or even its collapse, as well as a decline in Iran’s role in the country. Until now, some sort of equilibrium has been maintained among the key regional and international actors involved in Syria—Russia, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States, along with their local allies. If Iran and its allies were to be hit hard by Israel, this could disrupt such an equilibrium. That is why Türkiye appears to be reinforcing its positions in the northwest, not only to stay in tune with the shifting dynamics but also to swiftly fill any power vacuum that arises.
In contrast to the northwest, there is eerie silence in the Kurdish-dominated northeast regarding the conflict with Israel. This is no less unsettling for Damascus. Most scenarios favor the Kurdish-imposed status quo, bolstered by U.S. protection. Should Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah and Iran draw in Syria, the Kurds could stand to gain from an enfeebled regime, whose chances of reclaiming oil-rich areas under U.S. and Kurdish control are steadily diminishing. The odds are also in the Kurds’ favor when it comes to a continuation of the U.S. presence, as the idea of a full American withdrawal in the shadow of Israel’s ongoing wars is improbable.
Being consistently inconsistent when it comes to the “unity of fronts” has helped the regime avoid direct Israeli reprisals, but this alone won’t be enough to shield Syria from future dangers. For Israel, a return to the status quo prior to October 7 was never acceptable, whether in Gaza or Lebanon, and this logic applies to Syria as well. Before becoming Netanyahu’s new foreign minister, Gideon Sa’ar issued a warning to Assad that if Syria continued to serve as a supply route for weapons to Hezbollah, or allowed attacks against Israel from its territory, this would endanger his regime.
It is now evident that Syria poses no direct threat to Israel, leaving Israel’s warnings open to interpretation in at least two possible contexts. First, Syria may be expected to dismantle Hezbollah’s local infrastructure, which supplies weapons to Lebanon. Hezbollah has established a military network in Syria, stretching from Hadar near the Golan Heights, to Zabadani, the Qalamoun mountains, and Qusayr in Homs Governorate. If Israel intends to weaken Hezbollah’s military capabilities, dismantling this infrastructure will be essential. Second, Syria would also need to cease being a passageway for Iranian arms. Both of these demands would present significant difficulties for the Assad regime, particularly as the Syrian president may be unable to implement decisions he takes in these regards.
Assad’s objectives while Israel is engaged in a conflict with Hezbollah and Iran are clear: to survive and navigate the crisis with minimal losses. The president seems to have recognized that the “unity of the arenas” approach is a gamble with little chance of success. However, to continue surviving, Assad will have to keep walking a tightrope, one held by various regional actors. This balancing act will become increasingly difficult as Israel pursues its war, which may move nearer to Damascus. What’s even more troubling for Assad is that other parties—Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, the Syrian opposition, Türkiye, the Kurds—may try to take advantage of the regime’s vulnerabilities, further eroding Syria’s territorial integrity.
