• Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Middle East logoCarnegie lettermark logo
LebanonIran
{
  "authors": [
    "Shlomo Avineri"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "MEP",
  "programs": [
    "Middle East"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Middle East",
    "Israel",
    "Palestine"
  ],
  "topics": []
}
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

In The Media

Letter to Edward Said

In light of the failed Oslo Peace Accords and other events that have transpired since, Edward Said's support for an Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Palestinian territories, rather than reaching a Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, was not only pragmatic, but it was right.

Link Copied
By Mr. Shlomo Avineri
Published on Oct 22, 2000

Source: The Jerusalem Post

For those of us in Israel who thought that an eventual Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement would never wholly satisfy either side, but nevertheless give each a place in the sun, Oslo was the ray of hope. It has now been extinguished.

Back in l970, I published (in Commentary, then still a liberal journal) a plea for an Israeli approach to the PLO, and called for Israel to negotiate a two-state solution with the Palestinians.

Many Israeli moderates, still committed to what was then called the "Jordanian option," thought this ill-advised; still others considered a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza a mortal danger to Israel. And for its part, the PLO was steadfast in its position of total rejection of Israel and of compromise.

Over the years positions have softened: because of our realization of the limits of our country's power; because of the intifada; because of the Palestinian leadership's opting for half a loaf, over hopeless moral absolutism, Oslo became possible. We imagined it the breakthrough to an historical compromise.

We have endured many vicissitudes since Oslo: the assassination of prime minister Yitzhak Rabin; the massive bomb attacks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv; the election of prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu; and the stalemate in the peace process - you know all this.

But those of us who believed, not only in the possibility, but also in the moral justice of an historical compromise, never lost hope that the process, for all its flaws and ambiguities, would continue - and that reason and moderation would persevere.

You, on the other hand, joined the Rejection Front. For you, anything short of a total Palestinian nationalist victory - i.e. the elimination of Israel - was unacceptable.

Many of us thought that you were being obtuse, morally irresponsible, and just out of touch with the newly emerging reality of reconciliation. We also thought - and hoped - that your views, harking back to the '60s and '70s, would end up in the dustbin of history. We thought that when fighters like Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat and Rabin reach out to each other, intellectual absolutists like you become redundant. Or so we hoped.

But we were wrong. Last summer at Camp David, Arafat rejected the most generous offer ever made to a Palestinian leader by an Israeli statesman. As you know, Barak wagered his political future on these concessions, and lost his parliamentary majority in the process. Of course, what Barak offered was less than the Palestinian Authority's demands.

Arafat rejected them, and it appeared the Palestinian leadership behaved once more as it had in l947, when it first passed up an opportunity to have a Palestinian state, albeit only in part of historical Palestine. We all know how difficult compromises are: but they are the test of a statesman.

Likud leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount should never have taken place, and it was conceived in bad faith, in order to undermine the agreement. But then both you and Sharon believe that coexistence is impossible, that it is a zero-sum game, that a win-win
situation is impossible.

And when Arafat did not restrain the Palestinian population - and one can understand their anger and frustration - it suddenly dawned on us that we do not have a partner: only an enemy, who cannot even find a humane word when our people are lynched.

Israelis understand your pain; and the sight of Palestinian stone-throwing teenagers being shot at by Israeli soldiers causes anguish and soul-searching in Israel.

No such soul-searching occurred on the Palestinian side. What came out - on the streets, among the Palestinian elite on CNN - was sheer hatred, and a fundamental rejection of Israel.

You were right, Edward: The compromise did not work. It was tried - despite your voice, despite the voice of Ariel Sharon. Yet it has now failed.

But now we know: there is no such thing as a Palestinian leadership with whom an agreement can be reached. We are at war - and you have been its clarion voice. You, at least, are honest.

Somehow, we shall have to pick up the pieces. Israel will have to decide how to withdraw unilaterally from most of the Palestinian territories, because we should not and cannot hold on to them. Your people will then have an oppotunity to have state of their own - it should have been achieved through an agreement, but if an agreement is impossible - better a unilateral action that leads to Palestinian statehood, than the continuation of the illusion of historical compromise.

And your voice, Edward, will always haunt us from the heart of the darkness which you so eloquently recognize and describe. Thanks again for your honesty.

The writer, a professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is currently a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Said, a professor of English and literature at Columbia University, is a leading spokesman for the Palestinian cause.

About the Author

Mr. Shlomo Avineri

Former Visiting Scholar

    Recent Work

  • Other
    A Realistic U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

      Mr. Shlomo Avineri

  • Report
    Israel-Russia Relations

      Mr. Shlomo Avineri

Mr. Shlomo Avineri
Former Visiting Scholar
Middle EastIsraelPalestine

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    What Is Israel’s Plan in Lebanon?

    At heart, to impose unconditional surrender on Hezbollah and uproot the party among its coreligionists.

      Yezid Sayigh

  • people watching smoke rising at sunrise from rooftops
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Bombing Campaigns Do Not Bring About Democracy. Nor Does Regime Change Without a Plan.

    Just look at Iraq in 1991.

      Marwan Muasher

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Axis of Resistance or Suicide?

    As Iran defends its interests in the region and its regime’s survival, it may push Hezbollah into the abyss.

      Michael Young

  • GCC foreign minister meeting in Kuwait City on June 2, 2025
    Article
    Can the Gulf Cooperation Council Transcend Its Divisions?

    Without structural reform, the organization, which is racked by internal rivalries, risks sliding into irrelevance.

      Hesham Alghannam

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    What Gaza Showed Us

    The conflict did not reshape Arab foreign policy; on the contrary it exposed its limits.

      • Angie Omar

      Angie Omar

Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Carnegie Middle East logo, white
  • Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.