At the end of 2024, there were major political changes in Lebanon and Syria. The regime of Bashar al-Assad collapsed in Damascus, while Israeli attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon led to a fundamental shift in the balance of forces in Beirut, giving rise to new leaderships with different political directions.
What is notable is that the current presidents in both countries, Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria and Joseph Aoun in Lebanon, were until recently military commanders on opposing sides of conflicts in which many lives were lost. Today, both stand as symbols of change, having overturned dominant political powers in their respective countries. Their leadership also marks a clear departure from Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria, signaling new alignments with the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Still, a legitimate question is whether previous tensions separating Sharaa and Aoun will now affect ties between the countries? Or can the two men build a solid relationship between the two neighbors, perhaps for the first time Lebanon’s and Syria’s history?
Saudi Arabia has stepped in to help bring Lebanon and Syria closer together after years of strained relations. A symbolic step came when the defense ministers of Lebanon and Syria met in Riyadh last March. Saudi Arabia also supported Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s visit to Damascus in April and helped arrange a telephone call between Aoun and Sharaa in February. A second call between the two men took place during Aoun’s visit to Paris in late April, and they met on the sidelines of the extraordinary Arab Summit in Cairo in mid-May. These steps led to talk of new opportunities for economic and political cooperation between the countries, particularly after the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria. However, despite the optimism, very real doubts remain about how far the Lebanese-Syrian relationship can go.
Several problems remain unresolved. A major issue is Syria’s demand that Lebanon hand over prisoners currently being held in Lebanese jails. Lebanon has refused to do so, arguing that the individuals requested were involved in attacks against the Lebanese Army. Prisons in Lebanon, notably the one in Roumieh, house over 2,100 Syrian detainees, many of whom have been held without trial for years. These individuals include former members of the Free Syrian Army and others accused of participating in the Arsal clashes of 2014. Human rights organizations have reported that some detainees have been subjected to torture and forced confessions. In early 2025, Syria and Lebanon announced an agreement to repatriate a certain number of Syrian prisoners. However, after the formation of the new Lebanese government, no specific steps were taken to implement the agreement, which remains stalled.
Syria also continues to express frustration with smuggling along the border with Lebanon, accusing the Lebanese authorities of failing to take adequate action. From the Syrian perspective, smuggling is not just a border security issue; it signals, in their view, a lack of real commitment by Beirut to cooperate seriously.
Another problem is the nature of the Lebanese government’s commitment to disarming all parties in Lebanon. According to sources close to the Syrian administration, while Lebanon appears firm when it comes to confiscating Hezbollah’s heavy weapons that are directed against Israel, it has taken a more relaxed approach to light and medium weapons used by Lebanese parties in clashes with Syria. Syrian officials believe Beirut isn’t doing enough to address this question and sees it as a sign of weak enforcement or political hesitation.
Border policies have also contributed to the mistrust. The new Syrian government had expected that Lebanon would ease border restrictions, but when it didn’t Damascus also stiffened entry procedures for Lebanese citizens. Lebanon has further tightened entry restrictions on Syrians—especially via Beirut Airport—and imposed border fees for Syrians entering Lebanon, before reversing itself. The Lebanese authorities fear that facilitating cross-border movement could further destabilize Lebanon, especially given the presence of nearly 2 million Syrian refugees in the country and continued instability in Syria. These concerns are compounded by growing domestic political opposition to the refugee presence, deepening economic hardship, and mounting security anxieties
Another moment of controversy came when Aoun was photographed shaking hands with Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif at the inauguration ceremony for Pope Leo XIV in May. Tarif is the religious leader of the Druze community in Israel. Aoun’s media office later explained that Aoun was unaware of Tarif’s identity. However, a source close to the Syrian government described the incident as a diplomatic misstep with symbolic repercussions, given the fact that Israel has sought actively to fragment the Syrian Druze community.
The clearest signal that things were not right came during a speech by Sharaa on May 14, shortly after the formal lifting of most international sanctions on Syria. In a televised address, he publicly thanked a long list of countries—from the Gulf states, to Türkiye, to countries in North Africa—for their support during Syria’s transition. Conspicuously, he did not mention Lebanon, despite the fact that the country has hosted a very large number of Syrian refugees since the start of the Syrian conflict. This omission was clearly intended.
Relations between Lebanon and Syria have never been simple or balanced. So even minor events today are interpreted through a sectarian and political lens. Among the Lebanese, there is a view that Syria views their country as a weak neighbor, one that should fall under Damascus’ influence. Syrians, in turn, believe Lebanon is behaving in a disrespectful way toward Syria’s new leadership. According to a Syrian source, behind all this unstated sectarian tensions continue to shape attitudes on both sides.
Moreover, this tension is also creating political divisions within Lebanon’s own leadership. Aoun has taken a cautious and firm stance toward Syria, while Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and his team are pushing for a more open and practical approach. Salam’s camp believes that engaging with Syria—even if it means making some compromises—could help Lebanon grow politically and economically. It argues that Lebanon’s attitude toward Syria is affecting how the Gulf states view and engage with Beirut, and explains why Lebanon was not invited to the Gulf-U.S. summit hosted by Saudi Arabia on May 14, during President Donald Trump’s visit to the Middle East.
In response, according to sources close to Salam, Aoun’s team has warned that giving in to Syrian demands could threaten Lebanon’s sovereignty. They fear that this might open the door to renewed Syrian influence in the country—albeit in a different form than during the past. They also point to concerns about the Syrian refugee situation and potential security threats linked to Syria.
In the end, Lebanon’s relationship with Syria is both a foreign policy matter and a matter of internal disagreement between the Lebanese presidency and the premiership, each seeking to define Lebanon’s alliances. All of this is happening when time is not on Lebanon’s side, and as the country faces mounting economic, political, and social crises.
