Recent unrest in Syria has reignited the debate over the fate of minorities in the country, and has attracted international as well as Israeli attention. In April, Syria’s new rulers faced their second major internal crisis since March, after an insurgency in the country’s coastal region, followed by a massacre of Alawites.
The latest round of fighting began at the end of April in Jaramana, a Druze-majority town near Damascus, when local armed men fought forces from the Defense Ministry and the General Security Directorate. Clashes soon spread to another Druze stronghold, Sahnaya, as well as to Suwayda in the south. The clashes left dozens of casualties among the Druze and government-affiliated forces, and culminated in the Israeli bombing of an area near the presidential palace in Damascus, under the pretext that Israel would not permit any threats to the Druze community.
The developments personified Syria’s multifaceted problems since the downfall of the Assad regime. They also opened a window on rival regional interests in Syria, Syria’s postwar challenges, and shifting dynamics among the Druze. The internationalization of events in Jaramana showed that Syria remains a battleground for foreign powers. The regime’s collapse and Iran’s exit last December allowed Türkiye, Israel, and Saudi Arabia to fill the vacuum and try to shape events in Syria. Ankara and Riyadh, each for its own reasons, are spearheading efforts to stabilize the country and support what interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has called “state building,” prevent domestic discord, and secure resources for the state (through oil production and the lifting of international sanctions), among other things. The disarmament of militias and their integration into the state are part of this process, which Türkiye and Saudi Arabia support.
For Israel, a Syria ruled by a radical Islamist group backed by Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia represents a ticking time bomb. Therefore, the Israelis prefer to actively seek Syria’s fragmentation and remain committed to preventing any threats near their borders. The deployment of extremist groups toward the south, under the cloak of the Syrian state or otherwise, could potentially pose a threat to Israel as such groups could combine their efforts with local or regional actors to influence regional security. The ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria show the lengths to which Israel is willing to go to impose its red lines.
The Druze are caught up in such dynamics. Sharaa is working to consolidate power by reintegrating autonomous areas of Syria into the state, primarily by disarming them. In Jaramana, Sahnaya, and Suwayda, he demanded that local armed groups surrender their weapons, leading to Israel’s aggressive, even disproportionate, response. This was, in part, due to the historically strong relations between Israel and its Druze community. It is also very much part of Israel’s attempt to advance a project of partition in Syria. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated clearly that his country would “not allow [Syrian] forces to deploy south of Damascus or [pose] any threat to the Druze community.”
The developments also reveal two distinct approaches by the Druze to engage with Syria’s new rulers, adopted by different local actors and supported by separate Druze authorities. One approach is represented by the religious leader Hikmat al-Hijri, who has become increasingly uncompromising. Hijri has portrayed Syria’s new rulers as “wanted by international justice,” has described the recent events in Syria as a “genocide” against the Druze, and has called for international intervention. His position aligns with that of a leading Druze religious figure in Israel, Muwaffaq al-Tarif, who is in close contact with the Israeli government.
On the other side, religious figures such as Hammoud al-Hannawi and Youssef Jarbua, along with younger voices such as Layth al-Balous, have taken a more conciliatory approach toward the new Syrian authorities. During the Jaramana fighting, they engaged in negotiations with the state, unlike Hijri. The Lebanese Druze leader Walid Joumblatt, an important regional authority for the Druze community, has supported such an approach. He has openly criticized Tarif’s growing involvement in Syrian Druze affairs, backed by the “Zionist” state, which is pushing for “endless war against Muslims,” as Joumblatt put it. Such an outcome could have dangerous consequences for both Syrians and Lebanese.
What all Druze factions seem to agree on, however, is the need to retain their weapons, at least for now. This was true before and remains unchanged after the recent events. It reflects a deeper layer of unease in the Syrian situation, namely due to insecurity across the country, which minority communities face especially. Uncontrolled groups and rising sectarian rhetoric risk provoking violence—especially in a weak Syrian state unable to contain them. In the recent events, the Druze were demonized and there were spontaneous calls to massacre them.
In theory, handing over weapons to the new rulers in exchange for protection, rewards, positions, and a role in state-building is appealing. But in Syria’s harsh environment, relying on Sharaa’s fragile rule is often seen as risky. Without weapons, minority communities like the Druze would be left vulnerable. The problem isn’t just the absence of a functioning state or rule of law, but a deep lack of trust. In 2015, the predecessor of Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, namely Jabhat al-Nusra, massacred Druze in Idlib, while in 2017, a Jabhat al-Nusra suicide bomber killed nine people and injured 23 in the Druze-majority town of Hader.
The massacre of Alawites in March came after Sharaa’s mobilization of his supporters exposed the raw power behind his rule, primarily made up of formerly marginalized Sunni jihadi forces. While it is important to note that the Druze are not perceived in the same way as are Alawites, who many see as complicit in the crimes of the Assad regime, many from the community feel disarmament would leave them exposed. Even conciliatory figures, such as Hannawi, voiced concern over the killings on the coast. More recently, a negotiator from Jaramana remarked, “We have the right to be afraid. We’ve seen what happened elsewhere.”
The Druze are central to Syria’s state-building process. Their disarmament and integration into the state—or lack thereof—serves as a benchmark for the strength of rulers in Damascus. From the time of the French Mandate to the presidential terms of Shukri al-Quwwatly, Husni al-Zaim, and Adib al-Shishakli during the 1950s, Syrian leaders have tried to integrate the Druze by force, with limited or no success. It was during the years of Baath Party rule that there was an improvement, not because of coercion but because many Druze saw the party as being able to shape Syria’s future. These are valuable lessons for Syria’s new leaders to bear in mind.
