Lebanon’s appointment of Simon Karam as civilian negotiator with Israel in the framework of the so-called Mechanism was an inevitable measure. It was implemented under duress, certainly, but for now it does not represent normalization with Israel, as Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stressed on December 3.
But we should be under no illusion, Israel and the United States want to insert a wedge that can ultimately lead to a peace settlement between Lebanon and Israel, shoehorning the Lebanese (and the Syrians) into the Abraham Accords. Both the Israelis and Americans seek to permanently neutralize the southern Lebanese border. This means, for starters, that they will try to impose security guarantees, which will most probably involve monitoring mechanisms inside Lebanon and measures that, among other things, carefully filter who enters border villages.
The Lebanese hold few cards allowing them to push back against Israeli and American preferences. And let’s discard the myth that “the resistance” represents a valid shield against Israel. It’s thanks to Iran’s and Hezbollah’s misguided Unity of the Arenas strategy that the Israelis are now occupying Lebanese land again. Regionally, most influential Arab states either look at Israeli intentions with sympathy or are too weak to thwart them. Therefore, the negotiations conducted in the context of the Mechanism may have delayed the full-scale Israeli offensive that many had predicted. However, the moment Lebanon pushes back against what the Israelis consider essential demands, Israel is bound to significantly escalate its attacks to force a change in the Lebanese position. Karam knows he may soon be negotiating under fire.
Those who argue in favor of a defiant Lebanese position are at a loss for convincing ideas. If resistance is bound to fail, largely because Hezbollah has lost much of its support in the country, and because Shiites are enduring considerable, and heartless, devastation, what options does Lebanon have? The speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, has well understood the existential dangers to his community. That is why he sent his aide Ali Hassan al-Khalil to Iran recently to explain to his Iranian interlocutors the risks Lebanon’s Shiites face. It is also why the most senior Iraqi Shiite cleric, Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, is said to have expressed to the Iranians the need for Lebanon’s Shiites to be “protected,” an unprecedented move implicitly warning against Iranian intransigence.
Nor should we forget that the last time Lebanon rejected a withdrawal agreement with Israel, namely the May 17, 1983 accord, the Israelis continued to occupy Lebanese land for an additional sixteen years (the agreement was formally rescinded in 1984). So, the path of courageous stubbornness is one that few Lebanese want to take, even less so if it leads to the permanent loss of large swathes of Lebanese territory.
What might the negotiations with Israel look like? A day after the Lebanese delegation met with the U.S. envoy Morgan Ortagus on December 3, there were unconfirmed media reports that the sides had discussed adding more civilian negotiators. Karam is the only civilian in the current team of military officers, though the communique from the presidential palace announcing his appointment pointedly stated that he would “head” the Lebanese delegation. This was a very different formulation from the Lebanese position recently, in which Beirut agreed to add civilians to the negotiating team, but only as technical advisers. Now, not only is a civilian officially leading the delegation, but in light of this, any eventual decision to add civilians would have to be interpreted in a more expansive way than that of providing technical assistance.
The Israelis are certainly aware that the Lebanese army’s capacity to use force to disarm Hezbollah is very limited. Yet the assumption that Israel’s principal aim is to disarm the party may be misstating their thinking. Definitely, this remains a primary objective, but it’s probably also true that Israel is looking to completely alter the broader Lebanese environment in which Hezbollah and Iran have been able to anchor themselves. In other words, what they want is to create a new reality in the south, one in which Israel can impose security guarantees to its liking, as it has done in Gaza and Syria, but also embark on a wider process of normalization that ends the very possibility of cross-border attacks, namely through some form of agreement with Lebanon.
In light of this, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s naming of Uri Reznik to head the Israeli team, as Karam’s counterpart, was revealing. In appointing him, the Israelis portrayed the negotiations as “an initial attempt to establish a basis for a relationship and economic cooperation between Israel and Lebanon.” The focus on economics was also present in a statement after the first meeting, which the Israelis said “was held in a positive atmosphere [in which] the parties agreed to work on ideas for a potential economic cooperation …” even if they did add, “Israel made it clear that Hezbollah must be disarmed regardless of advancing economic cooperation.”
The focus on economics was interesting, both because the Lebanese have made it a point to say they will not be discussing economic issues, and because it may hark back to a proposal the former U.S. envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, brought with him last August. He reportedly suggested the creation of an economic zone in the south that would generate economic opportunities and supposedly provide the inhabitants with an incentive to abandon Hezbollah. The Barrack scheme, like many ideas floated by the erratic envoy, has fallen off the radar, but it may initially have come from Israel’s former strategic affairs minister, Ron Dermer. Is this what the Israelis were thinking of in their statement, or was Netanyahu talking about oil exploration, as one Lebanese analyst who previously advised Lebanon’s prime minister claimed?
One thing Karam may have to watch out for is the fact that the Israelis will come to the negotiations from oblique angles that touch on, but do not directly address, Hezbollah’s disarmament. They would do so to steadily break down the Lebanese refusal to expand negotiations to topics that might indicate normalization. Ironically, staying away from Hezbollah’s weapons might relieve the Lebanese, who don’t want to be pushed into a corner on the matter. For Lebanon, the three main demands will be an Israeli withdrawal from the south, border demarcation, and the return of Lebanese held in Israeli prisons. If Israel refuses to discuss these subjects until there is progress on Hezbollah’s arms, it poses risks. When negotiations are deadlocked, one way out is to widen the scope of the discussion to find breakthroughs. But what that means is the Lebanese may lose control of the agenda. Another way is for one side, in this case Israel, to raise the level of violence and bludgeon the adversary into accepting its conditions.
Karam’s main task will be to preserve as much as he can of Lebanese sovereignty, while also limiting the scope of what is discussed to avoid a domestic backlash from both Berri and Hezbollah. A key part of his role will be to keep the speaker onside, knowing that Berri is far more flexible about disarming Hezbollah than is the party. In early November, Hezbollah issued an open letter affirming its opposition to disarmament and negotiations with Israel. It addressed the letter to the president, prime minister, and the speaker, which doubtless stung Berri. However, one thing Karam is not is a Mount Lebanon Maronite with a limited grasp of Shiite concerns; he’s from the southern town of Jezzine, cultivates the legacy of his late uncle Jean Aziz, a Chehabist minister and parliamentarian, and has longstanding relations with figures in the Shiite community, even if his ties with Hezbollah are not particularly good. In other words, he probably has what it takes to work with Berri if it is necessary to do so.
By appointing Karam, the president, prime minister, and speaker have handed him a poisoned gift—recognizing his experience but also making him a lightning rod if the talks go sour. However, unlike Antoine Fattal, the lead Lebanese negotiator with Israel in 1982–1983, who disappeared into the night after the May 17, 1983 accord was abandoned, Karam has several things going for him: Most Lebanese are fed up with the way Hezbollah has transformed their country into a battleground with Israel, which has led to two pointless wars from which Lebanon has gained nothing and lost much; this time, negotiations are quietly supported by a key Shiite figure with a large following; and five years after Lebanon’s financial collapse, most people simply want a functional state that can improve their standard of living, not a garrison state that sustains an independent militia alongside the Lebanese army. Karam will have to turn these realities to his advantage if he wants to succeed in his mission.
