Armenak Tokmajyan is a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. His research focuses on borders and conflict, Syrian refugees, and state-society relations in Syria. Recently, he and Kheder Khaddour published a long paper titled “Borders Without a Nation: Syria, Outside Powers, and Open-Ended Instability,” in which they examined how the dynamics in Syria’s border regions were affecting the situation in the rest of the country and its conflict. Insofar as the recent offensive by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham began in the border area of Idlib and led to the capture of Aleppo, their paper was particularly prescient. It was to understand more about what is taking place today in Syria that Diwan interviewed Tokmajyan in early December.
Michael Young: Can you explain the recent developments in northwestern Syria?
Armenak Tokmajyan: As my colleague Kheder Khaddour and I previously argued, a status quo had been in place in Syria since 2020, reflecting the balance of power on the battlefield at the time. This status quo was maintained through regional-local alliances—Russia and Iran with the Assad regime; Türkiye with the Syrian opposition groups; the United States with the Kurds. During this period, these various actors managed their differences rather than resolving the conflict. In the northwest, Russia, Iran, and Türkiye collectively preserved the status quo, while in the northeast, the U.S.-Kurdish alliance and Iran-backed forces maintained a similar balance along the Euphrates River.
The status quo has now been shattered, as the balance has shifted against Russia, Iran, and their local ally, the Assad regime, which experienced a partial collapse in and around Aleppo. Khaddour and I have warned about the possibility of what we called “partial implosions” from within Syria. All local actors were prone to this risk, but recent developments showed the regime was the most vulnerable. This is what happened with the partial regime collapse triggered by the offensive dubbed “Deterrence of Aggression” and led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham that began on November 27. Within a week the opposition coalition was in central Aleppo.
A few days later, Turkish-backed forces joined from the north, expanding their control in northern Aleppo, most importantly in the Tell Rifaat area that hosted the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and a Kurdish population. For some time, Türkiye had sought to eliminate this pocket and seems to be reaching its goal even as we speak. According to reports, the frontlines are still largely holding in the northeast. However, there have also been clashes between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on the one hand, and the regime and pro-Iran militias on the other, with reported U.S. participation. But with Aleppo gone,and Iraq resisting Iranian pressure to send militias to Syria, the balance of power in Deir al-Zor must favor the SDF and United States.
MY: Can you clarify the broader geopolitical context in the Middle East and how this is related to the developments in Syria?
AT: There are two main catalysts that have greatly contributed to the shift in the balance of power in Syria: the retreat in Russia’s role as a security broker in the region and, more importantly, the Israel-Iran confrontation. Let me start with the latter. There is no doubt that Iran has so far has emerged as the losing side in its confrontation with Israel, which has been evident on multiple levels. Take, for instance, Iran’s conciliatory rhetoric with the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, after the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, which indicated Iranian weakness and an attempt to minimize differences with regional powers amid Tehran’s war with Israel. On the battlefield, Iran has faced significant losses: it lost Hamas as a means of leverage over Israel; many senior Iranian officials were subsequently killed in Syria; and Hezbollah forces withdrew from Syria to Lebanon, only to face defeat against Israel, all without meaningful retaliation from Iran. This inaction has had far-reaching reverberations. Even in Damascus there were whispers hinting at Iran’s declining influence long before Aleppo fell.
The regime’s other ally, Russia, has also grown weaker. Russia’s retreat in Syria began after its invasion of Ukraine, which undermined Moscow’s unique role as a broker among international, regional, and local actors. There was a time, if you remember, when the Russians were pretty much present in every important meeting concerning Syria. The deal in 2018 that enabled the regime’s return to southern Syria, while securing U.S., Arab, and indirect Israeli support, at the expense of Iranian influence, was a notable diplomatic achievement. Much of Russia’s influence stemmed from its image—a powerful military force making a comeback in the Middle East with notable successes in Syria.
However, the war in Ukraine has damaged this image, eroded Russia’s role as a mediator, and strained its resources—for example, the Russians have lost the Wagner Group that operated in Syria. Russia also largely failed to implement the 2018 deal on the ground, especially after the start of the Ukraine war. Since October 7, Russia has attempted a comeback, as seen in its renewed activity in southern Syria. I initially thought this could pave the way for Moscow to reassert itself as a broker, particularly with Donald Trump on his way to the White House next January. However, recent events suggest otherwise, as both Türkiye and Israel appear to have lost trust in Russia’s ability to mediate and, more importantly, guarantee results. All this has created a power imbalance in Syria, which was exposed by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and which is now being filled by various local and foreign actors.
MY: Can you elaborate more on the regional and international dimensions here, especially on the possibility that there was Turkish-Israeli, perhaps also U.S., coordination in what is taking place in Syria?
AT: Whether the trio—Israel, the United States, and Türkiye—coordinated their actions, potentially sharing intelligence on the regime’s positions in Aleppo and aligning over the timing of the attack, remains unproven. Officially, Israel has not taken sides in the Aleppo conflict, Türkiye denies involvement with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, and the United States has reiterated its designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as a terrorist organization. However, there appears to be at least a partial alignment of interests among the three parties. Just look in whose favor the balance of power has shifted.
The fall of Aleppo has significantly strengthened Türkiye’s position, enhancing its bargaining leverage against Russia, Iran, the Assad regime, and even the United States, whether diplomatically or militarily. Notice that so far all high-level meetings have been taking place in Türkiye, even if the next one is scheduled for Qatar, though this remains unconfirmed. For Israel, the breakdown of a status quo largely dominated by Russia and Iran represents a clear advantage. While Israel has avoided a direct confrontation with Russia, it seems to have lost faith in Moscow’s ability to act as an effective broker and a party that can keep Iran away from southern Syria. As for Iran, the fallout is undeniable. For instance, the changes in the control map have imposed severe logistical constraints on Tehran, leaving it surrounded by more powerful adversaries in Deir al-Zor.
When it comes to the United States, its position is harder to gauge. While the Americans likely disapprove of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s gains, given their designation of the group as a terrorist organization, Türkiye’s expanded role also puts pressure on their Kurdish allies. However, Washington appears somewhat complicit, potentially due to its heightened activity in the northeast. The Americans have been striking Iranian targets, framing these actions as self-defense against attacks on U.S. bases or anti-Islamic State operations, though there seems to be more at play. For instance, reports suggest U.S. support for the SDF’s advances against regime and pro-Iranian positions in certain villages in Deir al-Zor, although some sources have suggested the SDF was unable to take these villages. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. will play an active role in cutting the so-called Iranian corridor that extends from Iraq to Syria through the Qa‘im-Boukamal crossing.
As I mentioned, these interests only partially may align. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s advance further south toward Hama strengthens Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s position but raises fears of an Islamist takeover or chaos in Syria, which is concerning for Israel and unlikely to sit well with the United States, given its longstanding tensions with Türkiye over support for Islamist groups. In the northeast, the collapse, or near-collapse, of the regime caused by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s activities bolsters Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. This leaves Türkiye with two difficult choices: going to war with U.S.-backed Kurdish forces or accepting Kurdish autonomy in Syria, both of which present significant challenges. All said, we should keep in mind that the situation is in flux.
MY: The situation is in flux but how do you see the developments on the ground progressing in the short term? How about the political processes that existed before the Aleppo attack?
AT: The developments in Syria have reshuffled all the cards on the military and diplomatic levels. On the ground, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is advancing toward Hama. The Syrian regime, Iran, and Russia have not yet been able to meaningfully mobilize forces to form new defensive lines. In my view, this is because of one key reason: back in 2016, government forces were made up of several components—the army, the security branches that expanded and recruited fighters, the auxiliary forces, Hezbollah, foreign pro-Iran forces, and Russia bombing from the skies. Today no such coalition exists anymore.
The regime and Russia are scrambling to mobilize. Reports suggest that the regime is offering $200 to new recruits, or sometimes resorting to forced conscription. Russia is continuing its airstrikes, but without a capable ground force its impact is limited. Iran, on the other hand, appears to be attempting mobilization efforts of its own, with reports that it is trying to involve units from Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. However, logistical challenges, such as the lack of secure routes to move fighters into Syria, as well as deterrents, such as the likelihood of Israeli intervention, complicate these efforts. For instance, Israel just targeted and killed a Hezbollah liaison in Syria. This leaves the regime in a precarious position, while also weakening Russia and Iran, whose interests remain closely tied to the Assad regime’s survival.
The situation remains highly fluid. But it is clear that the ongoing battles near Hama city could determine Syria’s fate. If opposition forces were to capture Hama and push further west and south, this could inflict significant damage on the regime. Recapturing Aleppo, for now, seems out of reach. However, if the regime halts the advance, it might pave the way for some form of settlement. That said, platforms such as the Astana track, the Arab track, or the Damascus-Ankara dialogue—or at least the rationale that once underpinned them—are now history.
