Source: Getty
commentary

A Sigh of Relief in Iraqi Kurdistan

The peace process between Türkiye and the PKK will stabilize areas where they had been fighting, as well as the wider region.

by Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Published on August 12, 2025

A group of 30 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters ceremonially threw their weapons into a fire on July 11 in the Jasana cave of Sulaymaniya in Iraqi Kurdistan as part of a new peace process between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state. In the 1920s, the cave was used by the Kurdish leader Sheikh Mahmoud to resist British forces. The fact that the ceremony took place in Iraqi Kurdistan showed the potential repercussions the peace process may have for the area, since the PKK has been based in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1982, after a deal with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 2015, the last peace process that took place failed.

Both the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have expressed support for the peace process. Furthermore, a delegation from the Turkish pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party also visited the leadership of both parties, including PUK leader Bafel Talabani and KDP President Massoud Barzani. The delegation conveyed a message from the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Oçalan asking Barzani to visit him.

“The Kurdistan Regional Government [or KRG] has consistently supported a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue in [Türkiye],” Treefa Aziz, the KRG representative in the United States, declared. “We believe dialogue is the only viable path to long-term stability, and we encourage all parties to return to negotiations in good faith.”

Indeed, the two ruling parties have supported peace efforts between the PKK and Türkiye since 1993. However, the situation is now different from the previous peace efforts because starting in 2019 most of the fighting between the PKK and the Turkish army has taken place in Iraqi Kurdistan, affecting and displacing local civilians. In July 2022, Turkish strikes killed nine Iraqi tourists in Zakho.

Türkiye has in recent years developed a military edge over the PKK, following the Turkish army’s crackdown on an urban insurgency led by PKK militants in the Kurdish majority southeast of Türkiye after the failure of the 2015 peace process. Since 2019, the Turks have also established over 35 military points, entering 15 kilometers into Iraqi Kurdistan and driving the PKK out from parts of Duhok Governorate along the border. Last year, Türkiye was also planning an operation in the Gara mountains further inland.

The Turks have also developed drones that have targeted PKK fighters, driving them underground into a complex of tunnel systems built by the party. The PKK this year said they had developed countermeasures against the drones, and have shot down several of them. On July 6, twelve Turkish soldiers died from exposure to methane gas while searching one cave.

According to a report by the Community Peacemaker Teams, following the disarmament ceremony Turkish military strikes decreased by 97 percent compared to the previous month. Apart from this, tensions have also significantly decreased between the KDP and PKK. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency recently reported that “PKK disarmament, if completed, is likely to have a positive effect on stability in northern Iraq, assuming it is accompanied by a withdrawal of Turkish military forces.” The Iraqi government also welcomed the process and called for a Turkish withdrawal from Iraq, although Türkiye is still reportedly establishing new bases inside the country.

The KDP, which controls Erbil and Duhok, has built a strong relationship with Türkiye since the Turks opened a consulate in Erbil in 2010. Most of the Turkish ground operations have also taken place against PKK positions near KDP territories in Duhok. The KDP, traditionally a rival of the PKK, has also opposed the PKK’s territorial expansion since the 1990s from Qandil into many traditional KDP areas. Both sides also fought each other during the Kurdish civil war of the mid 1990s. In 2020, the KDP called on the PKK to take their fight inside Türkiye, while the PKK accused the KDP of preparing a war against the PKK in cooperation with Ankara.

Furthermore, the PKK has also established a presence in Sinjar after the Islamic State attacked the area in 2014. Six years later, Erbil signed an agreement with Baghdad, the aim of which was to remove the PKK from Sinjar, though it was never implemented. The KRG in 2021 also blamed the problems related with the PKK presence for a rise in the number of migrants to Europe, with many young Kurds seeking to escape the ambient instability through Belarus. According to the KRG, more than 800 villages were evacuated due to clashes between Türkiye and the PKK, displacing countless civilians and devastating local communities.

There has also been friction between the KDP and PKK over the thousands of Kurdish refugees in Makhmour camp who fled Türkiye during the 1990s, from which the PKK has recruited fighters. Since October 2017, Iraq has controlled Makhmour and has put pressure on the camp. Oçalan recently implied that the refugees in Makhmour could return to Türkiye. In light of this, Noreldin Waisy, press secretary and media adviser to KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, underlined that the KRG fully supported any peace talks with Türkiye that “aim to bring an end to the violence and pave the way for lasting stability in the region.”

“These areas, located in some of the most beautiful and promising parts of the Kurdistan Region—particularly in terms of tourism and natural resources—have suffered tremendously. In addition to the economic and environmental toll, many innocent lives have been lost as a result of the continued confrontations,” Waisy added.

While Türkiye hasn’t been able to carry out ground operations in PUK-controlled territories far from the Turkish border, it has carried out drone strikes against the PKK in PUK areas, even inside Sulaymaniyah city. The PUK, which rules over Sulaymaniyah, has traditionally had better relations with the PKK, although it also briefly fought the party in 2000.

Since April 3, 2023, Ankara has on multiple occasions extended its flight ban on Sulaymaniyah International Airport. Türkiye has also directly called on the PUK to end its relationship with the PKK. As early as 2017, two Turkish agents were captured in Sulaymaniyah by the PKK, exacerbating Turkish-PUK relations, and Türkiye targeted Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi at Sulaymaniyah airport in 2023. The SDF is led militarily by the People’s Protection Units, which Türkiye considers an extension of the PKK, an accusation the SDF denies. On March 15, 2023, a helicopter carrying SDF members to Sulaymaniya crashed in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing nine people. This highlighted the links between the PUK’s security forces and the SDF.

Therefore, it was interesting that the recent disarmament ceremony was held in Sulaymaniyah, which was also attended by officials from the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT). One of the two MIT officers captured by the PKK in 2017 was recently brought back to Türkiye, as was the body of the other, who had died in captivity. A PUK official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the PUK was asked officially by mediators to organize the disarmament ceremony. “Initially some sides had suggested a location in Erbil [Governorate] for the ceremony, but the PKK rejected the proposal and opted for a location in [Sulaymaniyah]. The security apparatus of the KRG and PUK took part in ensuring the security and safety of the process.”

However, the PUK source said that in return, there is no expectation that the Turks will reward the PUK for their role. “However, since the PUK genuinely wished success for this process, and for peace to finally be achieved in [Türkiye] through this process, it is only natural to be optimistic about a restoration of relations between the PUK and [Türkiye] as a byproduct of the peace process.”

Devlet Bahceli, the leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party, who launched the peace process last year, recently said that he expects the process to be completed by the end of 2025. According to Mohammed A. Salih of the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute’s National Security Program, if “the PKK lays down arms and the Turkish state reciprocates by granting some recognition of Kurdish rights within a legal framework, that would certainly be a welcome step for the KDP and PUK, and Iraqi Kurds in general.” He added, “It would especially rid the border areas of conflict and the negative impact this has had on the lives of civilians in those areas. It would also help strengthen the relationship between Iraqi Kurds and Türkiye, given Türkiye’s major role in regional affairs and its status as an ally of the West.

Therefore, the peace process with Türkiye, if successful, could have a major impact on the future of Iraqi Kurdistan, including its economy, tourism industry, and stability. It could also further improve relations between Iraq and Türkiye, and between the Iraqi Kurdish parties and Türkiye, and lead to the return of refugees from the Makhmour camp. A successful process would end the Turkish flight ban on Sulaymaniyah and restore Turkish-PUK relations. Furthermore, for the KDP, the peace process could remove what it sees as territorial encroachment from a Turkish Kurdish party into Iraqi Kurdistan. Time will tell how much light there is at the end of this tunnel.  

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.