Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. Recently, Sadjadpour wrote an essay for Foreign Affairs, titled “Autumn of the Ayatollahs: What Kind of Change is Coming to Iran?” Diwan interviewed him in early November to discuss the essay, and more broadly to examine what the future holds for Iran.
Michael Young: You’ve just written a very interesting essay for Foreign Affairs in which you examine the kind of changes that may be coming to Iran once the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, passes away. Before getting into the piece itself, what immediately hits the reader is that your conclusions are far different—I would say far more potentially pessimistic—than the usual assumptions in the West about what might happen in the country once the Islamic regime goes. To what extent were you motivated by a desire to push back against optimistic scenarios that seem to prevail?
Karim Sadjadpour: My intention wasn’t to write optimistic or pessimistic scenarios, but realistic ones based on Iran’s unique history and political culture. In the aftermath of the Twelve-Day War—when Khamenei’s fate appeared uncertain—I was struck by the research of political scientist Barbara Geddes, which shows that from World War II to the present, less than a quarter of authoritarian transitions have led to democracy; far more often, they have led to another form of authoritarianism. Iran’s 1979 revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the outcome of uprisings in most Arab Spring countries are all examples of this. When authoritarian governments collapse as a result of internal violence or external conflict, the likelihood of a democratic transition is even lower.
The question I wanted to probe was whether the Islamic Republic after Khamenei would endure, transform, or implode—and what kind of system would emerge in its wake. My own sense is that the status quo is not sustainable, yet if the regime were to implode anytime soon, the autocratic alternative would be better positioned to take power than the democratic alternative.
As I wrote, Iran has all the makings of a G-20 country: an educated, globally connected population, tremendous natural resources, and a proud civilizational identity. For Iranian democrats, however, the international climate could hardly be less favorable. The United States and other Western governments that once championed democracy have withdrawn resources and are preoccupied with their own democratic backsliding. In this context, Iran is more likely to follow broader regional and global trends in which strongmen rise by stressing the virtues of order rather than the promise of freedom. There’s a light at the end of the tunnel, but for now, Iran’s democrats are still trying to build the tunnel.
MY: What do you see as the possible futures for Iran once Khamenei, passes away?
KS: What I tried to do was use a comparative framework to make these scenarios more accessible. I was inspired by an essay that the historian Stephen Kotkin wrote in Foreign Affairs titled “Russia’s Five Futures.” Iran will, of course, follow its own unique path, but these are the five trajectories I wrote about, in no particular order: First, Iran as Russia, where a nationalist strongman takes power. The regime collapses under the weight of sanctions, corruption, and social unrest, leaving a vacuum filled by security elites and oligarchs. Out of that turmoil could emerge an “Iranian Putin,” who replaces Islamism with grievance-driven nationalism.
Second, an Iran as China scenario, characterized by pragmatic autocracy. Iran’s leaders attempt to preserve the system by shifting from revolutionary zeal to pragmatic national interest—opening the economy and seeking rapprochement with the United States. The regime remains repressive, but its legitimacy rests more on growth and nationalism than on ideology.
Third, an Iran as North Korea scenario, in which there is continuity in the clerical leadership. The state doubles down on ideology, isolation, and repression, perhaps under Khamenei’s son Mojtaba or another hardline cleric, sustained mainly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Survival depends on totalitarian control at home and a nuclear deterrent abroad.
Fourth, an Iran as Pakistan scenario, defined by military dominance. The IRGC eclipses the clergy, ruling directly or indirectly as guardians of national unity. Iran becomes a praetorian state defined less by ideology than by generals, vacillating between confrontation and accommodation with the West.
Finally, an Iran as Türkiye scenario, where populist democracy emerges. Clerical power gives way to more competitive elections, producing populist leaders who mix nationalism, religious symbolism, and mass appeal. This model offers popular legitimacy but risks sliding into illiberal authoritarianism rather than liberal democracy.
These scenarios aren’t mutually exclusive. Iran’s transition could blend elements of several—say, a populist strongman backed by the military. I believe Iranian society is ripe for representative government, but authoritarian transitions are rarely popularity contests; they are more often coercive competitions. It’s self-evident that if Iran’s liberal or democratic opposition is incapable of organizing, what follows the Islamic Republic will be illiberal.
MY: One thing you don’t mention much is Iran’s regional network of alliances. How would you situate this in the evolving situation? Do you believe there is still a desire to revive the so-called Axis of Resistance, or would it be more accurate to say Tehran wants to ensure that this card is not devalued, because it realizes it will have to negotiate it away in the foreseeable future?
KS: So long as Khamenei remains supreme leader, the Islamic Republic will remain committed to proxies opposed to Israel and the United States. For him, this is not a bargaining chip but an article of faith that has defined his life. The regime’s capacities have weakened over the past year, but its ideology has not changed.
The real question is whether a post-Khamenei Iran will continue to prioritize revolutionary ideology over national interest. In my view, the Islamic Republic’s ideological pillars—“Death to America” and “Death to Israel”—have deeply undermined Iran’s national interests; Iranians are poorer and less secure because of them. Most Iranians understand that their country will never realize its potential until it normalizes relations with the United States. Doing so will require rethinking its regional conduct, above all its hostility toward Israel and support for armed proxies.
MY: In the parallels you drew between Iran and Russia, you mentioned the possibility that a leader may emerge who relies on “grievance-driven […] nationalism as the organizing creed of a new authoritarian order.” Would many Iranians necessarily consider this a bad outcome, or is the desire for a pluralistic order and good relations with the West more profound?
KS: I think most Iranians have higher aspirations than to live under another corrupt dictatorship like Vladimir Putin’s Russia, even if it were secular and offered social freedoms. But authoritarian transitions are determined by who can best harness coercive power for political gain, as Putin did. That said, Russia and China, regardless of their political systems, will likely always define themselves as great-power rivals of the United States. Iran, by contrast, is a regional power that has historically aligned with Washington, in part to deter predatory neighbors such as Russia. The Islamic Republic’s hostility toward America is therefore a historical anomaly, not an inevitability.
MY: Let me push back on something else you said earlier. In this day and age, with a much more multipolar international order, therefore more choices in terms of alignments, how truly important is it for Iran to have better relations with the United States if it abandons its ideological militancy after Khamenei is gone? In other words, might a successor find it easier to maintain official distance from the United States if this is paired with less open hostility than what we have at present, without damaging Iran’s political and economic power?
KS: That’s possible. There is no government in the world that has devoted a greater share of its finite political and economic capital to opposing the United States than the Islamic Republic of Iran—and the country has paid a high price for this enmity. Iran’s 92 million people make up the largest population in the world to have been isolated from the global financial and political system for decades. Its economy is among the most sanctioned, its currency among the most devalued, its passport among the most denied, its internet among the most censored, and its air among the most polluted.
Two of the countries I referenced in the essay, Pakistan and Türkiye, have at times had profound differences with Washington, yet have long remained U.S. partners. Vietnam is another example—a nation once at war with the United States that has prospered since normalization, transforming itself into one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies and a key American partner. Even close U.S. allies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have maintained strategic and economic partnerships with China and Russia. The question for post-Khamenei Iran is whether it will continue to define itself by opposition to America, or by the pursuit of its own national interest.
MY: You describe the IRGC as a “constellation of competing cartels whose rivalries—generational, institutional, and commercial—have been contained under Khamenei’s authority.” Can you explain the repercussions of this once Khamenei leaves the scene, and how you think this might affect the succession situation?
KS: What’s remarkable is that despite the failures of Khamenei’s leadership and the extreme factionalism of Iranian politics, there are virtually no examples of senior political figures or active IRGC commanders publicly criticizing him. Yet the entire nation is quietly anticipating his departure, and what comes next. The institution that has the constitutional authority to choose the next supreme leader is the Assembly of Experts, composed of 88 mostly elderly clerics. It remains to be seen whether the IRGC will continue to defer to the clergy in selecting the next commander in chief or whether they will seek to rule more overtly. Nor is the IRGC a unitary actor: it consists of over 150,000 men with competing ambitions and visions for the country.
As Siamak Namazi—who was held hostage by the IRGC for eight years—observed, “Iran is today a collection of competing mafias—dominated by the IRGC and its alumni—whose highest loyalty is not to nation, religion, or ideology but to personal enrichment.” For this reason, there is concern even among fierce opponents of the regime that what’s at stake is not only the stability of the Islamic Republic but the cohesion of the Iranian state itself—concerns that the regime and its supporters have deliberately amplified to equate their survival with Iran’s.
MY: You seem to dismiss a monarchical restoration by the Pahlavis. Why, and do Iranians actually seek such a restoration?
KS: The first draft of my essay included a section entitled “Iran as Spain,” which explored the scenario of a transition back to monarchy. It was cut for space, but I wrote that the lone opposition figure to the Islamic Republic with widespread name recognition and a seeming base of popular support is the country’s former crown prince, Reza Pahlavi, who was last in Iran at age 17, just before the 1979 revolution.
Leading an opposition from exile and restoring a deposed monarchy are both daunting challenges, but neither is unprecedented. Lenin in Russia, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran all spent more than fifteen years in exile before returning to lead revolutions that toppled the regimes that had banished them. Several countries that once abolished their monarchies—including Spain, Cambodia, and Britain (under Oliver Cromwell)—later restored them as constitutional monarchies.
But while Spain’s 20th-century transition from dictatorship to democracy is often cited by Iranian monarchists, the contexts are profoundly different. In Spain, General Francisco Franco groomed Juan Carlos de Borbón, the heir to the deposed monarchy, as his protégé and successor. Yet when Franco died in 1975, Juan Carlos defied expectations by dismantling the dictatorship and ushering in a democratic constitution. What made Spain’s transition possible was Juan Carlos’s dual legitimacy—groomed by Franco yet carrying the symbolic weight of the monarchy. Reza Pahlavi’s context is very different.
The deeper question is what kind of order Iran’s monarchists aspire to restore. Reza Pahlavi has consistently said his goal is to help Iran transition to democracy—and perhaps serve as a constitutional monarch if chosen by the people. Yet his most passionate supporters are vocal about restoring another absolute autocracy. This tension has inhibited his ability to build the kind of broad-based democratic opposition that real change would require.
The broader lesson from history is humility. Authoritarian transitions are rarely linear or predictable. As I noted in my essay, both Western scholars and Iran’s leading intellectuals profoundly misread Khomeini and the revolution’s trajectory. Few imagined that clerics would rule, and some even hailed Khomeini as “an Islamic Gandhi.” While many Iranians still believe that foreign powers can determine the Islamic Republic’s fate, the bipartisan lesson from America’s misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq is that no foreign power can fabricate the kind of national consensus Iran’s opposition will ultimately need to succeed.
