The Struggle Over Mahra

In January, the Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF), a Saudi-backed Salafi force under the command of the president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, deployed several units to the eastern Yemeni governorate of Mahra. The deployment, and the opposition if provoked from the Peaceful Protest Committee in Mahra Governorate (PPCMG), a social movement opposed to growing roles in Mahra by countries other than Oman, reflected a revival of the Saudi-Omani rivalry there. This threatens to undermine the governorate’s stability and deepen political fragmentation among Mahris themselves.

Prior to the deployment, Sheikh Ahmad Belhaf, the former chief of external relations in the PPCMG, welcomed the NSF forces and announced his defection from the protest committee over the alleged “spread of a Houthi agenda.” He also established a splinter group known as the Corrective Path of the PPCMG. At the same time, Sheikh Ali Salem al-Huraizi, a prominent Omani-backed tribal figure who chairs the PPCMG and has good relations with Ansar Allah, called for public mobilization against the Salafi presence and Saudi influence.

As in neighboring Hadhramawt, the NSF in Mahra has sought to expand its presence through local recruitment—including among non-Salafis—to secure buy-in. It has also reportedly made a commitment to avoiding any acts that would be unwelcome to the local community. This recruitment will extend a source of livelihood to a few thousand Mahris, deepening their engagement in security provision in their governorate. However, it also serves the purpose of counterbalancing the influence of Huraizi’s tribal forces, who have received monthly salaries of up to 200 Omani riyals from Muscat (the equivalent of around $530), according to a local tribal figure. In late February, key tribal figures, security and military personnel, local officials, and civil society activists attended a public meeting in Mahra’s Qishn district with the head of the NSF, demonstrating a degree of local acceptance.

By expanding the NSF’s operational control into Mahra, Saudi Arabia endeavors to increase its influence near the governorate’s eastern border. Its objective is to strengthen border security and prevent the transfer of weapons through Oman to Ansar Allah, particularly equipment for the assembly of drones and missiles. Last December, the security authorities in Mahra announced the interception of fiber optic cables at the Sarfayt crossing between Yemen and Oman bound for Ansar Allah. Such cables are often used to enhance the stealth, range, and anti-jamming capabilities of drones.

To this end, Saudi Arabia and the local authorities in Mahra look to improve stabilization efforts in the governorate, while countering the influence of Ansar Allah and the PPCMG. For instance, the Saudi Program for the Development and Reconstruction of Yemen has established the King Salman Medical and Educational City, as well as a dialysis center, in Mahra to enhance health services. Additionally, the Saudis aim to curtail the expansion into Mahra of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks secession from Yemen. The STC has already expanded its presence in the neighboring governorate of Hadhramawt. An additional Saudi objective is to limit the influence in Mahra of the STC’s regional backer, the United Arab Emirates, which has gained influence along the Hadhramawt coast.

The deployment of the NSF in Mahra has intensified threat perceptions in Oman, which views the governorate from the national security and domestic stability angles. The sultanate fears the expansion of Salafi ideology into Oman’s western regions, given their predominantly Sunni makeup and the implications for civil peace in Dhofar. Additionally, Oman does not want to see the Saudi sphere of influence expand to its borders. Between 2015 and 2021, Muscat opposed the growing military presence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Mahra, and it used the PPCMG and the tribal networks it supports to do so, given the historical ties that Oman enjoys with the governorate. Indeed, Oman has sought to counterbalance rising external interference in Mahra, fearing that this could lead to the greater sway of other Gulf states in an area the Omanis have long regarded as being part of their sphere of influence.

Since December 2024, the PPCMG had rallied the public against the NSF presence and growing Saudi influence in Mahra. In early January, Huraizi announced a new phase of peaceful resistance to “interference and a sectarian agenda,” and accused Saudi Arabia of “destabilizing” the governorate. He staged protests against the NSF, including in Ghaidha, Mahra’s capital. In mid-February, there were reports of skirmishes between anti-NSF tribal militias and forces that appeared to have been mistaken for the NSF. Despite the apparent error in identification, the incident demonstrated the potential for armed confrontation. Signs of discontent are unlikely to fade, as there have been similar actions for over a decade in the governorate.

Nevertheless, full confrontation between the Saudi-backed NSF and the Omani-backed PPCMG remains unlikely for several reasons. First, the muhafiz, or governor, of Mahra, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Yasser, has focused on the containment of potential escalation by adhering to the Mahri tribal code of conduct and reactivating dialogue channels, while boosting the vigilance of local security forces. Second, Riyadh has adopted a long-game approach in Mahra by improving bilateral cooperation with Oman, including through economic support, in a way that also reduces tension.

Manifestations of such tension will likely continue to be expressed by local proxies, probably through sporadic protests, limited attacks, and antagonistic political rhetoric. However, Saudi Arabia and Oman should participate in talks to preserve stability and prevent a deterioration of the situation. Mahra’s muhafiz will also have to pursue more proactive engagement and initiate a dialogue with Huraizi to reduce political polarization and contain any further acts of instability.