Lebanon’s New Breed of Drug Barons

Mohanad Hage Ali is the deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the shifting geopolitics and Islamist groups after the Arab uprisings. He has just published a paper at Carnegie, titled “Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking,” and Diwan interviewed him in late March to discuss the topic of his paper and the nature of drug production in Lebanon, notably of Captagon, a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline.

Michael Young: You have just published a paper on Lebanon and the risks of Captagon trafficking. What is the main argument you make, and what are the consequences of such trafficking?

Mohanad Hage Ali: My central argument is that Captagon trafficking poses a threat that extends beyond drugs and law enforcement, presenting deeper challenges to Lebanon’s political system and its ability to recover during this transitional phase. This is due to two key factors. First, the structure of the Captagon network has concentrated wealth in the hands of a select group of drug barons, strengthening their influence. Second, Lebanon’s ongoing financial and economic crises have severely weakened state institutions. With the Lebanese currency, the pound, having lost over 98 percent of its value in the past four years, Lebanon’s security forces and state capacity to combat the drug threat have been significantly eroded. The prevailing assumption today is that in Lebanon and Syria new political orders are emerging on the ruins of the old, given the changes in both countries in the past  year. However, the illicit networks may not only survive this transition, they may come to play a central role in shaping the new reality.

MY: In your paper, you highlight the difference between a new breed of Captagon traffickers and more traditional tribal clan-based traffickers, who mainly produce hashish, or cannabis, as well as opium. What are the major differences between the two?

MHA: Clan-based hashish networks operate in a more decentralized manner, with a structure that includes working with peasant cultivators, traders, and independent transnational smuggling networks. This disperses profits among different actors, limiting the concentration of financial power and, consequently, the ability to secure political influence. While some clan-based traffickers may have been elected to Lebanon’s parliament, or can be in the future, their focus tends to be on personal prestige and community representation rather than advancing their illicit trade.

In contrast, Captagon traffickers are deeply embedded in every stage of their business—production, smuggling, and international distribution—allowing them to accumulate significant capital. This financial power translates into direct political leverage, enabling them to influence state institutions primarily to serve their business interests. Unlike clan-based traffickers, whose tribal affiliations and local obligations often restrict their capacity for broader political control, Captagon networks strategically infiltrate political and security structures to facilitate and protect their operations.

Captagon traffickers have a far more expansive international footprint. Many of the key figures hail from the Lebanese-Syrian border region, maintaining strong cross-border connections and, in some cases, holding dual nationality. Their direct ties to the demand markets grant them a global reach that clan-based hashish networks lack. While hashish trafficking in Lebanon has traditionally been a localized challenge for authorities, the Captagon trade operates on a scale that poses a systemic threat to state institutions, security agencies, and the country’s political center itself.

MY: How extensive has been the involvement of Lebanon’s political parties, or specific politicians, in drug trafficking? How about state institutions?

MHA: The first level of involvement is through local networks, which often receive protection in exchange for loyalty and support from politicians or parties. Such dynamics have historically been a cross-sectarian phenomenon in the Beqaa Valley. Unlike traditional trafficking groups tied to specific factions, Captagon barons have not been affiliated with a single political party. Instead, they have cultivated a broad spectrum of connections across the political system, granting them greater flexibility and freedom of movement.

The second level of involvement is direct facilitation, as seen in the case of Hezbollah in Syria. As an ally of the former Syrian regime, Hezbollah maintained a military presence throughout the country, and its name has surfaced in multiple investigations as a facilitator of the Captagon trade. Given the industrial-scale involvement in Captagon trafficking of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division, which was controlled by Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar al-Assad, and given that the unit was a key Hezbollah ally, it is hard to believe that the party remained detached from Syria’s booming drug trade. The same logic applies on the Lebanese side of the border with respect to Hezbollah, where individual links and territorial control would have made the party’s complete disengagement from trafficking nearly impossible.

MY: With Lebanon facing a new political reality since the war with Israel—by which I mean Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—how has this affected Captagon trafficking?

MHA: With the Syrian regime at the center of Captagon production, its downfall in December dealt a significant blow to the drug trade. Whether it will recover, even partially, depends on two key factors. The first is production capacity, as demand for Captagon remains strong in the Gulf states and beyond. Despite the setback, production continues in opposition-held areas of Syria, including northern parts of the country controlled by the so-called Syrian National Army, as well as in southern Syria, making it possible to satisfy this demand, at least partly. A similar situation applies to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, though current production levels remain relatively low.

The second factor is whether the new leaderships in Lebanon and Syria can provide viable economic alternatives to drug production. However, given ongoing sanctions on Syria and security challenges in both countries, achieving this in the short term is unlikely. International and regional actors seeking to curb drug trafficking must take this into account and act swiftly, whether by reconsidering sanctions or supporting economic recovery efforts. The collapse of state institutions remains a central driver of the Captagon trade, making sustainable economic solutions all the more urgent.

MY: What do you propose is the best way to wean clan-based Lebanese traffickers away from growing and selling hashish? Do you think this is realistic? 

MHA: The state should take steps to legalize hashish for certain medical purposes, thereby separating the farming of hashish from trafficking. This would reduce drug-related crimes, weaken smuggling networks, and ensure that farmers benefit directly from the industry. It is also the core principle behind a 2020 law passed in Lebanon, which was not implemented due to the country’s governance crisis at the time. The government must follow through with its implementation, drawing lessons from Morocco, which has made significant progress in this area, generating substantial state revenues. So far, planting alternative crops to replace hashish and other narcotics has failed, which makes the legalization of hashish a critical opportunity to regulate the sector effectively.