Other
- +18
James M. Acton, Saskia Brechenmacher, Cecily Brewer, …
{
"authors": [
"James M. Acton"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy",
"Entanglement"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"East Asia",
"China",
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Nuclear Policy",
"Global Governance",
"Foreign Policy",
"Technology"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.
Published on Aug 8, 2018
Source: International Security
Abstract
Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of “entanglement” between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: “misinterpreted warning” or the “damage-limitation window.” The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.
Preface
Since first publishing this article, it has become clear to me that one of my arguments risks being misunderstood as implying that the United States has the capability to successfully undermine China’s or Russia’s nuclear deterrents. I argue that if the United States became concerned that its nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence system was about to be attacked, it “could worry that its window of opportunity for conducting effective damage-limitation operations might have closed by the time the war turned nuclear.” I further argue that this concern—which I term the “damage-limitation window”—could spark escalation.
My point here is not that the United States has the capability to conduct effective damage-limitation operations. In fact, I have long argued that, today and for the foreseeable future, the United States could not deprive either China or Russia of its second-strike capability. Nonetheless, the United States openly acknowledges that it plans for damage-limitation operations. Even though these operations would almost certainly prove ineffective, in a large-scale conflict, decisionmakers might be reluctant to abandon the option of conducting them (not least because political leaders might not fully understand the full extent of their probable ineffectiveness). For this reason, the damage-limitation window could prove escalatory even as China and Russia retain survivable second-strike capabilities.
This preface was added based on feedback received after publication.
This article was originally published in International Security.
About the Author
James M. Acton
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Unpacking Trump’s National Security Strategy
- Trump Has an Out on Nuclear Testing. He Should Take It.Commentary
James M. Acton
Recent Work
SecurityNuclear PolicyGlobal GovernanceForeign PolicyTechnologyNorth AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaChinaRussia
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
- What Does the Strait of Hormuz’s Closure Mean?Commentary
In an interview, Roger Diwan discusses where the global economy may be going in the third week of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.
Nur Arafeh
- Tehran’s Easy TargetsCommentary
In an interview, Andrew Leber discusses the impact the U.S. and Israeli war against Iran is having on Arab Gulf states.
Michael Young
- The Gulf Conflict and the South CaucasusCommentary
In an interview, Sergei Melkonian discusses Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s careful balancing act among the United States, Israel, and Iran.
Armenak Tokmajyan
- Syria Skirts the Conflict With IranCommentary
In an interview, Kheder Khaddour explains that Damascus is trying to stabilize its borders, but avoiding war isn’t guaranteed.
Michael Young
- Israel’s Forever WarsCommentary
The country’s strategy is no longer focused on deterrence and diplomacy, it’s about dominance and degradation.
Nathan J. Brown
