Robert Templer (roberttempler.com) is an author and policy consultant with deep expertise in conflict research and practice. He has written four books, including the acclaimed Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam, and has worked extensively with organizations such as the United Nations and the International Crisis Group on issues ranging from conflict prevention and peacebuilding to climate change and violent extremism, primarily in Asia. Templer’s career is marked by hands-on experience, as he has lived and worked in numerous conflict zones. A committed advocate for Syrian rights since 2011, Templer co-founded the Aleppo Project at the Central European University in 2014 and the Higher Education Alliance for Refugees in 2018. He is also a research associate in Harvard University’s Anthropology Department and Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.
Armenak Tokmajyan: After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has emerged to claim a central role in Syria’s transitional period. However, it is not the only force. There are other civilian and military groups that have long opposed the regime and now seek to be part of the country’s transition. What should Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham do, and what shouldn’t it do? What lessons can we draw from previous post-conflict transitions?
Robert Templer: Even in the case of a military victory, there needs to be an enduring political process to build peace. This process should include as many groups as possible—the victors and the vanquished. Don’t rush toward writing a new constitution, as such a document needs to be a key part of a narrative that holds a new Syria together. It must reflect the wishes of the majority of the population and speak to people clearly and effectively. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has said that elections may not be held for four years, which is sensible. Take the time needed for a constitution, a census, and the creation of electoral rolls. Holding elections too soon introduces an additional source of tension and differences. Afghanistan rushed its political process, constitution writing, and elections, and they all lacked legitimacy and durability. There is no such thing as a political quick fix.
There are ways to build legitimacy and develop a national narrative without elections. Create a national dialogue body from volunteers chosen to match what we know of the make-up of the Syrian people: half men, half women, farmers, teachers, engineers, all professions, ages, ethnic and religious groups, and so on. Members can be randomly chosen from a list so that the body represents the nation’s makeup but is not just made up of party hacks. The body could discuss key national issues: justice for those abused by the state and others; the future of minorities; the return of property and compensation; the role of religion; how to guarantee human rights; and the pressing issues of water and climate change. Choosing this path might avoid some of the perils of party identification and foreign interference. These bodies have been shown elsewhere to cool tempers and deliver legitimate answers to contentious questions.
Consider the shape and role of political parties in the future carefully. Setting the political rules in the immediate aftermath of a conflict can lock in place divisions—as we have seen in Bosnia and Lebanon, for example. This is unfortunate and can result in gridlock. Syria will need some dispersal of power to accommodate reality. Still, there is much to be said for discouraging politics from forming only around religious or ethnic identity. That can be done, for example, by choosing the right electoral system, building a government from local authorities upward, making parties field candidates in all areas of the country, and maybe having sunset clauses that limit contentious political activity for a certain period and introduce more freedoms over time.
AT: All sides in Syria’s conflict have committed crimes, with the worst atrocities carried out by jihadi groups and the Syrian regime, which has proven to be one of the most brutal regimes in the Arab world, if not globally. Now that the regime has fallen, how should Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham address war crimes, ensure transitional justice, and promote reconciliation? What lessons can we draw from other cases?
RT: Transitional justice comes in many forms and can be contentious as well as healing. It may take much longer than victims want and may deliver much less than they need. There are many lessons from the rest of the world. First, preserve as much evidence as possible, not just within Syria but in a repository abroad. Second, those worst offenders who can be detained now should be tried in Syria in locally-led, open processes. Third, victims need to have their stories told, and that can become part of shaping a new narrative for the country, one that rejects such extreme violence. This can be done in many ways: a formal truth and reconciliation process; by allowing scholars and others access to records; and by developing sites of remembrance and archives that retain the history. It may be tempting to erase Saidnaya prison from the face of the earth as a place of pain and horror, but it should be preserved. These locations of terrible suffering hold immense power and make it difficult to forget past crimes.
Transitional justice takes time and requires patience. It may seem like a luxury when the economy is broken and people are hungry. I believe the process should be Syrian-designed and -led and only include outsiders where Syrians choose to include them. But I do think the international community could contribute to a compensation fund, perhaps using any Assad regime assets frozen abroad, that would begin a process of providing resources for victims to try and remake their lives. The priorities must be to make information available to the families of those who were disappeared and to help victims of torture. This is a very urgent need and a critical part of building peace. Torture on this scale corrodes the soul of a country, and it must be addressed.
AT: Syria’s civil war has been one of the most internationalized in recent history. The country, which will remain weak, will continue to be subject to external influence. What steps should external players take to support a successful transitional period?
RT: Unfortunately, outside powers—especially Israel, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—will all meddle in Syria’s future, seeking political and economic advantage. This will almost certainly result in competition and continued instability. Pakistan interfered relentlessly in Afghanistan, supporting the Taliban and prolonging war and misery there. Now, Pakistan and the Taliban are at each other’s throats, and Islamabad is facing yet more instability. What goes around, comes around. That should be a lesson for all. But nations are always willing to take short-term tactical gains over long-term stability, alas, and I’m sure this will be the case in Syria.
There might be some utility in a “Group of Friends”—a gathering of most of the countries mentioned earlier, along with the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations—to coordinate actions and try to bring about some consensus on how to get Syria back on its feet and stabilize the region. It would require skilled and conscientious diplomacy, which seems to be in short supply. In general, though, the less interference from outside powers, the better. It is hard to point to any recent successes in international post-conflict nation-building. Syrians will be better off managing their own processes. There is no shortage of intelligent and able people among the population at home and abroad. But it may be an impossibly naïve hope that they should be allowed to find their own way forward.
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