The downfall of Bashar al-Assad has reshaped Syria’s regional role, marking the end of an era defined by Iranian dominance and the beginning of a new contest to redraw the country’s geopolitical map. New regional relationships are emerging, shaped by Turkish and Gulf cooperation, in support of President Ahmad al-Sharaa. This is occurring under U.S. oversight, even as Israel opposes the new Syrian regime. At the heart of the evolving reality lies a central question: Where do the objectives of Israel and the backers of the Sharaa regime converge, and where do they diverge?
The Syrian political leadership, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia all share a common interest in curbing Iran’s influence in Syria—specifically, in dismantling Tehran’s regional alliance network that depends on linking proxies from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. Sharaa, aware that this issue is essential for maintaining his regime’s stability amid international rivalries, consistently highlights it. Such an aim represents the principal meeting point between Damascus’ allies and Israel.
For Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, the priority is to consolidate a unified and friendly Syrian state under a cooperative leadership. Israel, by contrast, views any unified, assertive neighbor with suspicion, especially one led by Islamist figures backed by Ankara. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed such skepticism by saying, “I’m not naïve; I know who I’m dealing with,” in reference to Syria. This has translated into Israeli support for separatist or ethnosectarian tendencies in the country, the imposition of a buffer zone in southern Syria, and a revival of ideas that could lead to regional fragmentation. Not surprisingly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has accused Israel of trying to undermine Syria’s stabilization process.
After the Assad regime was ousted, Israel moved swiftly to neutralize any attempts to rebuild Syria’s military capabilities. It launched precision strikes on missile production facilities and weapons depots—most notably in Masyaf—as well as on sites around Damascus and key airbases such as T-4 and Palmyra. These attacks delivered a clear message: strategic weaponry must remain beyond the reach of Syria’s new armed forces. Concurrently, Israel expanded its military footprint by creating a buffer zone in Syria’s southwest, adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights, even as it took over new positions on Mount Hermon. This placed Israeli forces within proximity of Damascus and Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, a strategic hub for Hezbollah, while also imposing red lines on Turkish military ambitions in Syria.
Türkiye has intensified its engagement with the Syrian armed forces, engaging in training initiatives, logistical support programs, and joint exercises to rebuild a cohesive military institution. In the same vein, Saudi Arabia has endorsed the redeployment of Syrian forces across Syria, despite Israeli objections, viewing this as a cornerstone for restoring stability and security. Against this backdrop, the Syrian leadership has sought to leverage Turkish and Gulf backing to advance a calibrated process of Syrian military rehabilitation. Yet it also realizes that Israel will not tolerate any reemergence of a range of Syrian military capabilities, such as long-range ballistic missile forces, advanced air-defense systems, modernization of the country’s air force, or the reconstitution of other high-end military assets.
At the top of Syrian leadership’s agenda is regaining political and economic legitimacy, under a Turkish-Saudi umbrella. In a remarkably short span of time, Sharaa appeared before the UN General Assembly, backed by a flurry of diplomatic steps on the international stage. A White House official has also confirmed that the Syrian president will be meeting with President Donald Trump in Washington on November 10. On the economic front, sanctions relief has begun to take shape. The European Union has eased most restrictions on Syria, and the United States is in the process of revising its sanctions framework, signaling a gradual shift toward normalization, though major legislative hurdles remain. Türkiye and Saudi Arabia are moving in tandem to support Sharaa: Ankara is focusing on rebuilding infrastructure and transit corridors linking Türkiye to the Gulf, while Riyadh is pursuing a “reconstruction-through-investment” strategy that ties financing to political stability.
This growing momentum has been reinforced by positive U.S. signals, particularly from the U.S. ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack. It points to a trajectory of accelerated reintegration into the global economy. On September 20, Barrack voiced optimism that Congress would soon repeal the Caesar Act, calling it vital to “let Syria’s economy breathe again.” Yet Israel continues to put pressure on Washington to maintain the sanctions in place, viewing them as a crucial tool for retaining strategic leverage over Damascus.
The Syrian leadership’s pursuit of international recognition has also been reflected in its approach to managing Syria’s internal affairs—particularly in the east, along the coast, and in the south. Its strategy prioritizes deescalation and containment over opening new military fronts. Within this framework, the Syrian government seeks to resolve tensions with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), without engaging in a direct confrontation. Sharaa has met repeatedly with Mazloum Abdi, the SDF commander, producing agreements that have yet to be implemented, due to diverging agendas, even as Türkiye has intensified its military pressure on the SDF to push it toward a settlement to integrate its forces into the state. Ankara considers the Kurdish question in Syria as essential for its own national security, given the potential for spillover into southern Türkiye, where a large Kurdish population is present.
The Syrian government has adopted a similar approach of containing conflict in the coastal and Suwayda regions. The tensions in the coastal region, where Syria’s Alawite community is concentrated, feature prominently in Damascus’ ongoing engagement with Russia, backed quietly by Türkiye. In Suwayda, the government’s strategy revolves around political and social outreach while avoiding any new clashes in the governorate. It seeks to inhibit local actors who oppose the Syrian leadership—such as the Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri—and to significantly isolate Suwayda from Israel and other outside influences. This approach aims to bring Suwayda more firmly under Damascus’ control, or at least to limit its ability to mount an effective uprising against the government. The government’s reinforcement of the M5 highway from Damascus to the Jordanian border has served to isolate Suwayda from Israeli-controlled territory, a measure that Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have supported.
The situation with Israel remains the most complex and potentially dangerous for Damascus. Neither Syria nor its backers view a military escalation as a viable option and are instead wagering on a negotiated process. Should such talks succeed, they would consolidate Sharaa’s authority and accelerate Syria’s normalization and recovery. But if they fail, Damascus is expected to continue exercising strategic patience and pursuing negotiations, maximizing its diplomatic and economic gains and gradually reinforcing its standing.
The competing regional agendas in Syria are also affecting developments on another level, namely how to connect Sunni-majority areas in Türkiye, Syria, and Jordan with the heartland of the Arab world through overland corridors such as the M5 highway. Ankara and Riyadh are wagering on a single overland political-logistical axis running from these three countries to the Gulf. The Turkish trade minister has stated that the Türkiye-Syria corridor is slated to open next year. This means coordinating measures to facilitate the transportation of goods, harmonizing customs procedures at borders, and rehabilitating certain segments of road—all steps designed to put in place a more developed and integrated regional logistics network.
In parallel, Turkish-Gulf defense partnerships are deepening. These include a Saudi-Turkish deal for the kingdom to acquire Türkiye’s Akinci armed drone, alongside Türkiye’s strategic agreements with Kuwait covering investments, maritime transport, energy, and defense, not to mention its broader strategic relationship with Qatar, as well as other projects with Gulf states. The effort to reinforce the connections from Türkiye to the Gulf, via Syria and Jordan, is also aimed at countering any eventual Israeli plans to prevent this, for example though the establishment of a geographical line of influence from Israel, through southern Syria, to Tanf and Deir al-Zor, toward the Kurdish-controlled areas of Syria’s northeast and into Iraqi Kurdistan.
The struggle for Syria has not ended and will not soon end. Signs that the new order is being consolidated are stronger than the contrary, but the U.S. position remains decisive. Either Washington reins in Israel’s and the SDF’s impulses and steers them toward a durable settlement with the new Syrian regime, or Syria will enter new cycles of instability. However, this will not suffice on its own. The Syrian leadership’s domestic policies will prove equally pivotal in either reinforcing social cohesion and a sense of shared purpose or reigniting internal divisions and renewed conflict.
