In recent days, we have seen movement toward a possible ceasefire in Gaza thanks to the efforts of the Trump administration. Washington has applied pressure on both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas to finalize an agreement that will secure the release of hostages, end the war, and pave the way for a transition in governance that excludes Hamas.
Regardless of whether the initiative ultimately succeeds or not, the renewed momentum offers Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government in Lebanon an opportunity to leverage its Arab and Western backing to renegotiate the terms of last year’s November 27 ceasefire, end Israeli hostilities, and place Hezbollah’s disarmament back on track with a clear and well-defined timeline.
Although the ceasefire has held for nearly a year, it remains far from sustainable. The one-sided arrangement, in which Israel retained the ability to strike targets inside Lebanon at will and on a daily basis, is costly for Hezbollah. However, the short-term security that the agreement gave Israel is equally shaky in the absence of a long-term agreement with Beirut.
For Hezbollah, the so-called ceasefire has been accompanied by a heavy death toll, with more than 200 party members and allies and 105 civilians killed since it came into effect. The party has turned its whole network of members and supporters into sitting ducks. At the same time, Israel has been preventing any rebuilding process in South Lebanon by targeting construction machinery. The absence of security and the reconstruction of towns and villages could erode Hezbollah’s popularity over the long term, and the party understands that silence is not a sensible strategy. But what exactly is Hezbollah waiting for?
The party is seeking a window of opportunity to renegotiate both the terms of the ceasefire with Israel, and to translate this into a new domestic arrangement within Lebanon. Both objectives are deeply challenging, if not impossible, under current conditions.
With regard to the former, renegotiating the ceasefire with Israel requires reestablishing some degree of deterrence. This is unattainable for as long as Israel retains an open timeframe for escalation in response to any Hezbollah operation. A shift in the U.S. position would be necessary to limit Israel’s latitude to widen the war. At present, Israel can destroy neighborhoods in cities, as well as towns and villages, displace populations, and even speak of building settlements on the ruins, without facing serious consequences. It continues to receive military equipment, even from countries publicly critical of its campaign.
Within Lebanon, an internal arrangement with Hezbollah also remains difficult, given the party’s refusal to disarm and its insistence on a dialogue over a “national defense strategy.” This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, such a dialogue would likely drag on indefinitely, until a changing geopolitical environment erodes what limited leverage the current Lebanese government still holds. Second, the United States, Israel, and major Lebanese political factions are unlikely to accept any agreement that preserves Hezbollah’s military structure or its arsenal of drones and missiles, even under the nominal supervision of the Lebanese armed forces.
Another obstacle lies in the evolving nature of Hezbollah’s leadership and the deepening Iranian role within it, particularly after the elimination of much of the party’s senior command during the conflict with Israel. Israeli strikes over the past year suggested a more direct Iranian hand in Hezbollah’s decisionmaking than previously assumed. The killing of General Mohammed Zahedi, who was reportedly a member of Hezbollah’s Shura Council in the attack on the Iranian Embassy in Damascus in April 2024, the wounding of Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mujtaba Amani, in the so-called pagers attacks in September 2024, and the killing of Abbas Nilforoushan, the deputy commander of the Quds Force, in the assassination of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah the same month, all underscored this. General Mohammed Reza Falah-Zadah, another senior Iranian commander, was allegedly named supervisor of Hezbollah after Nasrallah’s killing, and reportedly had survived a strike that killed a senior Hezbollah military chief.
If Iran’s influence over Hezbollah’s leadership was this extensive under Nasrallah, it is difficult to imagine that Naim Qassem, the current secretary general, operates with greater autonomy. This context highlights the potential importance of the Amal Movement, led by Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, in steering the Shia political alliance toward outcomes more rooted in Lebanese sectarian interests than in Tehran’s regional calculations.
Israel’s overwhelming superiority in firepower has rendered the traditional logic of attrition obsolete. Given the asymmetry in military capabilities and technology, Hezbollah can no longer rely on tying Israel down in an incremental confrontation. Imposing a deterrence equation on the Israelis would require that the United States curtail Israeli military responses and that the Netanyahu government face increasing instability. These factors remain improbable at best, which is why Lebanon risks paying a very heavy price for any miscalculation.
That is why the Lebanese government must seize the moment on two fronts. First, it must work to win the hearts and minds of those most affected by the ongoing Israeli strikes in the Shia community. This could begin with a national strategy to facilitate the return of the displaced populations to the border region. Even with limited resources, the government can improve basic services in the south—from makeshift schools to mobile medical clinics. Avoiding such tasks and focusing instead on narrow political skirmishes with Hezbollah will only reinforce the organization’s narrative and strengthen its position.
Second, the government should develop a comprehensive disarmament framework in coordination with the Amal Movement, Hezbollah’s major ally, and in consultation with Tehran. Amal has both the interest and leverage to advance a political settlement. It showed this earlier this year when it supported Lebanon’s endorsement of the plan presented by U.S. envoy Tom Barrack, outlining a step-by-step roadmap toward Hezbollah’s disarmament, an Israeli cessation of hostilities and withdrawal, and reconstruction. Such a deal could also pave the way for a final border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, following the maritime agreement brokered under the Biden administration.
By maintaining its current passive stance, the Salam government risks ceding the initiative to the only two actors still shaping events: Hezbollah, which may resort to a military escalation in an effort to restore deterrence; and Israel, which could expand its buffer zone and prolong an occupation that threatens to derail Lebanon’s fragile political and economic recovery.
