In a little over a week, Bashar al-Assad saw his reign of brutality fall as rebels launched an offensive from the northwest followed by a parallel offensive from the southern front. The facade of military strength crumbled as the Syrian army—the same force that had mercilessly barrel-bombed civilian populations and deployed sarin gas against children—abandoned their posts, leaving behind arsenals of equipment in a retreat that exposed the regime’s hollow foundation.
As his forces dissolved around him, Assad watched helplessly as his longtime patrons, Russia and Iran, orchestrated their own withdrawals—Russia to its coastal strongholds in Lataqiyya and Tartous, and Iranian forces eastward to Iraq. This left the ophthalmologist-turned-despot to contemplate the ruins of his dictatorship, built on incomprehensible human suffering.
The roots of this moment can be traced back to 2012, when Iran first committed to preserving Assad’s rule. Major-General Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), embarked on a series of visits to Syria to assess the Assad regime’s stability. These reportedly left him alarmed about the regime’s ability to withstand the revolutionary surge and insurgent pressure. Soleimani also traveled to Lebanon where he met with Hezbollah’s late secretary general Hassan Nasrallah to shore up Assad’s defenses.
Nasrallah’s and Soleimani’s lobbying shaped Iran’s decision to intervene militarily in Syria, particularly in persuading Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Iranian Supreme National Security Council to overcome their initial hesitation. Khamenei had expressed significant concerns about the substantial financial and operational commitments required for a large-scale ground intervention. However, Nasrallah and Soleimani presented a case that framed the intervention as essential for preserving both Hezbollah’s future and Iran’s broader regional influence. Their argument centered on the existential threat that Assad’s possible downfall would pose to their strategic interests and to the so-called Axis of Resistance.
Now, more than a decade later, there is a profound irony in the outcome. Neither Soleimani nor Nasrallah lived to witness the unraveling of their grand strategic vision. Their intervention, intended to cement the Axis of Resistance, instead became a testament to its deterioration. The very strategy designed to divide and control Syria has collapsed under its own weight, marking not just the end of Assad’s rule, but potential irreparable decline for the axis.
Over the past thirteen years, Iran has invested an estimated $30–50 billion in Syria, underscoring its unwavering commitment to ensuring the survival of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Iranian advisors, particularly those from the Quds Force, played a decisive role in safeguarding Assad’s government during the Syrian civil war. Official reports cite more than 2,000 casualties among the “defenders of the shrine”—Iran’s euphemistic term for its forces in Syria. Most of these casualties are believed to be Afghan nationals recruited as part of the Fatemiyoun Brigades, though Iran did lose considerable numbers of IRGC personnel as well, notably during the battle of Khan Touman in 2016.
Iran embedded itself within key military and paramilitary structures in Syria. One such example is the National Defense Forces (NDF), a pro-regime militia network that Iran helped organize, arm, and train. Formed in 2013 under IRGC supervision, the NDF became a critical auxiliary force, integrating local fighters into Assad’s military strategy and supplementing the overstretched Syrian army. Iran also cultivated close ties with certain divisions of the Syrian military, particularly the 4th Armored Division and the Republican Guard. The 4th Armored Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother, was a favored recipient of Iranian training, weaponry, and financial aid due to its reliability and effectiveness in major offensives. Similarly, the Republican Guard, tasked with protecting the regime’s inner circle and key infrastructure, benefited from Iranian logistical and operational support, ensuring its continued loyalty to Assad.
In the past year alone, however, Iran saw the unraveling of its command and control in Syria. In December 2023, Israeli strikes in Damascus killed Seyed Razi Mousavi, a senior IRGC adviser who served as the main conduit for Iranian interests in Syria. This blow was followed by an even more significant strike on April 1, 2024, when Israeli F-35 fighter jets targeted the Iranian Embassy’s consular section in Damascus, killing General Mohammed Zahedi, the former commander of IRGC ground forces. Meanwhile, Iran’s Axis of Resistance was in peril. These losses, coupled with the severe degradation of Hezbollah’s command structure in Lebanon, including its leadership under Nasrallah, substantially diminished Iran’s regional influence.
When the rebel offensive commenced in late November, Iran found itself poorly positioned to mount an effective intervention to support Assad. Unlike in 2016, when Iranian ground forces complemented Russian air support in the siege of Aleppo, neither patron demonstrated the will or capability to launch a similar counteroffensive. Both powers had grown increasingly frustrated with Assad’s intransigence. For Russia and Iran, Assad was their man until he wasn’t.
By early 2024, both Iran and Russia had changed when it came to the Syrian president. Russia was particularly incensed by his repeated violations of the Idlib deescalation agreement and stubborn resistance to any form of a negotiated settlement. Meanwhile, Iran found its once-considerable influence over Damascus steadily eroding, with Assad increasingly charting an independent course that often conflicted with Tehran’s regional objectives. Iran’s suspicions of Assad deepened after a series of leaks disclosed the movements of IRGC officials that culminated in Israeli strikes on these officials in Syria. The Quds Force, once given relatively free rein in Syria, now found its movements increasingly restricted by the Syrian authorities, with Assad refusing to allow the use of the Golan Heights as a potential front against Israel. Perhaps most provocatively, Damascus had begun limiting Shiite religious activities throughout Syria—a direct challenge to Iran’s efforts to expand its ideological and cultural influence in the region.
By the time rebels launched their offensive, neither Iran nor Russia saw sufficient value in expending further resources to prop up a regime that had become more liability than asset. Assad’s growing independence had effectively undermined the very partnerships that had sustained his rule for over a decade. Eventually, Russia offered Assad asylum on humanitarian grounds but Moscow’s disdain for Assad seemed apparent in Sergei Lavrov’s comments at the Doha forum, where he chastised the interviewer for wanting “to drown [him] in Syria” questions.
The Syrian army’s fundamental weakness became glaringly apparent even before the rebels captured Aleppo. Discussion on Iranian social media platforms, particularly pro-IRGC Telegram channels, reflected this reality. Ordinary Iranians in these forums began openly criticizing Assad and his military’s incompetence. Perhaps most telling was the shift in sentiment among traditionally staunch IRGC supporters, who began expressing indignation at Assad’s corruption and the Syrian army’s ineffectiveness.
Iran’s initial response suggested a familiar playbook—the mobilization of Iraqi militias to shore up Assad’s defenses. However, the Iraqi government refused to allow these forces to cross into Syria. Rather than challenge this decision, Iran acquiesced with surprising ease. In a stunning development, Iranian-backed forces abandoned their most strategic asset—control of the Syrian-Iraqi border crossing—without any resistance. The IRGC and pro-Iran Iraqi fighters had already pulled out of Deir al-Zor before Kurdish forces moved in, leading to the swift capture of the crucial Qa’im-Bukamal border crossing by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The governorate of Deir al-Zor and its border crossing at Bukamal had served as Iran’s crown jewel in Syria, representing a vital link in Tehran’s regional ambitions. After capturing control of Deir al-Zor from the Islamic State group in 2017, Iran transformed this eastern Syrian region into a crucial corridor for projecting power across the Levant. The Qa’im-Bukamal crossing became the linchpin in Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon, facilitating the movement of weapons, fighters, and supplies to its proxy forces throughout the region.
The significance of Deir al-Zor was not just in its logistical value. Iran had invested heavily in securing this territory, establishing a network of military bases, and cultivating deep ties with local tribal leaders. The Iranians exploited Arab grievances against both the Islamic State and later the SDF, while simultaneously using the region to pressure U.S. forces stationed at the Tanf garrison and near the Conoco gas field. Iranian-backed militias frequently launched attacks against American positions from this territory, making it a theater in the broader U.S.-Iranian regional competition. Yet when Assad’s regime began to fall apart, Iran made the surprising decision to cede this vital territory to the SDF. This retreat perhaps reflected a more nefarious, long-term strategy—betting that the persistent tensions between Kurdish forces and the local Arab population and Turkish-backed rebel forces would eventually create new opportunities for a return of Iranian influence.
Iran’s withdrawal from Syria extended far beyond abandoning Deir al-Zor, marking a complete reversal of its military presence across the country. The night before Assad fled Damascus, the New York Times revealed that Iran had begun evacuating its military commanders and personnel from Syria. The stark reality of Iran’s capitulation was captured by an analyst close to the regime who told the newspaper: “Iran is starting to evacuate its forces and military personnel because we cannot fight as an advisory and support force if Syria’s army itself does not want to fight… The bottom line is that Iran has realized that it cannot manage the situation in Syria right now with any military operation and this option is off the table.”
The collapse of the Assad regime effectively dismantled over a decade of Iranian investment in Syria, unraveling the complex web of influence woven by Qassem Soleimani. As the Quds Force commander, he had devised a strategy of regional destabilization that inflicted immense suffering across the Middle East. His approach was methodical: identify vulnerable states, exploit their weaknesses, and fill power vacuums with Iran-backed militias that became notorious for their brutality and exploitation of local populations. The logic of this approach lay in Soleimani’s understanding that governmental weakness was the fertile soil in which Iranian influence could take root and flourish. Syria represented the pinnacle of this strategy, where Soleimani helped transform a popular uprising into a catastrophic civil war.
What initially began as an intervention in Syria to salvage the Axis of Resistance became, instead, the harbinger of its decline. This network of proxy forces and allied regimes, stretching from Tehran to Beirut to Sanaa, was meant to be Iran’s answer to regional isolation and Western pressure. The model that seemed so effective in Lebanon crumbled months earlier with Israel’s attrition of Hezbollah, culminating in the devastating Israeli bombing campaign and invasion that began on October 1. Ultimately, it proved unsustainable in Syria.
Much remains unclear about Iranian decisions during Assad’s final days. While Tehran cannot realistically hope to restore the level of influence it enjoyed under Assad, its calculations likely extend beyond the immediate crisis. Given Iran’s proven skill in exploiting regional chaos, it may be anticipating that Syria’s transition away from Assad will create new opportunities for influence, particularly as various factions vie for power and resources. The Syrian Kurds’ hostility to Turkish influence in Syria may represent one such opening, for example. Iran’s demonstrated ability to work with Sunni groups could also lead to pragmatic alliances formed around opposition to Israel, especially given that the Israelis have just seized the demilitarized buffer zone established by the 1974 disengagement agreement in southern Syria.
Yet all of this remains highly speculative. What is certain is that Assad’s inglorious fall has exposed the profound damage inflicted on Syria by his rule and the external powers that sustained him. The coming months will reveal whether Iran can adapt its strategy to Syria’s new reality, or whether Assad’s exit marks a genuine endpoint to its Syrian ambitions.
