It’s been almost two years since the Kremlin launched what it terms its “special military operation” against Ukraine, and most Russians have learned to cope with wartime pressures by distancing themselves as much as possible from what is unfolding on the battlefield.

Carnegie Politika podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Center in Moscow, and Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, to discuss their new paper for Carnegie Endowment, "Alternate Reality: How Russian Society Learned to Stop Worrying About the War."

Carnegie Politika podcast host Alex Gabuev is joined by Denis Volkov, director of the Levada Center in Moscow, and Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, to discuss their new paper for Carnegie Endowment, "Alternate Reality: How Russian Society Learned to Stop Worrying About the War."

Many Russians equate their country with the political regime that rules it, and believe it is their duty to support the state’s actions. This belief and the limited impact the war in Ukraine has had on the day-to-day lives of most Russians go some way to explaining continuing high levels of support for the war among Russians.

Rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict in Ukraine has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect.

Moscow-based Carnegie Endowment Senior Fellow Andrei Kolesnikov and Levada Center director Denis Volkov sit down to discuss their latest paper and its implications for Russian society.

The prevailing attitude among members of the ruling class appears to be that there is enough oil and gas to keep the state coffers full, buy voters’ loyalty, and control civil society and the media for as long as the country’s current leaders are in power. What comes after that does not concern them—to quote Madam de Pompadour: “After us, the deluge.”

Russia faces a litany of long-term economic challenges that will hobble its growth potential but likely won’t be severe enough to force far-reaching political change.

The Kremlin has consistently failed to define its vision of Russia’s future. But what about the Russian public?

What are the challenges to Putin’s system? How stable is the Putin majority? What do the domestic protests mean? What signals do the protests in Belarus send to Russia’s elites and civil society? What impact will the attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny have? A seminar held by Carnegie Moscow Center and the Embassy of Finland in Russia addressed these questions and much more.