Can the Palestinian Authority (PA) be reformed? Central to many “day after” plans for the Palestinian territories—advanced by a host of official and unofficial actors at the global and regional levels—is constructing a “day after” in Gaza that involves a reformed or revitalized PA.
But the slogan of “reform” is almost as old as the PA itself. As a student of Palestinian politics, I began writing on the topic a quarter of a century ago, and back then I was plowing ground well tilled by others. For a long period, what was meant by reform of the PA was fairly clear and there was some overlapping consensus among diverse actors about what it meant. However, that consensus evaporated some time ago.
Changes in the PA may occur, but nothing deserving the title of “reform” will likely happen. The problem is not only that those calling for reform give that word meanings that are different, it’s that these meanings are totally contradictory. This means that any move toward one conception of “reform” will be blocked by a powerful party that wishes to move in the opposite direction. And even if such differences were papered over, for one important actor, namely the current Israeli political leadership, the only positive change for the PA would be its disappearance.
To Palestinians, the PA is generally assessed by what its leaders present it as being: an interim structure designed to allow Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to rule themselves and pave the way for a Palestinian state. However, it is difficult to find anyone, even within the senior ranks of the Palestinian leadership, who believe that this is what the PA has been able to do. Criticism of the authority began early on for more than the failures of diplomacy and institution-building to deliver a state. The PA was also denounced by many for its corruption and authoritarianism. Therefore, the authority that was emerging was weak in defending Palestinian interests, but was also one in which its leaders were accorded privileges, immunities, and benefits. By the late 1990s—when the reform talk began—there was an elected president and parliament to be sure, but there seemed little prospect of a second set of elections; the parliament seemed sidelined by the executive; official positions seemed to be awarded on the basis of political connections and loyalties; and high-level officials were accorded travel privileges (and perhaps even official contracts and other favors) that allowed them to escape the effects of a deteriorating political situation.
Therefore, from the beginning, talk of “corruption” among Palestinians was not simply about venality, but instead was deeply rooted in a sense that their leaders were either unable or unwilling to serve Palestinian interests, even as they were securing their own personal interests. It was as often VIP passes as the pilfering of public funds that would come up in public complaints and private discussions. And in more recent years, the failure of the PA to hold elections for nearly two decades aggravated the sense that ordinary people were voiceless and their leaders unaccountable. Increasingly, the harassment of critics and journalists has added to the PA’s domestic reputation for acting imperiously while delivering little.
Thus, Palestinian discussions about reform begin with talk of elections, as well as “reconciliation” (that is bringing Hamas into PA structures), devising a national consensus, and even reviving the Palestine Liberation Organization, the body that represents all elements of the Palestinian nation and deputizes those who govern structures in the West Bank and Gaza. Reform means PA accountability to those it rules. And such discussions are coupled not only with the need for better governance today, but with a political horizon that expresses Palestinian national identity either in the form of statehood or some other alternative that recognizes Palestinian rights on the individual and national levels.
However, when reform is discussed internationally, it is the PA’s effectiveness in maintaining security, sidelining Hamas, and providing social services that matter. Sound fiscal practices and combatting graft remain concerns, though they have faded somewhat over the years. Eventual Palestinian statehood is sometimes given lip service, but only as an eventual goal or a vague direction. The idea that reforming the PA will transform it into the State of Palestine is more exhortative than something that has a practical outcome.
And of course, Palestinian visions of reform pull in precisely the opposite direction: reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and elections, which would be open to Hamas, are the most obvious places where visions starkly clash. But even steps that would enhance judicial independence or curb security abuses (items that sometimes pop up in reform plans) are backed internationally only when they do not interfere with the ability and willingness of PA forces to move against Hamas and engage in security coordination with Israel.
Sometimes, international discussions prioritize issues derived from longstanding Israeli talking points—about educational curriculums and prisoner payments, most frequently—but these are grounded neither in solid understandings of the real situation nor in Palestinian social and political realities. For instance, most Palestinian high school graduates with whom I have spoken believe their educational system is already forced to be bashful on sensitive issues, so that importing textbooks from other countries as a substitute, as has been seriously suggested, would hardly be seen as reform by pupils, teachers, or any Palestinian with a memory of the situation before the PA’s creation. Such proposals often are based on naivete or simple ignorance of institutional and political realities, though that is not the crux of the problem since even detailed and well-informed reform programs display some of the same features. The point of such international efforts is not to make the PA liberal, democratic, or responsive to Palestinian society, but to make it palatable to international donors and Israel.
The international audience can be mollified only by steps that would make the PA more distant from those it administers and no closer to any prospect of genuine statehood. A reform agenda that combined internal governance issues with specific, visible, and immediate steps toward statehood might be hammered out in theory, but almost no plans on offer show even an awareness of the fundamental contradictory motivations of international and domestic audiences.
It is with the Israeli audience that reform programs come completely apart. The current Israeli leadership is clear: the problem is not that the PA is distasteful, but that it is regarded as poisonous. For a long time, Israeli leaders have found ways to undermine, avoid, or ignore Palestinian leaders, a tendency that was joined by U.S. officials during the first Trump administration. In a sense, the pledge of the original 1993 Oslo agreement that Israel and the PLO would recognize and deal with each other as national representatives has been decaying for decades. International discussions of Israel and Palestine that are anchored in shallow understandings of Palestinian politics are common. However, now there seems to be an unprecedented deafness to what Israeli leaders are actually saying. Under Israel’s current government, it is no longer a matter of subtle shifts, but vociferous, insistent, repeated, and categorical statements that the PA is not to be allowed back into Gaza—and that even in the West Bank it is no longer a partner. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been explicit: the PA is no different from Hamas in being a mortal enemy of Israel.
All kinds of improvements could be made in the PA. However, the idea that there is a clear set of reforms that would render it legitimate domestically, palatable to donors, a foundation stone for a two-state solution, and a security partner for Israel was difficult to achieve two decades ago and now seems utterly impossible. Pretending that Israel, the international community, and Palestinians can agree on PA reform simply obscures the degree of decay, destruction, and even death currently afflicting Palestinian society.
